本文主要探討在1983年到2015年之間的美國公司中，經理人能力與公司的債務期限之間的關係。我們採用Demerjian等人於2012年的文獻中介紹的MA-score來衡量經理人能力。研究結果發現，經理人能力越好的公司，傾向擁有較短的債務期限，尤其是有財務限制的公司。再者，在經濟衰退期間，經理人能力有效地減少了債務期限的縮短幅度。最後，由於能力越好的經理人能夠透過風險性的營運作為，雖為公司帶來較好的公司績效，但也伴隨著較高的風險。總而言之，我們的實證結果指出，經理人為了將財富從債權人轉移至股東，而從事較風險性的管理，即使未來公司績效表現良好，卻導致債權人認為公司違約風險升高，必須要透過縮短債務期限來達到較高頻率的監督功用。

This study examines the relationship between managerial ability and firms’ debt maturity by adopting MA-score (Demerjian et al., 2012) and book-value weighted numerical estimation of debt maturity in U.S. from 1983 to 2015. Firms with higher managerial ability have shorter maturity of debts, among financial constrained firms in particular. Additionally, managerial ability helps mitigate the impact on debt maturity during recession period. At last, preference for risk-taking activities namely along with higher risk emerges due to higher managerial ability and this contributes to better firm performance. Overall, the results imply that managers transfer wealth from creditors to shareholders through riskier behavior, which forces creditors to supervise firms with higher managerial ability more frequently by means of shortening maturity of debts.

論文審定書…………………………………………………………………...………… i
摘要…………………………………………………………………………………... ...ii
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………iii
CONTENTS……………………………………………………………………………iv
LIST of TABLES……………………………………………………………………….v

I. Introduction 1
II. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 5
A. Debate on relation between managerial ability and debt maturity 5
B. Managerial ability in recession and crisis period 7
C. Managerial ability of firms with financial constraints 8
III. Research Design 9
A. Data and sample construction 9
B. Measurement 9
C. Methodology 13
IV. Empirical Results 15
A. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 15
B. Relationship between managerial ability and debt maturity 17
C. Analysis in different financial condition 20
D. Robustness test 21
E. The effect of managerial ability on firm performance 22
V. Conclusion 24
Tables 26
References 34
Appendices 38
Appendix A Variables and definition 38
Appendix B Altman Z-score and Zmijewski score 39


LIST of TABLES

Table I Descriptive Statistics…………………………………………………………26
Table II Univariate Analysis…………………………………………………………27
Table III Correlation Matrix…………………………………………………………28
Table IV Baseline Regression ………………………………………………………29
Table V Regression with Recession Analysis………………………………………30
Table VI Subsample Analysis…………….…………………………………………31
Table VII Robustness Test………………………………………………………….32
Table VIII Managerial Ability and Firm Performance……………………………33

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