在現行所有權與經營權分立的上市公司組織架構中，具有主導企業決策、且必須為經營績效負責的主權者，除了代表所有權的董事長與董事會之外，便屬總經理或其他職稱之最高階經理人最為重要，也因此經理人的選任議題一直是企業管理學門中相當熱門的話題。
就程序上而言，總經理的選任與否及其權責範圍，乃屬於董事會議事範疇。董事會依據企業的策略走向，評估經理人候選人的各項特質和企業需求的適配程度，經董事會內討論而後作出最適人選的決策，因而選任決策的制定不免受到董事會議事品質及時機的影響，未能完全符合理性的策略走向需求。
本研究結合過往文獻探討以及質性訪談成果，推導出三項上市公司選任總經理之選任邏輯，分別為1.社會網絡觀，2.政治權力觀，3.理性才能觀，並收集2003年國內682家上市公司的年報資料，以實證資料驗證各項邏輯假說。統計分析之結果可歸納為以下幾點結論：1.在三項選任邏輯中，社會網絡觀對於選任結果的影響效果最為顯著，政治權力觀次之，理性才能觀則無顯著關係。2.董事長的象徵性權力與股權持有對於總經理人選並無顯著影響力，但董事會席次控制力則與總經理人選有顯著相關。3.總經理的管理才能無法替代社會網絡關係。4.總經理的社會網絡關係及股權持有與其是否參與董事會有正向顯著相關，但董事長的權力和總經理的管理才能則無法影響其參與程度。

Most corporations today have an organizational framework that includes a separation between ownership and management of the company. Along with the Board of Directors, the chief executive officer (CEO) usually has the power to make significant decisions on corporate policy and also takes personal responsibility for the performance of the company. Thus the selection of an optimal CEO is a crucial business decision, and is the focus of this management study.
When undertaking the procedures for CEO succession, the members of the Board must select appropriate candidates for the position, as well as deciding upon the CEO’s job responsibilities. The Board evaluates the extent to which the various candidates’ capabilities and experiences match the needs of the corporation. After discussing the pros and cons of each candidate, the Board selects the most appropriate individual for the position. However, certain circumstances often exist that serve to affect this decision process. Specifically, the quality and timing of Board meetings may have a serious detrimental affect on selecting the optimal candidate.
By analyzing the literature reviews and annual reports of 682 public companies in Taiwan in 2003, three succession logics of selecting a CEO can be observed: 1) social relationship, 2) political power, and 3) rational capability. From these three logics, the following conclusions can be drawn: 1) The social relationship has the most influence on the selection outcome, with political power acting as the second most influential aspect, and management capability as the third; 2) The influence of the Chairman’s abstract power, as well as his ownership of stock, do not have an obvious influence on the selection outcome, though the Chairman’s control over Board seats has a statistically significant impact on CEO selection; 3) A CEO’s social relationship can not be replaced by his management capability; 4) CEO’s social relationship and stock ownership both have high positive correlation with his involvement of the Board, while the Chairman’s power and the CEO’s management capability don’t.

摘要 iii
Abstract iv
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究問題 2
第二章 文獻探討 3
第一節 經理人特質 3
第二節 經理人選任影響因素 6
第三節 經理人選任邏輯 9
第三章 質性訪談 13
第一節 研究架構 13
第二節 訪談結果分析 14
第四章 量化研究 19
第一節 研究架構 19
第二節 研究假說 22
第三節 資料來源與變數定義 25
第五章 實證結果分析 27
第一節 樣本敘述 27
第二節 統計分析 34
第三節 假說驗證與討論 46
第六章 結論與建議 53
第一節 研究結論 53
第二節 研究限制與建議 55
參考文獻 57

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