外購軍品裝備表面上可省去研發及生產的投資，對裝備獲得成本及時間成本有利，但無法隨著科技進步而隨時更新。在彌補裝備不足前提下獲得軍事裝備，雖能滿足國防需求，但這種追求短期利益的政策及龐大外國軍品採購預算的排擠效應，對國防科技能力、民生工業乃至台灣長遠經濟發展皆無法有正面影響。因此就長期利益而言，使研究開發能力持續累積，創造軍民合作雙贏局面，是一個重要的議題。
在現今軍事採購市場，已將不具機敏性及非核心軍事裝備釋出由民間承接生產及研發的情況下，本文設定採購協商過程若建構在雙方喊價拍賣模型(Chatterjee and Samuelson,1983)上，我們可得到當廠商想要提高效用時，不僅是要提供給政府最迫切需求的軍品裝備，更重要的是要降低生產成本。同樣的，政府若是想要提高效用，主要方法是要改進自己對軍用品的評價。於是，政府與廠商可以透過評估與測試得知現今台灣對軍用品最迫切的需求方向，爾後進行研發合作，如此一來可以提高第一期軍用品裝備的評價及降低生產成本，藉以提高效用。
軍品採購市場符合雙方喊價時，政府與廠商為雙邊獨占，當市場存在軍事裝備二次採購(reprocurement)，他們可以試圖達成一個有約束力的契約，雙方按照協議生產最大化聯合壟斷利潤，即可構成合作賽局。本文考慮在喊價模型之後引進研發合作契約，將原來只有一期的喊價模型，擴展為後續仍有研發合作契約的兩階段賽局。文中證明研發契約的加入，將提高雙方喊價模型的交易機率，亦有助於提升彼此的效用。然而，研發契約機制的引進雖然可以使得雙邊市場的交易機率增加，卻有機會讓不適任廠商進入採購喊價市場，影響國家整體福利。也就是後續研發契約的機制，符合無效率定理。

If the market of military procurement conforms to the double auction (Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1983), the government and the manufacturer can try to reach a binding agreement and maximize the monopoly profit. When they both comply with the agreement, the game constitutes a cooperative game. The government and the firm can extend the periods of the game from one to two through signing the research and development contract. When they carry out the research and development contract in the second phase, the trading probability in the first phase that is double auction model will rise.
However the R&D contract causes an increase of transaction probability, the market offers an opportunity let the ineligible manufacturer participate in the defense procurement. We can find the trade-off relationship between the advancement of trading probability and the appearances of unqualified firm. The result is consistent with Inefficiency theorem that an incentive-compatible mechanism which is ex post efficient will not be individual theorem.

第壹章 緒論
1.1研究目的與動機 1
1.2研究方法與架構 4
第貳章 理論與文獻回顧
2.1拍賣理論 5
2.2 Nash議價賽局 8
2.3軍事採購文獻與研發合作契約 10
第参章 政府與廠商喊價模型
3.1基本理論模型假設 15
3.2 雙方喊價拍賣的均衡解 17
3.2.1政府與廠商的最適策略選擇 17
3.2.2政府與廠商交易區域的決定 20
3.2.3政府與廠商交易進行時的效用 22
第肆章 後續附有研發合作契約的雙邊喊價模型
4.1引進政府與廠商間的研發合作契約 24
4.1.1雙方研發合作契約的機制設計 25
4.1.2廠商誘因相容的決定 27
4.1.3政府與廠商的最適研發合作契約 28
4.2後續附有研發合作契約的喊價模型均衡解 31
4.2.1修正後的雙邊喊價模型 31
4.2.2修正後政府與廠商的最適策略 32
4.3後續附有研發合作契約的喊價模型分析比較 36
4.3.1引進研發合作契約後雙方最適策略的分析 36
4.3.2引進研發合作契約後交易區域與效用的分析 37
第伍章 結論與建議
5.1結論 45
5.2未來研究方向 47
參考文獻 48
附錄 51

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