本文主旨在於探討「運用升遷機制來解決道德風險」的效率問題；並以國內大學升等制度為例加以說明。分別建立齊一能力與異質能力二模型，論述「淘汰升等制」與「留任升等制」所產生的效果。結果證明，能力相等時，若採「淘汰升等制」，教師之努力程度反而下降；能力有差別時，採「淘汰升等制」，更能顯現出經濟效率，此時高、低能力教師之努力程度皆因而提升。此外，在異質能力模型下，可以觀測到齊一能力模型所沒有的「心力帶動效果」－高能力教師之努力程度的升降帶動低能力教師之努力程度的同向變動。

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1 緒論………………………………………………………………………………………3
1.1 前言…………………………………………………………………………………3
1.2 國內大學採行「淘汰升等制」與各級教師比例變動的概況……………………4
1.2.1 國內一般大學採用「淘汰升等制」之情況………………………………4
1.2.2 探討國內大學各級教師之比例概況………………………………………8
1.3 研究文獻回顧………………………………………………………………………13

2齊一能力下的升等制度…………………………………………………………………18
2.1不補足第二期職缺的淘汰升等制模型…………………………………………20
2.2補足第二期職缺的淘汰升等制模型………………………………………………23
2.3留任升等制…………………………………………………………………………26
2.3.1不升等不晉薪………………………………………………………………26
2.3.2不升等仍晉薪………………………………………………………………27

3異質能力下的升等制度…………………………………………………………………30
3.1不補足第二期職缺的淘汰升等制模型……………………………………………32
3.2補足第二期職缺的淘汰升等制模型………………………………………………36
3.3留任升等制…………………………………………………………………………39
3.3.1不升等不晉薪………………………………………………………………39
3.3.2不升等仍晉薪………………………………………………………………41

4齊一能力與異質能力下的升等制度之比較……………………………………………43
4.1齊一能力與異質能力下的升等制度之比較……………………………………43
4.2齊一能力模型與異質能力模型之淘汰升等制的比較………………………44

5結論………………………………………………………………………………………47

參考文獻………………………………………………………………………………49

附錄………………………………………………………………………………51

林忠正 (2000)，中央研究院經濟所升等續聘辦法的經濟分析，行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫(計畫編號：NSC89-2415-H-001-014)。
林忠正 (2006)，懲罰怠惰、流失人才-升等續聘辦法標準的經濟分析，行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫(計畫編號：NSC94-2415-H-001-009)。
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