金融風暴後，金融監督管理委員會規範銀行於受理投資人辦理財富管理業務前，須讓投資人填寫「客戶資料表」；以協助投資人瞭解自身的風險等級，便於辦理投資理財業務時檢視及評估所欲投資產品是否符合投資人可承受的風險範圍。
本文我們探討出每個投資人在填寫「客戶資料表」後的結果，得知對於風險承受度較高或較低的投資人有可能不會據實以告；而風險承受度中間的投資人會依預期效用來選擇適當的金融商品。理財專業人員的功能可能因「客戶資料表」的機制而消減。

After the financial crisis, the Financial Supervisory Commission set a new regulation for banks that investors will be required to complete the “Client Information Statement” before financial consultation from banks. Hopefully clients can evaluate their own acceptable level of risk prior to making investments, and banks can make appropriate suggestions.
However, it is found in this dissertation that investors who care much or less about risks tend not to reveal the corresponding acceptable level of risks in the statement as desired. Further, the average investors simply choose their investment targets according to expected utilities each financial product can bring. After introducing “Client Information statement,” the financial consultants in banks cannot manipulate investors’ choice as before.

目 錄
論文審定書 i
論文公開授權書 ii
謝誌 iii
摘　要 iv
Abstract v
第一章 研究背景與動機 1
第二章 文獻回顧 6
第三章 共同基金概況 10
第四章 數學模型 14
第五章 結論與建議 20
參考文獻 22

圖 次

圖 3 1申購手續費與風險評級的關係圖 12
圖 3 2年化報酬率與標準差(風險)關係圖 13
圖 4 1 各金融商品關係圖-1 16
圖 4 2 各金融商品關係圖-2 16

一、中文部份
1 .陳詩舜、張植雄、吳承達著，(2005)，投資組合管理，台北市，保銷國際文化事業股份有限公司

二、網站資訊
1.鉅亨網，http://fund.cnyes.com// (2015,2,)
2.金融監督管理委員會，http://www.fsc.gov.tw//

三、英文部份
1. Akerlof, A. (1970), “The market for lemons : quality uncertainty and the market mechanism” , The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3, 488–500.
2. Bester, H. (1985), “Screening vs. rationing in credit markets with imperfect information” , The America Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 4,850-855.
3. Biglaiser, G. (1993) , “Middlemen as experts” , The Rand Journal of Economics ,
Vol. 24, No. 2, 212-23.
4. Huston, H. and Spencer, W. (2002), “Quality, uncertainty and the internet : the market for cyber lemons”, The American Economist, Vol. 46, No. 1, 50-60.
5. Miskin, S. (1990), “Asymmetric information and financial crises : a historical perspective” , NBER Working Paper, No. 3400.
6. Myers, C. and Majluf, S. (1984), “Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information investors do not have”, Journal of Financial Economics , Vol. 13, issue 2,187–221.
7. Ryoo, J. (1996), “Lemons models of professional labor markets reconsidered”, Eastern Economic Journal , Vol. 22, No. 3, 355–363.
8. Shapiro, C. (1986), “Investment, moral hazard, and occupational licensing”，The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 53, No. 5 , 843-862.
9. Stiglitz, E. and Weiss, A. (1981), “Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information” , The American Economic Review , Vol. 71, No. 3 , 393–410.
10. Wimmer, S. and Chezum, B. (2003), “An empirical examination of quality certification in a lemons market” , Economic Inquiry , Vol. 41, issue 2 , 279-291.