就美國證券交易法條10b-5 規範故意隱瞞、失實陳述或遺漏公司重大事實等不誠實的行為，本研究探討經理人自願性揭露的決策。藉由ㄧ個簡單的模型架構，發現該法條未能達到預期效果。模型ㄧ開始將公司區分為誠實與不誠實二種類型，由於公司消息有好有壞，及其發布的時機點影響投資人形成偏好，使得投資人對公司訊息產生相信及不相信的反應。假設法條不存在，該模型可以得出ㄧ個混淆均衡和ㄧ個分離均衡。但當該法條存在，模型只得出ㄧ個混淆均衡，顯見在法條規範下，投資人反而無法辨別公司誠實與否。
上述模型隱含三項假設。第一假設為該法條適用所有公司經理人，若放寬第一假設，則僅得出混淆均衡；第二假設為公司與經理人對法條立場一致，若放寬第二假設，投資人便可辨別出支持該法條的公司與經理人。第三假設為經理人言行ㄧ致，若放寬第三假設，投資人則可辨別盡責管理公司的經理人。顯見該法條僅適用於公司與經理人立場一致的前提下，特定經理人決策行為。除非經理人揭露公司資訊，並且言行一致，否則，投資人可質疑經理人違反該法條。本研究建議該法條詳細載明檢核經理人言行一致的作業程序，並在經理人做出不誠實的揭露時，由公司承受該成本。

This research discusses the reaction of a manager to voluntary disclosure after the execution of Rule 10b-5. I use backward induction to explain the strategic decisions within a firm concerning financial disclosure. Extensions of the base model examine the interaction of financial disclosure, investor relations, and managerial incentive to disclose, such as demonstrating a signaling game between a manager and investors for financial disclosure. I provide clues to distinguish between the honesty of companies and managers over the policy of voluntary disclosure. The path to screen managers' behavior does exist, but it only becomes a question of timing to find and take reaction.
This research first focuses on discussing voluntary disclosure under Rule 10b-5 and explains financial disclosure concerning strategic decisions within a firm. It demonstrates how Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act fails to induce voluntary disclosure. I separate firms by their method of raising external capital and analyze the decisions those firms make beyond the Rule’s execution, and then I show that company owners may deter the disclosure policy for their financing decisions. While there is a link between the way in which firms raise external capital and the information which the firms disclose, I further present that the transformed reaction of disclosure is the signal for the company's financing policy.
This research next discusses the reaction of investors to voluntary disclosure after information is in fact disclosed. I explain decisions concerning financial disclosure by which investors may cede the strategic role to managers. It is clear to see why the disclosure of information regulated by Rule 10b-5 results in noise for investment as well as different factors inherited by investors. I draw up the interaction of financial disclosure, the behavior of investors, and managerial incentive to disclose. The extra requirement for information shifts the positions of investors towards managers concerning the policy of financial disclosure.
After all factors (investor preference, prior belief, and information/endowment) discussed are taken into account, any financing action by investors is supposed to be rooted in a particular social context. To fully understand a given disclosure of news, the reaction of investors to believing such a disclosure must therefore be situated within the framework of the non-discrete relations that encompass it.

Contents v
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Rationale 1
1.2 Purposes 3
1.3 Motivation for this study 4
1.4 Structure of this study 5
Chapter 2 Literature Review 6
2.1 Rule discussion 6
2.1.1 Most essays before 1980 6
2.1.2 Essays before 2000 10
2.1.3 Essays after 2000 15
2.2 Investor relations 19
2.3 Ownership and external capital for disclosure 21
2.4 Other literature about voluntary disclosure 25
Chapter 3 The Model 30
3.1 Basic settings 30
3.2 Three factors concerning investor relations for financial disclosure 34
3.2.1 Investor preference 34
3.2.2 Prior belief 38
3.2.3 Information and endowment 40
3.3 The reaction of investors 41
Chapter 4 Rule Execution 47
4.1 Rationale behind firms’ behavior 47
4.2 Change in firms’ behavior 51
4.3 The possibility for truth-telling 56
Chapter 5 Examining Whether Investors Trust Managers Due to the Rule 63
5.1 Rationale behind investors’ behavior 63
5.2 The message conveyed by the managers 68
5.3 Reaction of firms to screen managers’ behavior 72
Chapter 6 Conclusions and Suggestions 76
6.1 To reboot the robustness of truth-telling 76
6.2 Temporary conclusions with no end of the game 87
6.3 Suggestions for further research 101
References 102
Appendix 107
Appendix 1: 107
Proof of Proposition 1. 107
Appendix 2: 114
Proof of Proposition 2. 114

Figure
Figure 1. The model setting 34
Figure 2. The type-changing process 36
Figure 3. The model ignoring Y type managers 59
Figure 4. The model with X changing to Y managers 60
Figure 5. The model re-setting 66
Figure 6. The model with X changing to Y managers 73
Figure 7. The model to scrutinize type Y managers 74
Figure 8. The transposed model setting 78
Figure 9. The model setting 83
Figure 10. Final setting of the model 88

Table
Table 1. The notation for Figure 1 33
Table 2. The notation for Figure 2 37
Table 3. The notation for Figure 5 66
Table 4. The notation for Figure 8 78
Table 5. The notation for Figure 9 83
Table 6. The notation for Figure 10 88
Table 7. Temporary outcome of the game 93

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