Responsive image
博碩士論文 etd-0630110-154625 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-0630110-154625
論文名稱
Title
股東會委託書對公司經營權及公司營運,公司治理影響之研究- 以C公司為例
A Study of Shareholders Meeting Proxy's Impact on Corporate Management, Operation, and Governance - Case Study of C company
系所名稱
Department
畢業學年期
Year, semester
語文別
Language
學位類別
Degree
頁數
Number of pages
82
研究生
Author
指導教授
Advisor
召集委員
Convenor
口試委員
Advisory Committee
口試日期
Date of Exam
2010-05-27
繳交日期
Date of Submission
2010-06-30
關鍵字
Keywords
董事選舉提名制、委託書、公司治理、董監選舉、經營權、電子與通信投票
proxy, corporate governance, board election, board election nomination system, electronic voting, management
統計
Statistics
本論文已被瀏覽 5630 次,被下載 0
The thesis/dissertation has been browsed 5630 times, has been downloaded 0 times.
中文摘要
中文摘要
本國公司法規定,公司召開股東會須有公司發行股份百分之五十之股權出席,同時也規定,股東得於每次股東會,出具公司印發的委託書,載明授權範圍,委託代理人出席股東會。國內上市櫃公司股權逐步分散,一些中大型且上市已久的公司,董監大股東持股平均不到百分之二十,要順利召開股東會,通過議案及選舉董監事,很自然的就要依靠委託書的徵求。
公司營運、公司治理的良窳身繫於經營者的優劣,國內上市櫃公司目前尚無法做到所有權與經營權分離,誰取得經營權,誰就是經營者。由於國內上市櫃公司之董監大股東持有股份一般不高,且徵求委託書的成本遠較購入股權為低,而散戶股東多不關心委託書的權益,故大股東常藉重委託書選上較多董事席次,取得經營權。故委託書遂成為左右上市櫃公司經營權與公司營運、公司治理的重要工具。
委託書使經營者持有少數股權却取得經營權,使投入成本與擁有的之經營權利不對稱,容易衍生公司治理的問題;但委託書也幫助公司順利召開股東會,且成為正派公司捍衛經營權的利器。委託書具有優缺點,對於公司及整體經濟運作頗為重要。本文以C公司為研究個案,同時比照數家公司之案例,探討委託書對公司經營權、公司營運、公司治理的影響,並歸納出委託書的正負面效應,和針對負面的效應提出解決的建議。
研究結果發現,目前上市櫃公司倚賴委託書程度頗深,上市櫃公司大股東無論正派與否,大部份皆有進行委託書之徵求,並取得與持股不相稱的董監席位。但後續的公司營運與公司治理則與委託書之徵求無必然關聯,端視經營者的誠信與良心。但委託書由於充滿以小搏大的經營權槓桿效益,仍是衍生公司不治理的潛在因子,主管機關欲導正委託書不公平的現象及推動公司治理,必須從基本公司法修改下手,只有頻頻修改委託書使用規則將徒勞無功。本文提出的建議有:

(1)取消公司法股東會須有50%股權出席之規定。(2)徵求之委託書出席股權、表
決權、選舉權數應予打折。(3)積極推動電子與通信投票、法人股東表決權可分割、董事選舉採提名制。(4)改變獨立董事選舉方式,採獨立董事選舉非以表彰股權之選舉權數投票,而改以表彰股東人頭數之選舉權投票。提供予主管機關參考。
















關鍵字:委託書、公司治理、董監選舉、經營權、電子與通信投票、董事選舉提名制
Abstract
Abstract
According to the Company Act, to convene a regular shareholder’s meeting, a majority of the shareholders who represent more than 50% of the total number of the company’s outstanding shares shall be present. It is also regulated that a shareholder may stipulate the scope of authority in the proxy issued by the company and appoint a proxy to attend the shareholder’s meeting on his behalf. Due to the dispersion trend of ownership structure of domestic listed companies, where some mid/large-size companies with long histories have, in average, less than 20% of shareholding of board of directors, it seems reasonable for companies to rely on proxy solicitation in order to convene a shareholder’s meeting, have all proposals resolved, and elect board members.
The operation of a business entity and its corporate governance are closely tied to the effectiveness of its top management. However, domestic listed companies in general are unable to separate the ownership and management, and therefore those who obtain the management become the management team of a company. As a result of relatively low shareholding held by major shareholders of domestic listed companies, lower cost of proxy solicitation than buying shares from the market, and less care about proxy rights from individual investors, major shareholders in listed companies intend to win more seats in the board via proxy solicitation in order to obtain management. For the above reasons, proxy solicitation becomes an important tool in determing management of listed companies, their operation and corporate governance.
Proxy makes it possible to obtain the management of a corporate with relatively low shareholdings, resulting in asymmetry in cost and management obtained, and this might pose risks on company’s corporate governance. However, on the other hand, proxy assists convening a shareholder’s meeting, and therefore become an indispensable tool in defending the management of a corporate with honesty and integrity. With all the advantages and disadvantages, proxy is of great importance for individual corporate and overall operation of economy. The research conducts a case study on C Company with references on other listed companies to explore the

