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博碩士論文 etd-0708104-140441 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-0708104-140441
論文名稱
Title
代理成本對自願性盈餘預測影響之研究
agency cost
系所名稱
Department
畢業學年期
Year, semester
語文別
Language
學位類別
Degree
頁數
Number of pages
43
研究生
Author
指導教授
Advisor
召集委員
Convenor
口試委員
Advisory Committee
口試日期
Date of Exam
2004-06-25
繳交日期
Date of Submission
2004-07-08
關鍵字
Keywords
代理理論、自願性盈餘預測、代理成本
agency cost, voluntary earning forecast, agency theory
統計
Statistics
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The thesis/dissertation has been browsed 5685 times, has been downloaded 5032 times.
中文摘要
代理理論是由Jensen and Meckling(1976)發展而來,主要探討委託人和代理人雙方的利益衝突問題。在現今的公司,由於所有權和經營權分開,使得股東和管理當局形成代理關係。股東之所以將公司委託給管理當局,一方面可能由於管理當局的能力較股東本身能力較好,另一方面則基於其他原因使得股東無法親自治理,而必須將公司交付他人。但是由於管理當局比股東更具有資訊上優勢,以及管理當局為追求本身利益的情況下,卻可能發生管理當局的不當行為而損害了股東的權益,此即產生了所謂的代理問題。
除了股東和管理當局有代理上的問題以外,對一個有借貸行為的公司而言,管理當局和債權人也會產生相同的問題。為了減少代理問題以及維護自己本身的權益,股東通常會加強對管理當局的監督行為或對管理當局設立種種的限制,但是此種舉動對一個有抱負且認真的管理當局來說,反而增添其困擾。因此倘若股東和管理當局間的代理問題無法妥善解決,勢將嚴重影響公司的正常運作,甚至危害整個國家的經濟發展。
相對而言,自願性盈餘預測是可以降低資訊不對稱的現象。管理當局若能自願性發佈盈餘預測,則對降低管理當局和股東之間資訊不對稱、代理問題,有相當大的助益。本研究即基於此一觀點,假設管理當局為取信股東及債權人,必將主動發佈盈餘預測,而以「公司規模」、「自由現金流量」、「舉債程度」三個代理變數來衡量代理成本。研究結果發現,當公司舉債程度愈高,其揭露的意願愈強,和本研究原先的預期結果相同;但是現金流量對盈餘揭露行為並不顯著。而公司規模愈大,其自願性揭露的意願反而比較小,和代理理論觀點恰好相反。
Abstract
Agency theory, which discusses the conflict between agent and principle, was developed by Jensen and Meckling in 1976. Owing to the separation of ownership and management, shareholders and management authority have agency relationship. The one reason that shareholder hand in company affairs to management authority is that management authority has better management ability. Another reason is that shareholder cannot handle by himself for some reasons and must hand in to other people. Management authority has the advantage of information and they also seek for their own interest. But these behaviors may damage shareholder’s right and agency problems occur in the situation.
Agency problems occur not only between shareholder and management authority but also between management authority and lender in a company with debt. Shareholders often supervise management authority more strictly and make more rules to confine management authority in order to reduce agency problem or protect their own interest. But these actions disturb management authority when management authority is full of ambitions and endeavor. If agency problems between shareholder and management authority cannot be solved properly, it will make company operate abnormally and damage the nation’s economic further.
On the contrary earning forecast can reduce information asymmetry. If management authority can disclose earning forecast voluntarily, it is helpful to reduce the agency problem and the information asymmetry between shareholder and management authority. The article assumes management authority disclose earning forecast voluntarily in order to get shareholder and debtor’s trust in this point of view and use firm size、free cash flow、leverage as the proxy of agency cost. In this research we find that the more debt the company have, the higher voluntarily the company discloses earning forecast. It is the same as we expect. But free cast flow is not significant. When firm size is bigger, the management authority is less voluntary to disclose earning forecast. The result is contrary to the view of agency problem.
目次 Table of Contents
第一章 前 言 1
第一節 研究背景與研究動機 1
第二節 研究流程 3
第二章 文獻回顧與研究假說發展 4
第一節 財務預測制度發展與內容 4
第二節 代理成本與財務預測 10
第三節 假說發展 12
第四節 研究架構 16
第三章 研究方法 17
第一節 資料搜集 17
第二節 研究設計 17
第三節 變數之衡量 18
第四章 實證結果 22
第一節 模型分析 22
第二節 敏感性分析 27
第五章 研究結論 34
第二節 研究限制 36
第三節 未來研究方向 36
參考文獻 37
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