本文探討當本土企業設籍之國家，與其主要商品市場所在之國家，兩國間跨國貿易存在高關稅時，本土企業將會如何選擇其企業佈署形式，藉此避開直接銷往商品市場所須負擔的高關稅，進而提高企業利潤。由於為提及跨國企業的模型，因此也加入了企業之移轉訂價決策做討論。本文結果發現，假定不在商品市場國設置生產廠房下，本土企業會將生產廠房移至與商品市場間存在較低關稅的國家，再轉賣到商品市場。由於政府不希望企業總部也跟著外移，而使得稅收減少，因此接著討論政府之租稅制度將如何影響其政府稅收。本文結果發現，給定生產廠房所在之國家課徵雙重課稅，且已知生產地與商品市場之利潤稅與從價關稅下，隨著租稅制度越寬鬆，越有機會訂高的利潤稅率以及得到較多的稅收。

The aim of the paper is to discuss how the enterprise chooses its optimal location of the affiliate when its exports to the foreign market are subject to a high tariff rate. We want to know whether the enterprise chooses a third country, which is subject to a lower tariff, and sets an affiliate in there. Because the model contains the multinational enterprise, we take the transfer pricing into consideration. Assume that the factory will not be established on the foreign market, we show that the enterprise would like to move the factory to the third country then export to the market. Furthermore, when the headquarter moves to the third country, it will induce the decrease of the tax revenue of the host country. Then, we try to discuss how the governments’ tax policy affects the tax revenue. Assume the enterprise moves its factory to the third country where selects the double taxation. We show that when the government chooses a looser tax policy, then it will have more opportunity to receive more tax revenue.

論文審定書　 i
誌謝　　 ii
中文摘要 iii
英文摘要 iv
第一章 緒論
　第一節　研究動機與目的 1
　第二節　本文架構 2
第二章 文獻回顧
　第一節　跨國企業與外國直接投資 3
　第二節　企業移轉訂價與政府租稅制度 4
第三章 理論模型
　第一節　模型假設與設定 6
　第二節　均衡策略說明 12
　第三節　比較分析 23
第四章 租稅制度探討-以特定之跨國企業為例
　第一節　政府稅收 30
　第二節　兩國之租稅制度比較 31
　第三節　租稅探討-假定生產國採取雙重課稅　 39
第五章 結論與建議　 47
參考文獻　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 49
附錄 A~F 　　　 51~56

中文參考文獻：
1.施敏(2009)，「稅務法規」，高點文化事業有限公司，2009年10月八版。
2.聞順發(2005)，「國際貿易實務操作」，台北：五南出版社。
英文參考文獻：
1.Bond, E.W. and Samuelson, L. (1989), “Strategic behavior and the rules for international taxation of capital,” Economic Journal, Vol. 99, No. 398, pp. 1099-1111.
2.Copithorne, L.W. (1971), “International corporate transfer prices and government policy,” Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol.4, No. 3, pp.324-341.
3.Frenkel, J.A., Razin, A. and Sadka, E. (1991), “International taxation in an intergrated world,” (MIT Press. Cambridge, MA).
4.Gabrielsen, T.S. and Schjelderup, G. (1999), “Transfer Pricing and Ownership Structure,” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 101, No. 4, pp. 673-688.
5.Hamada, K. (1966), “Strategic aspects of taxation on foreign investment income,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 80, No. 3, pp. 361-375.
6.Haufler, A. and Wooton, I. (1999), “Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 71, No. 1, pp. 121-139.
7.Holm, P. (1997), “Vertically integrated oligopoly and international trade policy,” The Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'Economique, Vol.30, No. 1, pp. 194-207.
8.Horst, T. (1971), “The theory of the multinational firm: optimal behavior under different tariff and tax rates,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol.79, No. 5, pp.1059-1072.
9.Kant, C. (1988), “Endogenous transfer pricing and the effects of uncertain regulation,” Journal of International Economics, Vol.24, No. 1-2, pp.147-157.
10.Konan, D.E. (1997), “Strategic taxation of the multinational enterprise: A new argument for double taxation,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 63, No. 2, pp. 301-309.
11.Raff, H. (2004), “Preferential trade agreements and tax competition for foreign direct investment,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 88, No. 12 , pp. 2745-2763.
12.Scharf, K.A. (2001), “International Capital Tax Evasion and the Foreign Tax Credit Puzzle,” The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 465-480.
13.Schjelderup, G. and Weichenrieder, A.J. (1999), “Trade, multinationals, and transfer pricing regulations,” The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique, Vol.32, No. 3, pp. 817-834.
14.Weichenrieder, A.J. (1996), “Transfer Pricing, Double Taxation, and the Cost of Capital,” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, No. 3, pp. 445-452.