本文首先討論Varian (2007)位置拍賣所提出之對稱均衡各項性質，並驗證了(1)每位競標者淨效用必不為負。(2)對稱均衡具配置效率與柏拉圖效率。(3)誠實策略不一定存在對稱均衡中，再求出誠實策略存在之必要條件。接著放寬位置拍賣模型假設，提出作用於不完全訊息之重覆同步賽局之反應函數。此反應函數具有以下優點：(1)每回合每位競標者淨效用必不為負。(2)所需資訊相較於以納許均衡或對稱均衡為反應函數者為低，(3)當拍賣位置增加，收斂所需回合數增加比例大幅低於位置增加比例，(4)其判准法則使競標者易於理解，降低進入拍賣障礙。

We discuss main facts of symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE) of position auction proposed by Varian (2007). Then we describe more features in detail, such as (1) non-zero surplus of each bidder, (2) allocative and also Pareto efficiency in SNE and (3)the condition of existence of honest strategy in SNE. After that, we propose a best-response bidding strategy for repeated simultaneous position auction of incomplete information with simulation. This approach offers an explanation that how bidders may follow public information to achieve the same equilibrium of lower bound of SNE in the static model. Furthermore, the best-response bidding strategy has following merits: (1) non-zero surplus of each bidder in each round, (2) low information requirement for each bidder’s calculation, (3) much lower increasing rate of rounds than increasing rate of positions and (4) easier rule for bidders to get started with.

誌　謝 ii
摘　要 iv
目 錄 vi
圖 次 vii
表 次 vii
第一章 緒論.........................................1
第一節 研究背景.................................1
第二節 研究動機與目的.....................2
第三節 本文架構.................................3
第二章 文獻回顧.................................4
第一節 拍賣概觀.................................4
第二節 相關文獻.................................6
第三節 Varian位置拍賣模型簡介...10
第四節 對稱均衡...............................12
第五節 誠實策略...............................16
第三章 研究問題與模型...................20
第一節 模型.......................................20
第二節 設計反應函數.......................21
第三節 模擬結果與分析...................25
第四章 結論與建議...........................32
第一節 研究結論...............................32
第二節 未來研究方向與建議...........34
參考文獻...............................................35

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