台灣從2005年起實施承銷新制，對於金融制度的改革相當重要，其主要是為了呼應承銷制度改革是為提升上市上櫃公司的品質。目前台灣主要的IPO股票的承銷方式以申購抽籤與詢價圈購兩種制度混合搭配為主要的承銷方式，過去的研究強調採用詢價圈購制度時承銷商擁有較高的配售裁量權，可以對承銷價格的責任與敏感度增加，並且達到促進配售效率的結果。本研究比較中國大陸、香港與台灣在兩岸三地都有實施詢價圈購制度的市場加以比較，主要的發現為台灣的承銷商因為能提供詢價圈購配售的股票比重較高，而且承銷商具有較高的配售裁量權，因此較有可能會發生在配售IPO股票時是以公司本身的客戶為主，此舉會與當初改革的立意截然不同，同時對於發行公司或散戶投資人產生不利的影響。
本研究歸納過去文獻及問卷統計分析，提出法令規範嚴謹程度、配售預期利益、詢價圈購制度功能與配售結果控制程度對於承銷商的實際配售行為會造成影響。以2007年在台灣、香港與中國大陸有主辦承銷實績的承銷商中實際負責IPO配售決策的人發放問卷，經過單因子變異數的比較後發現中國大陸的承銷商明顯認為法令規範較嚴格，而IPO股票比較有利可圖，但是台灣的承銷商則明顯的認為對配售結果的控制程度較強，而在分配IPO股票時，中國大陸的承銷商傾向依制度分配，而台灣的承銷商則傾向依關係來進行分配。
本研究運用迴歸分析來探討承銷商依制度分配與依關係分配的因素，本研究發現法令規範中的客觀公平與詢價標準兩項因素的嚴謹程度越高，承銷商越會依制度來進行分配；而配售控制程度的制度導向及價格導向因素也會促進承銷商依制度來分配。而法令規範中的客觀公平因素嚴謹程度越高，承銷商越不會依關係來進行分配；而考量承銷商利益、預期獲利與關係導向因素越高承銷商越會依關係來進行分配。
據此，本研究提出許多建議用來改善目前台灣承銷商在配售IPO股票時可能會產生的問題，包括對事前報備、揭露原則、詢價圈購配售比例、將投資人分類按比例配售、規定持有期限、加強公證人員在配售過程的監督與取消申購以人為基本單位改為以申購資金規模當抽籤單位等。並期望政府相關部門及承銷商參考本研究論文，作為IPO制度後續的改革方向的參考。

Taiwan carries out the new underwriting rules since 2005, it is very important to the reformation of financial system, and its purpose is mainly for responding to the reformation of underwriting rules so as to promote the quality of listed companies. At present, the underwriting method of Taiwan’s major Initial Public Offerings (IPO) stock uses the mix and collocation of two systems, public subscription by lot drawing and book building, as the underwriting method, the previous studies emphasized that the underwriter had higher right to decide the amount of placing, which can increase the responsibility and sensibility for the underwriting price, and then the result of promoting placing efficiency can be reached. This study compares the markets in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan that have carried out book building system. This study mainly finds out, because the underwriters in Taiwan can provide higher stock weight of the placing of book building and the underwriters have higher right to decide the amount of placing, thus, it is more possible that when placing IPO stock, the company would regard its customers as the core, and this act is entirely different with the conception of the initial reformation, and unfavorable influence would be produced to the issue company or individual investor at the same time.
This study sums up the previous literatures and questionnaire statistical analyses, and then proposes the influence that degree of rigor of laws and regulations, anticipated result of placing, institutional function of book building and decisive factors of placing have towards the actual results of placing of underwriters. The questionnaires are distributed to the personnel who actually are responsible for the IPO placing strategy of underwriters that have hosted actual placing results in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China. After the comparison using single factor variance, one can find that the underwriters from Mainland China significantly think that the laws and regulations are stricter, and IPO stock has more good prospects of gain. However, the underwriters from Taiwan significantly think that the decisive factors of placing are stronger. When placing IPO stock, the underwriters from Mainland China prefer placing according to the system, while the underwriters from Taiwan prefer placing according to relationship.
