預算制度是管理會計控制系統中的重要工具之一，然而，在設定預算目標時，經理人常低估預算，造成預算寬列，因而損及預算之協調和激勵功能。
誘導實情獎酬制度不僅可誘導風險中立之員工，以預期績效作為預算目標，不會產生預算寬列，同時可激勵他們達成極大化的績效。但是，很多研究之實證結果均發現，此制度不僅無法根絕寬列的存在，也無法提高員工績效。本文認為關鍵在於獎酬制度中之參數設計不當，以致於無法發揮誘導實情和激勵的功能。
本研究採不確定情況下之決策分析準則大中取小(Minimax)法，探討誘導實情獎酬制度、風險偏好和預算寬列及績效之間的關係，指出：誘導實情獎酬制度中之參數關係是決定預算寬列和績效的一個重要因素。並採實驗設計，利用共變數分析(ANCOVA)，驗證誘導實情獎酬制度對預算寬列和績效的影響。此研究結果可作為學術界、以及實務上設計獎酬契約時之參考。

The budget system is one of the important tools in the management accounting control system. However, in the budget goal setting process, budgeting managers may insert slack into their budgets.
Budget slack will erode the effectiveness of the budget system. Agency researchers recognize that well-designed contracts can be used to solve this incentive problem. Therefore, truth-inducing schemes are widely discussed and analyzed. However, many empirical studies report that such schemes can decrease, but not eliminate slack completely. In the meanwhile, they can not increase performance. This study points out that the parameters of the schemes are not well-designed, therefore, the effectiveness to induce subordinates to disclose private information and increase performance is of failure.
This paper analyses the relationship among parameters of the truth-inducing pay scheme, risk preference and budget slack by Minimax law under uncertainty, and points that this scheme will lose its effectiveness under some condition. At the meanwhile, this thesis also explains how to design a compensation contract to provide a reference for practical application.

頁次
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究之重要性 4
第三節 研究方法 5
第四節 論文架構 6

第二章 文獻回顧 7
第一節 誘導實情獎酬制度 7
第二節 誘導實情獎酬制度影響預算寬列的相關文獻 11
第三節 誘導實情獎酬制度影響績效的相關文獻 13

第三章 理論模式之推導與假設之建立 16
第一節 均值定理與大中取小法 16
第二節 誘導實情獎酬制度和預算寬列之關係 17
第三節 誘導實情獎酬制度、風險偏好和預算寬列之關係 22
第四節 誘導實情獎酬制度、風險偏好和績效之關係 31
第五節 研究假設 33

第四章 研究設計 35
第一節 實驗設計概述 35
第二節 受試者與任務 36
第三節 變數衡量 37
第四節 實驗程序 39
第五節 資料分析方法 43

第五章 實證結果與分析 45
第一節 資料初步分析 45
第二節 誘導實情獎酬制度和風險偏好對預算寬列之影響 49
第三節 誘導實情獎酬制度和風險偏好對績效之影響 52



第六章 結論與建議 54
第一節 研究結論 54
第二節 研究限制 55
第三節 研究建議 56

參考文獻 58

附錄 66



表 目 錄
表2.1.1 誘導實情獎酬制度 10
表3.2.1 報酬表 19
表3.2.2 機會損失表 20
表3.2.3 機會損失、獎酬制度之參數和預算寬列之關係 22
表3.3.1 獎酬制度中之參數關係、風險偏好對預算寬列之影響 29
表3.4.1 獎酬制度中之參數關係、風險偏好對績效之影響 33
表5.1.1 各變數之平均數與標準差 45
表5.1.2 二因素之ANCOVA表-預算寬列 51
表5.1.3 二因素之ANCOVA表-績效 52



圖 目 錄
圖2.1.1 誘導實情獎酬制度 8
圖3.1.1 均值定理 16
圖3.2.1 績效與獎酬關係圖-預算寬列 18
圖3.2.2 機會損失、參數 和預算寬列之關係 （圖3.2.4）。此時之最佳方案為機會損失較小之方案：以 為預算目標，因而造成預算寬列（ - ）。 21
圖3.2.3 機會損失、參數 和預算寬列之關係 21
圖3.2.4 機會損失、參數 和預算寬列之關係 22
圖3.3.1 風險規避者的效用曲線 24
圖3.3.2 風險中立者的效用曲線 26
圖3.3.3 風險愛好者的效用曲線 27
圖3.4.1 績效與獎酬關係圖-績效 32
圖5.1.1 高誘因、中誘因、低誘因組之預算寬列 47
圖5.1.2 風險規避、中立、愛好組之預算寬列 47
圖5.1.3 高誘因、中誘因、低誘因組之績效 48
圖5.1.4 風險規避、中立、愛好組之績效 48

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