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博碩士論文 etd-0711111-220336 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-0711111-220336
論文名稱
Title
專業經理人職位的代理意涵:台灣個人電腦家族企業之實證分析
The Agency Implication of Professional Manager’s Position: An Empirical Study of Family Business in Taiwan’s Personal Computer Industry
系所名稱
Department
畢業學年期
Year, semester
語文別
Language
學位類別
Degree
頁數
Number of pages
92
研究生
Author
指導教授
Advisor
召集委員
Convenor
口試委員
Advisory Committee
口試日期
Date of Exam
2011-06-17
繳交日期
Date of Submission
2011-07-11
關鍵字
Keywords
專業經理人、獎酬、職位、家族企業、代理理論
family business, professional manager, agency theory, position, reward
統計
Statistics
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The thesis/dissertation has been browsed 5689 times, has been downloaded 3280 times.
中文摘要
家族式經營是台灣企業普遍的治理模式,而在台灣高科技產業中也不乏由家族所掌控的科技公司。由於高科技產業是競爭強度高、技術不斷在進步的產業,家族企業勢必要依賴專業經理人來協助公司經營,卻也因此衍生出所有權與經營權分離之代理問題。過去討論主理-代理人的代理問題,大多從績效-獎酬著手來激勵經理人,以避免其做出違背公司之自利行為,然而過去研究卻鮮少談論其他非金錢上的獎酬方式。本研究從代理理論觀點,以台灣30家電腦與周邊設備產業中的家族企業為對象,嘗試從長期角度,分析在這30家家族企業當中,給予高階經理人內部董事職位,對家族直接持股、間接持股與績效之間的關係。研究結果顯示,給予高階經理人內部董事職位,對家族直接持股與績效之間關係,不具有顯著調節效果;但是,給予高階經理人內部董事職位,對家族間接持股與績效之間關係,具有顯著弱化家族間接持股對公司績效負向影響之效果,代表專業經理人擔任公司核心決策職務,能夠充分發揮其專業能力,調和家族間接持股所帶來的可能負向績效意涵,並且對高科技家族企業,與其所屬集團企業間的網絡關係建立,有正向影響。研究結果對於家族企業獎酬專業經理人議題,具有相當之意義與價值。
Abstract
Family-owned governance is a typical governance structure in Taiwan’s companies, including those ones engaged in high-tech industry. For those family-owned companies in high-tech industry, they need to assign professional managers in key decision-making roles in order to compete in this industry characterize by fast-moving, rapidly changing, and highly competitive. Thus, the mechanism to solve the possible agency problem caused from separation of ownership and management is a rather tough issue for those high-tech family-owned companies. Utilizing the over-five-year data, this study examines the possible relationships between the assignment of professional managers in key decision-making roles, the family sharing, and the performance in Taiwan’s family-owned companies in personal computer industry. The results indicate that assigning professional managers in key decision-making roles will negatively moderate the negative relationship between family indirect sharing and performance. However, the assignment of professional managers in key decision-making roles will not significantly influence the relationship between family direct sharing and performance in high-tech family-owned companies. The finding highlights the importance of giving professional managers decision-making positions to solve the agency problem besides the typical compensation mechanism in family-owned company context. Furthermore, it also provides referable values in agency issues in family businesses.
目次 Table of Contents
論文審定書 i
誌謝 ii
中文摘要 iii
英文摘要 iv
第 一 章
緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 問題陳述與目的 3
第三節 研究重要性 5
第四節 研究流程 7
第 二 章 文獻探討 8
第一節 家族企業集團 8
第二節 高科技產業 13
第三節 家族企業專業化管理 25
第四節 家族企業中的代理問題 29
第五節 假說推導 36
第六節 研究架構 40
第 三 章 研究方法 41
第一節 資料蒐集 41
第二節 研究變數 43
第三節 Panel Data 模型 49
第 四 章 資料分析與實證研究 59
第一節 相關分析 60
第二節 迴歸分析 62
第三節 研究限制 66
第 五 章 結論與建議 67
第一節 研究結論 67
第二節 理論與實務意涵 69
第三節 後續研究建議 74
參考文獻 75
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