This study uses regression analysis to discuss the factors that influence the underwriters to carry out placing according to system or relationship. This study finds out if the degree of rigor for the two factors in laws and regulations, objective & fair and book building standard, is higher, then the underwriters will tend to carry out placing according to system more. And also, the system-oriented and price-oriented factors in decisive factors of placing also promote the underwriters carry out placing according to system. On the other hand, if the degree of rigor for the objective & fair factor in laws and regulations is higher, then the underwriters tend not to carry out placing according to relationship. When the factors such as considering underwriter’s benefits, anticipated profit, and relationship-oriented are higher, then the underwriters tend to carry out placing according to relationship.
In view of the above, this study has proposed many suggestions to improve the problems that might happen when underwriters in Taiwan placing IPO stock at present, including report beforehand, exposing the principles, ratio of book building placing, classifying the investors and placing in proportion, regulations of holding term, strengthening the supervision on notary public during the placing process, and canceling the use of person as the basic unit when purchasing but the use of purchasing capital’s scale as the drawing unit. This study also hopes that the relevant departments in governments and underwriters could consult this study thesis and take this study as the reference for the follow-up reformation direction of IPO system.

論文提要 ii
中文摘要 iii
Abstract iv
誌謝辭 vi
目錄 vii
表目錄 ix
圖目錄 x
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究流程與論文章節安排 4
第四節 研究範圍 6
第二章 文獻探討 8
第一節 承銷商角色探討 8
第二節 兩岸三地IPO承銷制度之探討 12
第三節 IPO發行方式之探討 39
第四節 各種IPO發行方式之比較 43
第五節 承銷商配售行為之探討 52
第三章 研究設計 55
第一節 研究架構與研究假設 55
第二節 研究變項定義與衡量 57
第三節 抽樣方式 60
第四節 資料分析方法 65
第四章 實證分析結果 67
第一節 信度分析結果 67
第二節 主成份因素分析結果 67
第三節 敘述性統計 73
第四節 樣本敘述性統計 79
第五節 單因子變異數分析 81
第六節 迴歸分析結果 92
第五章 結論與建議 99
第一節 結論 99
第二節 建議 104
第三節 後續研究建議 110
參考文獻 112
附件 承銷商運作調查問卷 119
作者簡歷 139

一、中文部份
1.朱峻賢，2000，證券承銷業務之法律責任，國立政治大學法律學系碩士班論文。
2.李青娟，2000，公司新股上市時配售方式之選擇與影響，國立中正大學財務金融學系碩士論文。
3.李淑瑜，2007，我國初次上市(櫃)新股承銷配售制度之規範及探討，國立政治大學經營管理碩士學程碩士論文。
4.呂建樺，1998，證券承銷配售方式之選擇，國立中山大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。
5.邱皓政，2005，量化研究法統計原理與分析技術，台北：雙葉出版。
6.林家慶，1997，詢價圈購制度下價格決定之資訊效果，國立中正大學財務金融學系碩士論文。
7.胡德中，2004，IPO承銷機制的選擇與最佳釋股決策，國立中山大學財務管理研究所博士論文。
8.洪振虔、吳欽杉、陳安琳，2003，「新上市公司股票刻意偏低定價之影響因素─隨機前緣模式的運用」，管理學報，20(1)：113-141。
9.洪崇祥，1996，承銷配售方式檢討及其對新股折價之影響，國立中山大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。
10.馬黛、胡德中，2003，「承銷機制之決定及其對IPO折價之影響：競價拍賣、詢價圈購及公開申購」，Journal of Finacial Studies，11(1)：1-40。
11.陳右超，2002，現金增資承銷配售制度之研究，輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文。
12.陳奕均，2006，新股配銷制度之國際比較研究，國立政治大學國際貿易研究所碩士論文。
13.廖芝敏，2005，「承銷新制變革影響及其因應」，證券暨期貨月刊，23(6)：14-26。
14.劉文鼎，2000，現金增資承銷方式之選擇與影響，國立中正大學會計研究所碩士論文。
15.劉玉珍、陳薇如，2004，「為何詢價圈購方式逐漸取代競價拍賣?」，證券暨期貨月刊， 22(5)：16-31。
二、英文部份
1.Aggral, R., Prabhala, N. R., and Puri, M. 2002. Allocation of initial public offerings and flipping activity. Journal of Finance, 57: 1421-1442.
