專利的競爭已是商場競爭中重要的一部分，專利策略也是企業整體策略中不可或缺的一環，藉由觀察對手的行為，專利可變成一個製造競爭的工具，不論是採取訴訟來謀求有形的利益，或是以防禦性的專利策略佈局來抵禦競爭對手可能的攻擊行動，運用得宜，才能維持或提升公司的競爭力。傳統的觀念認為專利權的訴訟提出與否通常取決於投入的R&D成本能否回收，本文分別以侵權廠商及專利持有廠商為先行動者，以預期的角度來分析專利布局是否有其必要性及侵權行為發生時是否有提出訴訟的必要性，再者，若採取訴訟，最適的結果為和解或爭訟到底。研究結果顯示，當專利布局的成本小於侵權訴訟的預期和解金額時，廠商有佈設專利地雷的誘因；當侵權行為發生時，唯一的和解金額相當於訴訟後侵權行為成立時被告廠商須支付予專利持有廠商的罰款，扣除侵權行為不成立時被告廠商自行支付的訴訟費用，若該和解金額為雙方所接受，則均衡結果為和解。所有專利訴訟還是要以成本考量為依歸，一旦獲益小於訴訟成本時，企業應衡量是否應該繼續訴訟。

Nowadays the competition of patents has become an important factor of business competition; also, it is essential for companies to be proficient in the strategic deployment of patents and its applications. In order to attain business competitiveness and to make profits sustainably, a firm has to employ its own patent rights either for financial gains or as a defensive measure to ward off potential patent threats from competition. In traditional concept, people often justify patents by a simple backward-looking argument that innovators deserve at least to recoup their R&D expenses. By assuming potential infringer and patent holder is a leader of a game respectively, I demonstrated the necessity of setting patent portfolio, and whether or not to sue the infringer. Moreover, either settlement or trial is an optimal outcome. As a result, when the cost of patent portfolio was smaller than the expected license fee of settlement, company would have the incentive to set the patent traps; when the infringement being happened, the license fee of settlement would be equal to the penalties the infringer must pay to the patent holders when the behavior of infringe is established deduct the trial charges the patent holder must pay when the case isn’t established. If such an amount could be accepted by two parties, the settlement would be the Nash equilibrium. All the trial cases for patents must depend on the cost, in the event of the expected payoff is less than the cost of the trial; the company must consider clearly that if it’s worth to continue the trial.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與研究目的 1
第二節 研究背景 1
第三節 研究方法 5
第四節 研究流程 6
第五節 本文架構 6
第二章 文獻回顧 7
第一節 專利策略相關文獻 7
第二節 專利佈局的演變 9
第三章 理論模型 12
第一節 模型架構 12
第二節 完全訊息之專利戰模型分析與均衡策略說明 12
第三節 不完全訊息之專利戰模型分析與均衡策略說明 15
第四章 延伸討論 20
第五章 結論與建議 21
第一節 研究結論 21
第二節 研究建議 21
參考文獻 23

一、 中文部份:
1. 卞宏邦(2012)，“美國專利訴訟策略之研究-以LGD VS.CPT案為例＂，碩士論文，國立台灣大學管理學院。
2. 劉尚志(2011)，“蘋果與宏達電之專利戰” STPI財團法人國家實驗研究院科技政策研究與資訊中心科技產業資訊室。
3. 張維迎著；劉楚俊編校(1999)，“賽局理論與信息經濟學＂，茂昌圖書有限公司。
4. 張郁齡(2010)，“專利制度之博奕分析＂，財產法暨經濟法第二十二期。
5. STPI財團法人國家實驗研究院科技政策研究與資訊中心科技產業資訊室(2012)，“專利情報”。

二、 英文部份:
1. Anton, James J. and Yao, Dennis (2004), “Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property, ” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 1-22.
2. Bessen , James E. and Meurer , Michael J.(2006), “Patent Litigation with Endogenous Disputes, ” American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 2, pp. 77-81
3. Crampes, Claude and Langinier,Corinne (2002), “Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement Cases , ” RAND Journal of Economics,Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 258-274.
4. Horstmann, I., MacDonald, G.M., and Slivinski, A.(1985) “ Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent, ” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93, No. 2, pp. 837-858.
5. Lanjouw, Jean O. and Lerner, Josh, (1997) “The Inforcement of Intellectual Property Rights , ”NBER Working Paper Series, pp.6296
6. Reinganum , Jennifer F. (1982), “A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior, ” Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 671-688.
7. Rockett, Katharine E. (1990), “Choosing the Competition and Patent Licensing, ” The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 161-171.
8. Yiannaka, Amalia (2009), “When Less Is More: Optimal Patent Breadth under the Threat of Patent Validity Challenges, ” Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 75, No. 4, pp. 1067-1093.