impacts of proxy on management and operation of a company and its corporate governance. Pros and cons for proxy solicitation are summarized while solutions are proposed.
The result of the research shows that listed companies demonstrate deep reliance on proxy. Whether or not a listed company conducts business with honesty and good faith, its major shareholder is likely to exploit the advantages to obtain unsymmetrical positions in the board in contrasts with its low shareholding. However, the performance of corporate governance afterward depends on the integrity and conscience of the management team, and actually has no direct link to proxy solicitation. Also, with the “winning betting” nature to achieve management leverage, proxy solicitation could be a possible factor for corporate mis-governance. To avoid the unfairness caused by proxy solicitation and enhance corporate governance, competent authorities must consider revising the Company Act and related laws instead of revising regulations governing proxy solicitation alone. Suggestions in this research include the following:
(1) To abrogate rules in the Company Act providing that “to convene a regular shareholder’s meeting, a majority of the shareholders who represent more than 50% of the total number of the company’s outstanding shares shall be present”. (2) The number of shares present via proxy solicitation, voting right and election right shall be discounted. (3) To promote electronic voting, split of voting rights of institutional shareholders, and adoption of nomination system for the director election. (4) To change the election method of independent directors, where the new method elects the independent director based on the number of voting individual shareholders, rather than the cumulative voting shares.
The suggestions are proposed to provide a reference for competent authorities.


Key words: proxy, corporate governance, board election, management,
electronic voting, board election nomination system
目次 Table of Contents
目 録
頁碼
中文摘要……………………………………………………… i
Abstract……………………………………………………… iii
誌謝詞………………………………………………………… v
目録…………………………………………………………… vi
表目録………………………………………………………… viii
圖目録……………………………………………………… ix 第一章 緒論…… ………………………………………… 1
第一節 研究背景與動機………………………………… 1
第二節 研究目的………………………………………… 4
第三節 研究流程………………………………………… 5
第二章 文獻探討…………………………………………… 6
第一節 公開發行公司使用委託書規則………………… 6
第二節 目前委託書之徵求管道及使用實況…………… 11
第三節 公司治理 ……………………………………… 14
第三章 研究設計……………………………………………… 20
第一節 研究架構………………………………………… 20
第二節 研究個案與資料來源及分析…………………… 21
第三節 研究限制…………………………………………… 21
第四章 資料分析與討論……………………………………… 22
第一節 個案公司背景介紹……………………………… 22
第二節 個案公司股權結構的變動……………………… 24
第三節 個案公司董監結構之變動……………………… 28

第四節 個案公司徵求委託書之情況演變……………… 36
第五節 個案公司營運及盈餘表現之追蹤分析………… 43
第六節 個案公司公司治理表現之追蹤分析…………… 48
第七節 委託書之徵求綜合對經營權、公司營運
及公司治理之影響分析………………………… 53
第八節 委託書之利與弊………………………………… 64
第五章 結論與建議…………………………………………… 67
第一節 結論……………………………………………… 67
第二節 建議……………………………………………… 68
參考文獻……………………………………………………… 72
參考文獻 References
參考文獻
1. C公司,1995~2009,年報、股東會議事手冊、股東會決議録、財務報告、公司章程。
2. C公司網站,http://www.csc.com.tw,2010年3月。
3. 中石化公司,1994,股東會決議録。
4. 中華工程公司,1994,股東會決議録。
5. 中華公司治理協會,2008,「公司治理自我評量表」。
6. 台灣證券交易所公開資訊觀測站網站,http://newmops.tse.com.tw,2010年3月。
7. 林瑛明,1996,「民營化事業公股股權管理之研究」,國立中山大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。
8. 金管會,2007,「公開發行公司使用委託書規則」。
9. 金管會,2006,「公開發行公司獨立董事設置及應遵循事項辦法」。
10. 張漢傑,2007,「破解財務危機」,梅霖文化事業有限公司,4月30日,初版。
11. 葉銀華,2008,「實踐公司治理」,聯經出版社,7月,初版。
12. 賴春田、薛明玲、蔡朝安,2003,「落實公司治理實務守策」,財團法人資誠教育基金會,4月1日,初版。
13. 證券暨期貨市場發展基金會網站,http://free.sfi.org.tw,2010年3月。
電子全文 Fulltext
本電子全文僅授權使用者為學術研究之目的,進行個人非營利性質之檢索、閱讀、列印。請遵守中華民國著作權法之相關規定,切勿任意重製、散佈、改作、轉貼、播送,以免觸法。
論文使用權限 Thesis access permission:校內校外均不公開 not available
開放時間 Available:
校內 Campus:永不公開 not available
校外 Off-campus:永不公開 not available

您的 IP(校外) 位址是 18.218.55.14
論文開放下載的時間是 校外不公開

Your IP address is 18.218.55.14
This thesis will be available to you on Indicate off-campus access is not available.

紙本論文 Printed copies
紙本論文的公開資訊在102學年度以後相對較為完整。如果需要查詢101學年度以前的紙本論文公開資訊,請聯繫圖資處紙本論文服務櫃台。如有不便之處敬請見諒。
開放時間 available 已公開 available

QR Code