2.Ajzen, I. 1985. From intentions to actions: a theory of planned behavior. In: Kuhl J, Beckman J, editors. Action control: from cognition to behavior Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 11-39.
3.Ajzen, I. 1991. The theory of planned behavior. Organiz Behavior Human Decision Proc, 50: 179-211.
4.Alexey M. 2004. The role of uninformed buyers in optimal IPO mechanisms, working paper.
5.Anand, A.I. 2005. Is the dutch auction IPO a good idea?, Expresso Preprint Series, Paper, 672.
6.Aorsio, R., G. Giudici, and S., Paleari., 2000. Underpricing and money "Left on the Table" in Italian IPOs, Working Paper, Politecnico di Milano - Dipartimento di Economia e Produzione.
7.Arikan, I. 2003. How should an entrepreneurial firm be sold? Auctions versus Negotiations, working paper.
8.Ausubel, L. M. 2002. Auction for IPO’s, Working paper.
9.Benveniste, L., and W. Busaba, 1997. Bookbuilding versus fixed price: an analysis of competing strategies for marketing IPOs, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 32: 383-403.
10.Beierlein, J. 2000. The efficiency of IPO mechanisms: a comparison of book-building, discriminatory price auctions and uniform price auctions, Unpublished paper, University of Utah.
11.Bennouri, M. and Falconieri, S. 2001. Price vs. quantity discrimination in optimal IPOs, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
12.Benveniste, Lawrence M., and Spindt, P. A. 1989. How investment bankers determine the offer price and allocation of new issues, Journal of Financial Economics, 24: 343-361.
13.Benveniste, Lawrence M., and Wilhelm W. J. 1990. A comparative analysis of IPO proceeds under alternative regulatory environments, Journal of Financial Economics, 28: 173-207.
14.Benveniste, Lawrence M., and Busaba, W. Y. 1997. Bookbuilding vs. fixed price: a analysis of competing strategies for marketing IPOs, Journal of Financial Quantitative Analysis, 32: 383-403.
15.Biais, B., Bossaert, P. and Rochet, J.C. 2002: An optimal IPO mechanism, Review of Economic Studies, 69: 117-146.
16.Biais, B., and Faugeron-Crouzet, A.M. 2002. IPO auctions: english, dutch, french and internet, Journal of Financial Intermediation , 11: 9-36.
17.Chahine, S., 2002. Mispricing in IPO methods and the predictive ability of investors’ interest for new issues, University of Audencia-Nantes, Working Paper.
18.Chemmanur, T. J. and Liu, H. 2002. How should a firm go public? a dynamic model of the choice between fixed-price offerings and auctions in IPOs and Privatizations, working paper.
19.Chemmanur, T., and Liu, H. M. 2003. How should a firm go public? a dynamic model of the choice between fixed-price offerings and auctions in IPOs and privatizations, Unpublished paper, Boston College.
20.Cheng, L.T.W., Chan, K. C. and Mak, B.S.C. 2005. Strategic share allocation and underpricings of IPOs in Hong Kong, International Business Review, 14: 41-59.
21.Chowdhry, B., and Sherman, A. 1996. International differences in oversubscription and underpricing of IPOs, Journal of Corporate Finance, 2(4): pp.359-381.
22.Chowdhry, Bhagwan and Ann Sherman, 1996a. International differences in oversubscription and underpricing of initial public offerings, Pacific-Basin finance Journal, 4: 15-30.
23.Derrien, F. and Womack, K. L., 2001. Auction vs. bookbuilding and the control of underpricing in hot IPO markets, Review of Financial Studies, 14(1): 1-25.
24.Derrien, F. and Womack,K. L. 2003. Auction vs bookbuilding and the control for underpricing in the hot IPO markets. Review of Financial Studies, 16(1): 31-61.
25.Draho, J., 2001. The effect of uncertainty on the underpricing of IPOs, working paper.Fernando, Chitru S., Vladimir A. Gatchev and Paul A. Spindt,2003,”Wanna Dance? How Firms and Underwriters Choose Each Other,” working paper.
26.Draho, J. 2001. The effect of uncertainty on the underpricing of IPOs mimeo, Yale University.
