本文探討在考量市場具有多元消費外部性，雙品牌之廠商如何決定其商品的最適廣告配置，並提供行銷策略之理論基礎。假設市場為具有多元消費外部性，而廣告在其市場所扮演的資訊角色將因消費者類型不同而有所差異，有別於過去市場上消費者齊一的假設和廣告角色的扮演，進而重新審視廠商的最適廣告策略。最後，我們發現廠商面對不同消費者類型之組合比例，廠商的訂價、廣告配置與行銷策略將會有不同的影響。若市場為相異之多元消費外部性此現象更為明顯；相反地，若市場為相似之多元消費外部性則廠商的最適策略為單一策略，即是不受消費者類型之組合比例影響。

The aim of the paper is to investigate how the dual brand of firm decides its optimal allocation of advertising and fundamental strategy of marketing under taking account of markets with multi-consumption externalities. We assume that the market is multi-consumption externalities, and advertising may function as a device to coordinate consumer expectations of the purchasing decisions of other consumers, which is different from the past assumption that consumer type is single and role of advertising in market. Therefore, we reexamine the firm with optimal allocation of advertising. Finally, we show that the firm will adapt different pricing, allocation of advertising and strategy of marketing when facing the different consumer type of combination proportion. If market is dissimilar consumption externalities, above statement will be more significant; On the contrary, if firm facing similar consumption externalities, the optimal is single strategy. In other words, it is independent to consumer's type of combination proportion.

目錄
第一章 緒論 1
第 一 節 研究動機與目的 1
第 二 節 本文架構 3
第二章 文獻回顧 4
第 一 節 空間與廣告之競爭模型 4
第 二 節 消費外部性 7
2.2.1 消費者外部性說明與定義 7
2.2.2 消費者類型之模型探討 10
第三章 理論模型 12
第 一 節 模型假設與設定 12
第 二 節 均衡策略說明 15
第 三 節 市場型態一 15
3.3.1均衡策略 16
3.3.2 比較靜態分析 22
第 四 節 市場型態二 27
3.4.1 均衡策略 27
第四章 結論與建議 32
參考文獻 35
附錄 38
附錄A 38
附錄B 44
附錄C 46

圖目錄
圖 1.市場型一之比例結構 18
圖 2.型III- 結構 24
圖 3.型III- 結構 24
表目錄
表 1. 型1-I環境的比較靜態 23
表 2. 型1-II環境的比較靜態 23
表 3. 型1-III環境的比較靜態 25
表 4. 市場型態二的比較靜態 30

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