本文以Ramani (2000)對已開發國與低度開發國間的公司合作賽局模型為基礎，加入技術外溢、市場競爭者與不對稱議價能力等變數，以Nash議價解探討這些變數對原合作策略的影響，並探討技術購買價格與利潤分配比例之變動差異。本文發現對低度開發國家的公司而言，在任何情況下皆能藉由與已開發國的公司技術合作增加利潤，且可提升低度開發國家的技術能力，然上述變數對已開發國的公司的影響則不一定，除技術外溢時會增加利潤外，其餘兩種情況將使利潤降低。

This paper is based on the model, originated from Ramani (2000), investigating cooperative game among firms of developed and least-developed countries, and further analyses the effects of technology spillovers, the existence of market competitors, and asymmetry bargaining power by adopting Nash bargaining solution. We reach three conclusions. For firms of least-developed countries, they will benefit from developed countries by cooperating in any circumstances. Second, the cooperation promotes technology capabilities of the least-developed countries. Third, firms of developed countries can benefit from cooperation only in the case of technology spillovers.

論文審定書 i
誌謝 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
目錄 v
圖目錄 vi
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與背景 1
第二節 研究目的 1
第三節 研究方法 2
第四節 本文架構 2
第二章 文獻回顧 3
第三章 理論模型 6
第一節 模型基本假設 6
第二節　技術外溢 7
第三節　市場競爭者 13
第四節　不對稱議價能力 18
第四章 結論 24
參考文獻 25

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