本文的目的在於建立模型來說明台灣的大學入學制度現況，並加以研究分析。研究方法主要採用Gale and Shapley建立之大學入學許可問題，以及Balinski and Sonmez提出的學生配置問題，加以修正以貼近台灣的現實狀況，分別為申請入學問題和考試分發問題。結果發現：1. 在94學年度以前的機制下，不考慮時間限制的申請入學可能會產生循環的問題，我們建議使用首位交易循環機制來解決這個窘境。2. 在94學年度以前的機制下，不考慮時間限制且不存在循環的申請入學所產生的配對和學生最適穩定配對相同。3. 95學年度之後的申請入學機制有可能被學生操縱。4. 在95學年度之後的機制下，甄選入學所產生的配對和大學最適穩定配對相同。5. 考試分發的機制和土耳其的大學入學機制相同，雖然是公平的，但是考慮學生單方的福利，考試分發的結果不是效率的。

This paper extends respectively Gale-Shapley’s model and Balinski-Sonmez’s model to analyze the college admission problem and the student placement problem in the case of Taiwan. Given the assumption that time is not considered as a critical dimension of this issue, it is argued that Taiwan’s admission mechanism is in accordance with the criterion of the student optimal stable mechanism with number restriction. As well, the outcome of Taiwan’s admission mechanism exhibits features which are similar to that of the student optimal stable matching with number restriction. However, with regard to Taiwan’s student placement mechanism, it is demonstrated that inefficiency may prevail.

目錄 頁次

第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………………….….1
第一節 研究動機………………………………………………………….….1
第二節 研究目的與方法………………………………………………….….1
第二章 文獻回顧……………………………………………………………….….3
第三章 申請入學與考試分發的模型……………………………………………..6
第一節 申請入學……………………………………………………………..8
第二節 考試分發……………………………………………………………20
第四章 結論與建議………………………………………………………………28
參考文獻………………………………………………………………………….….30

參考文獻
一、中文文獻
大學招生委員會聯合會大學甄選入學委員會編，96學年度大學甄選入學招生簡章彙編，嘉義：大學甄選入學委員會，2006年。
大學招生委員會聯合會大學考試入學分發委員會編，96學年度大學入學考試入學分發招生簡章，台南：大學考試入學分發委員會，2006年。
黃詩婷、劉楚俊，台灣大學入學制度效率判準的評估，高雄：2007年海峽兩岸經濟、產業、環境與管理青年論壇，2007年。
二、英文文獻
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