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博碩士論文 etd-0707111-164717 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-0707111-164717
論文名稱
Title
獨占廠商面對潛在廠商威脅下之最適廣告支出與訂價策略
The Monopolist’s Optimal Allocation of Advertising and Pricing under the Threat of the Potential Firm
系所名稱
Department
畢業學年期
Year, semester
語文別
Language
學位類別
Degree
頁數
Number of pages
44
研究生
Author
指導教授
Advisor
召集委員
Convenor
口試委員
Advisory Committee
口試日期
Date of Exam
2011-06-23
繳交日期
Date of Submission
2011-07-07
關鍵字
Keywords
品質、信號、廣告配置、價格競爭
quality, price competition, allocation of advertising, signal
統計
Statistics
本論文已被瀏覽 5753 次,被下載 9
The thesis/dissertation has been browsed 5753 times, has been downloaded 9 times.
中文摘要
本文旨在探討當獨占廠商面對潛在廠商加入市場之威脅下時,如何決定其最適廣告配置與訂價。當消費者無法辨別某項商品之品質時,將以對高品質與低品質商品的願付價格之平均作為此商品之願付價格,而廠商之廣告配置與訂價策略會因為不同類型消費者的平均願付價格不同而有所差異,我們發現不論消費者的平均願付價格為何,只要獨占廠商有能力與潛在廠商削價競爭,則廣告支出較大;反之,若無能力與潛在廠商削價競爭,則廣告支出較小。
Abstract
This article aims at exploring how the monopolist determines the optimal allocation of advertising and pricing when he faces the threat of the potential firm entering the market. When consumers are unable to distinguish the quality of a commodity, they will use the weighted average willingness to pay of the high quality and the low quality goods to be the willingness to pay for the commodity. Because that the average willingness to pay is different among consumers of different types, thus the monopolist’s decisions concerning the allocation of advertising budget and pricing will be influenced. We found that no matter what the average willingness to pay is, as long as the monopolist has the ability to compete against price, the expenditure on advertising will be larger; otherwise, the expenditure on advertising will be smaller.
目次 Table of Contents
第一章 緒論
第一節 研究動機與目的
第二節 本文架構
第二章 文獻回顧
第三章 理論模型
第一節 模型假設
第二節 完全訊息下之均衡策略
3.2.1. 高品質廠商為既有廠商
3.2.2. 低品質廠商為既有廠商
第三節 不完全訊息下之均衡策略
3.3.1. 高品質廠商為既有廠商
3.3.2. 低品質廠商為既有廠商
第四章 結論與建議
參考文獻
附錄
圖目錄
圖 3- 1完全訊息下高品質廠商為既有廠商時之最適廣告支出
圖 3- 2完全訊息下低品質廠商為既有廠商時之最適廣告支出
表目錄
表 1不完全訊息下高品質廠商之最適廣告支出與訂價策略
表 2不完全訊息下低品質廠商之最適廣告支出與訂價策略



參考文獻 References
Akerlof, G.A. (1970), “The market for "lemons": Qualitative uncertainty and the market mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488-500.
Bagwell, K. and Ramey, G. (1988), “Advertising and limit pricing,” RAND Journal of Economics, 19, 59-71.
Grossman, S.J. (1981), “The role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality,” Journal of Law and Economics, 24, 461-483.
Milgrom, P.R. and Roberts, J. (1986), “Price and advertising signals of product quality,” Journal of Political Economy, 94, 796-821.
Nelson, P. (1970), “Information and consumer behavior,” Journal of Political Economy, 78, 311-329.
Nelson, P. (1974), “Advertising as information,” Journal of Political Economy, 82, 729-754.
Orzach, R., Overgaard, P.B. and Y. Tauman (2002), “Modest advertising signals strength,” RAND Journal of Economics, 33, 340-358.
Ross, S.A. (1977), “The determination of financial structure: The incentive-signalling approach,” Bell Journal of Economics, 8, 23-40.
Spence, A.M. (1974), Market Signalling: Information Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
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