本文旨在探討賄賂行為之發生，在逃漏稅活動中，對於納稅人與稅務員，以及稅務員與司法人員間之交互關係及行為效應所造成之影響。
在研究模式之建立部份，主要採用Jean Hindriks, Michael Keen, Abhinay Muthoo (1999) 所建立納稅人與稅務員之間對立關係的模型為基礎，假設納稅人不誠實申報所得被發現時，納稅人面對逃稅利益可能消失，主動提出賄賂金的提供，視稅務員是否禁得起金錢的誘惑。並從中納入賄賂循環，進而建立以有限動態賽局為模型之整體分析架構。另進一步探討，在稅務員運用行政裁量權向違法的納稅人訛詐賄賂金的要求下，稅務員與納稅人之間策略關係的策略組合，並強調納稅人與稅務員之間存在共謀關係。
經由以上的分析，本研究所獲得的主要結論如下：逃稅是非法活動也是犯罪的行為，納稅人行賄就是稅務員貪污，貪污減少的有效方法是加重對逃稅者的懲罰。納稅人逃漏稅被發現，要加重納稅人預期補稅罰款的金額，使得納稅人一旦被發現有不誠實申報所得，必需接受補稅罰款的事實，避免對稅務員行賄，貪污行為才不會發生。為杜絕賄賂循環的發生，要加重司法人員的預期懲罰，司法人員拒絕收賄，貪污行為才會停止。然而在租稅徵收過程中，政府賦予稅務員充分的行政裁量權，納稅人於申報所得之後，實際應課稅額仰賴稅務員向政府申報之查核報告書的決定，為遏止稅務員貪污的念頭，加重對稅務員的預期懲罰，同時提高逃稅者的懲罰，使得納稅人在面對稅務員的訛詐時，考量懲罰的因素，而拒絕行賄。
總之，在租稅徵收過程中，稅務員濫用職權以包庇逃稅行為是逃稅的重要原因。因此控制貪污的直接有效方法是加重納稅人逃稅的懲罰。

This essay examines the behavior of tax evasion and bribery and the result of interaction among taxpayers, tax auditors and juridical officials.

This study is based on the established theory of Jean Hindriks, Michael Keen and Abhinay Muthoo(1999), and focuses on the opposing relationship between taxpayers and tax auditors. If taxpayers report their income untruthfully and are discovered by tax auditors, they might offer bribe to cover the illegal conduct. It’s also a temptation to tax auditors. Then it leads to a cycle of bribery. The analysis is based on a finite dynamic game. It explores further the situation where auditors abuse the administrative authority to extort bribe from unlawful taxpayers. It discusses the strategic and colluding relationship between auditors and taxpayers.

The main discovery of the analysis is as follows. Tax evasion is not only an illegal but also criminal act. Besides, tax evasion and corruption coexist. If taxpayers are found bribery for tax evasion and that means tax auditors have committed corruption. The best effective way to prevent corruption is to increase penalty for tax evasion. Taxpayers should be educated if they commit tax evasion, they will be imposed both taxation and penalty. If there is no bribe, the corruption of tax auditors will decrease. On the other hand, it is also necessary to make severer punishment for corruption so that auditors will dare not to receive the bribe. During the process of taxation, auditors are delegated sufficient administrative authority. After declaring income tax, the actual amount of personal taxation depends on the check report auditors hand in. Therefore, in order to prevent tax evasion and corruption, we should make more severe punishment for unlawful auditors and taxpayers.

In conclusion, the main reason for tax evasion is that auditors abuse the authority and cover up the illegality. Therefore, the most direct and effective method of decreasing corruption is to increase penalty for the act of tax evasion.

誌 謝 i
摘 要 ii
Abstract iii
第一章 緒 論 1
第一節 研究動機及目的 1
第二節 研究流程及本文架構 3
第二章 文獻回顧 5
第一節 逃稅文獻 5
第二節 貪污文獻 8
第三章 納稅人與稅務員之間策略關係--納稅人首先行動 12
第一節 基本假設 12
第二節 賽局的行動順序(圖二) 12
第三節 模型 15
第四節 模型分析 16
第五節 政策涵意 25
第四章 稅務員與納稅人之間策略關係--稅務員首先行動 28
第一節 基本假設 28
第二節 賽局的行動順序(圖六) 28
第三節 模型 31
第四節 模型分析 31
第五節 政策涵意 35
第五章 結論與實務涵意 37
第一節 結論 37
第二節 實務涵意 38
參考文獻 40

圖 目 錄
圖一：研究流程圖 3
圖二：納稅人、稅務員、司法人員逃稅賄賂賽局 14
圖三：稅務員行賄子賽局 17
圖四：納稅人行賄子賽局 19
圖五：納稅人申報的子賽局 21
圖六：稅務員與納稅人策略關係---稅務員首先行動 30

一、中文部份：
1. 何嘉雯，「賄賂行為與不完全執法之經濟分析」，淡江大學產業經濟研究所碩士論文， 民國89年。
2. 朱敬一、朱筱蕾，「臺灣地下經濟的成因與指標分析---DYMIMIC模型的應用」，經濟論文 第16卷第2期，1988，頁137-170。
3. 朱敬一，「臺灣營利事業所得稅逃漏稅的成因與指標---MIMIC模型的應用」，臺大經濟論文叢刊 第16卷第4期，1989，頁481-498。
4. 李鐵橋，「國稅政風單位角色之研究與執行成效分析—以南區國稅局為例」，義守大學管理科學研究所碩士論文，民國91年。
5. 曾秀惠，「租稅逃避與貪污行為的經濟分析」，逢甲大學經濟研究所碩士論文， 民國90年。
6. 張維迎著；劉楚俊編校，「賽局理論與信息經濟學」，台北市：茂昌圖書有限公司，民國88年。

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