27.Fishbein, M. and Ajzen, I. 1974. Attitude toward objects as predictors of single and multiple behavioral criteria. Psychol Rev, 81(1): 59-74.
28.Fredricks, A.J. and Dossett, D.L. 1983. Attitude-behavior relations: a comparison of the Fishbein-Ajzen and the Bentler-Speckart models. Journal of Personal Social Psychol, 45(3): 501-12.
29.Godin G, and Kok G. 1996. The theory of planned behavior: a review of its applications to health related behaviors. Am J Health Promot, 11: 87-98.
30.Guidici, G., and Paleari, S. 2001. What drives the initial market performance of Italian IPOS? An empirical investigation on underpricing and price support, Working Paper, Universita degli Studi di Bergamo, Italy.
31.Hsu, Y. and H. C-W. 2005. Why have IPO auctions lost market share to fixed-price offers? Evidence from Taiwan. Working Paper, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, Southern Taiwan University of Technology, Tainan, Taiwan.
32.Jagannathan, R., and Sherman, A. 2005. Reforming the bookbuilding process for IPO,Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 17(1): 67-72
33.Kaneko, T. and Pettway, R. H. 2003. Auctions versus book building of Japanese IPOs, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 11 (September): 439-462.
34.Kucukkocaoglu, G. 2008. Underpricing in Turkey: A comparison of the IPO methods, International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 13: 162-182.
35.Kutsuna, K. and Smith, R. 2001. Issue cost and method of IPO pricing: Japan’s change from auction to book building, working paper.
36.Lee, Y.T., Lin, J.C. and Liu, Y. J. 2003. What is IPO auction’ weakness? working paper, presented in EFMA.
37.Liu, Y., Wei, J. and Liaw, G. 2003. On the demand elasticity of initial public offerings: An analysis of discriminatory auctions , International Review of Finance, 2: 151-178.
38.Ljungqvist, A. P. and Jenkinson, T. 2001. Global integration in primary equity markets: The Role of U.S. Banks and U.S. Investors, working paper.
39.Loughran, T. and Ritter, J.R. 1995. The new issues puzzle. Journal of Finance, 50: 23–51.
40.Leite, T. 2007. Adverse selection, public information, and underpricing in IPOs. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(5): 813-828.
41.McDonald, S. 2001. Internet IPO Auctions: Will they eliminate traditional underwriting inefficiencies? University of Lausanne, Masters Thesis.
42.Nimalendra, M., Ritter, J.R. and Zhang, D. 2007. Do today’s trade affect tomorrow’s IPOallocations? Journal of Financial Economics, 84: 87-109.
43.Reuter, J., 2006. Are IPO allocations for sale? Evidence from the mutual fund industry. Journal of Finance, 61: 2289-2324.
44.Ritter, J.R. 1984. The hot issue market of 1980, Journal of Business, 57: 215-240.
45.Ritter, J. R. 1998. Initial Public Offerings, Contemporary Finance Digest, 2: 5-30.
46.Ritter, J. R. 2002. Investment banking and securities issuance, North-Holland Handbook of the Economics of Finance.
47.Ritter, J.R. and Welch, I. 2002. A review of IPO activity, pricing, and allocations, working paper.
48.Rock, K. 1986. Why new issues are underpriced, Journal of Financial Economics, 15: 187-212.
49.Sherman, A. E. 2002. Global trends in IPO methods: book building vs. auctions, working paper.
50.Sherman, A. E. and Titman S. 2002. Building the IPO order book: underpricing and participation limits with costly information, Journal of Financial Economics, 65: 3-29.
51.Sherman, A. E., 2000. IPOs and long-term relationships: an advantage of book building, Review of Financial Studies, 13: 697-714.
52.Smith, R. 2002. NASD proposes tougher rules on IPO abuses-agency would bar brokers from allocating hot issues to curry favor with clients, Wall Street Journal.
53.Spatt, C., and Srivastava, S. 1991. Preplay communication, participation restrictions, and effciency in initial public offerings, Review of Financial Studies, 4: 709-726.
54.Vandemaele, S. 2003. Choice of selling mechanism at the IPO: the case of the french second market, European Financial Management, 9(4): 435-455.