本篇論文研究在考量政府懲戒機率之下，跨國企業使其整體利潤極大的最佳移轉訂價。因為移轉訂價是企業內部所訂定的價格，企業有相當多的操作空間去訂定使得利潤極大的移轉價格，同時也有誘因去規避政府徵收的所得稅與交易稅。為了降低企業人為操作移轉價格的空間，以及站在課稅公平以及保障稅收的立場，許多國家也參照OECD之跨國企業與稅捐機構移轉訂價指導原則，訂定不合常規移轉訂價之相關法規。當跨國企業所訂定之移轉訂價極度不符常規交易原則時，額外徵收的加重補稅將用來懲戒企業。因此當國家與國家之間的稅率有所不同時，跨國企業所選擇的移轉訂價將會在利潤移轉的利益和政府懲戒的損失之間做權衡。
　　我們考量了三種機率型態，用以捕捉跨國企業操作移轉價格被抓到之可能懲戒。在直線與二次方之機率型態之下，我們找到模型對應下的最佳封閉解；而在沒有封閉解的指數型機率分配下，我們利用數值模擬找到模型對應下之模擬解。

　　This paper studies the MNE’s choice of the optimal transfer price with the consideration of the possibility of transfer pricing penalty. Because the transfer prices are determined in-house, there are opportunities for MNE to manipulate the prices and evade corporate income tax and trade taxes. To reduce these opportunities, most governments have implemented transfer pricing regulations based on the OECD guidelines. If the MNE’s manipulation of transfer prices is too flagrant, an extra tax will be levied to penalize the MNE. As long as the tax rates are different in different jurisdictions, the MNE will pick transfer prices that balance between the gain from profit shifting and the loss coming from the possible penalty.
　　Three forms of probability are introduced to capture the possibility of being penalized when the MNE tries to manipulate the transfer prices. We find close form solutions under the linear and quadratic forms of probability. And numerical simulation is used to get the optimal transfer price under the exponential form of probability.

I. Introduction 6
1.1 Background 6
1.2 Motivation of this study 8
1.3 Purposes of this study 9
II. Literature review 10
2.1 Literature regarding transfer pricing for multinational firms operating in different tax jurisdictions 10
2.2 Literature regarding theoretical analysis of transfer prices and taxation 11
2.3 Literature regarding possible penalty of transfer pricing manipulation 13
III. The Model 16
3.1 Setup 16
3.2 The Extended Models with the Transfer Pricing Penalty 18
3.3 The Extended Models with the Possibility of Transfer Pricing Penalty 20
3.3.1 The linear form of probability of transfer pricing penalty 20
3.3.2 The quadratic form of probability of transfer pricing penalty 24
3.3.3 The exponential form of probability of transfer pricing penalty 27
3.4 Existence of external market 34
IV. Conclusions 36
References 37
Appendix 39
Appendix A：The close form solutions under the linear form of probability of transfer pricing penalty 39
Appendix B：The close form solutions under the quadratic form of probability of transfer pricing penalty 40
Appendix C：The simulation and proofs under the exponential form of probability of transfer pricing penalty 43

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