現代的企業中，資本結構多由特定或不特定的大眾籌集而來。在經營權與所有權分離的情況下，所有權者的利益與經營者利益未必會一致的狀態，故產生代理問題。加上近年來，社會大眾對於企業發放不合常理之董監事酬勞存有很深的疑慮，故本研究以2005~2007年台灣上市公司為研究樣本，探討從公司治理的角度，針對董監事持股比例、董監事持股質押比例、董事長是否兼任總經理、董事平均酬金、獨立董事席次、外資投資人與機構投資人對於企業盈餘管理之影響。
而實證結果顯示，全產業、電子業與非電子業之董事長兼任總經理與盈餘管理程度呈顯著正相關，符合研究假說；全產業與非電子業之董事平均酬勞與盈餘管理程度呈顯著正相關，符合研究假說。而在不同產業下，部分假說受到實證結果支持，亦有部分假說不成立，因此本研究認為公司治理變數與盈餘管理之間的關連性深受產業特性影響。
此外本研究亦發現，公司治理與盈餘管理二者之間並非具有直接密切關係，故推論台灣開始重視公司治理的時間還尚短的情況下，公司治理可能無法成為一項獨立影響盈餘管理顯著抑制管理者之行為因素，因此呈現部分假說不成立。

In the modern enterprises, the capital structures are made up by the specific or the non-specific populace sources. In the separation of management rights and ownership, their common interests may not be the same, so the agency problems are arising. In recent years, the public has serious doubts about unreasonable compensation of directors with higher ranks. The study samples are companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2007, but excluding banks and insurance companies. This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. The corporate governance variables include director stock ownership, the pledged share ratio of directors, chairman of the board as general manager, percent of independent directors on the board, the average compensation of directors, foreign investors’ ownership, and institutional ownership in the firm.
The empirical results show that chairman of the board as general manager who has significant influence on earnings management in the whole industry, electronic industry, and non-electronic industry; the average compensation of directors with higher ranks have significant influence on earnings management in the whole industry and non-electronic industry. In different industries, some empirical results support the hypotheses while other hypotheses do not hold. Thus, this research study has believed that the interconnection between the corporate governance variables and earning management will be affected by characteristics of certain industries.
In addition, this research study has also found that there are no direct relationships between corporate governance and earnings management. Hence, the corporate governance in Taiwan is still considered not long enough and can not become an independent factor to affect earnings management inhibition of behavior. Therefore, certain parts of hypotheses will not establish.

謝 誌 i
摘 要 i
目錄 iv
圖目錄 v
表目錄 vi
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究流程 4
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 公司治理 6
第二節 代理問題與薪酬 11
第三節 盈餘管理 17
第四節 董事會特性與董監酬勞 23
第五節 獨立董事 31
第六節 機構投資人 34
第三章 研究方法與設計 36
第一節 研究架構與假設 37
第二節 變數衡量與實證模型 39
第三節 研究樣本及分析方法 45
第四章 實證結果與分析 48
第一節 敘述性統計 48
第二節 相關性分析 59
第三節 迴歸分析 60
第五章 結論與建議 71
第一節 研究結論 71
第二節 研究限制與建議 75
參考文獻 76
附錄 84

參考文獻
一、中文部分：
1.王國權，2006，獨立董、監事特性與盈餘管理關聯性之研究，雲林科技大學論文財務金融系碩士論文。
2.宋致皓，2006，董監酬勞與公司治理關聯性之研究，國立政治大學會計學系碩士論文。
3.林俊廷，2006，高階經理人獎酬計畫、公司治理與盈餘管理，國立東華大學企業管理學系碩士論文。
4.胡鈞婷，2007，獨立董事、公司績效與董監酬勞之關聯，國立臺灣大學管理學院會計學研究所碩士論文。
5.洪慧婷、歐小萍、江易峰、林祐榕、周郁倫、謝慧衿，2003，企業經營績效兩大支柱-員工與董監事以台灣上市電子業為例，輔仁大學企業管理學系財務管理專題報告。
6.高蘭芬，2001，董監事股權質押之代理問題對會計資訊與公司績效之影響，國立成功大學會計學系博士班論文。
7.莊忠柱，2005，董事會組成與盈餘管理對公司價值影響:以台灣上市上櫃公司為例，真理大學管理科學研究所碩士論文。
8.張瑞棻，2002，股權結構與盈餘管理之相關性研究，輔仁大學碩士論文。
9.陳春山，2002，董事責任及獨立董事:公司治理的規則，學林文化事業有限公司。
10.陳錦村與葉雅薰，2002。公司改組、監督機制與盈餘管理之研究，會計評論，第34 期（1月）：1-29。
11.陳文河，1999，上市公司外部董事及監察人行使職權成效之研究，證交資料，第456期，1－14。
12.陳茵琦，2005，機構投資人與公司治理，證券櫃臺，第一百一十一期（9月）：57-68。
13.陳明義，2006，董事會品質與盈餘管理之關聯性研究，淡江大學會計學系碩士論文。
14.粘元馨，2007，台灣上市公司的內外治理機制對盈餘管理影響之實證研究，佛光大學管理學系碩士論文。
15.許溪南、歐陽豪、陳慶芳，2007年6月，公司治理、盈餘管理與財務預警模型之建構，會計與公司治理第四卷第一期。85-121 頁
16.葉銀華、李存修及柯承恩，2002，「公司治理與評等系統」，商智文化出版。
17.傅慧貞，2006，我國獨立董監制度及董監酬勞對裁決性應計數影響之研究，輔仁大學會計學系在職專班碩士論文。
18.黃怡文，2007， 董事會組成、經營績效與薪酬之關聯性研究，國立高雄第一科技大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
19.詹浤榮，2002，外資法人持股調整與應計項目關聯性研究，逢甲大學會計與財稅碩士論文。
20.劉若蘭，2005，內部人股票交易與會計資訊品質關聯性之研究，國立成功大學會計碩博士論文。
21.劉恩強，2005，機構投資人對公司盈餘管理之影響，台北大學會計學系碩士論文。
22.劉坤億、蔡淑美，2004，行政法人公司治理模式可行性，行政院人事局委託研究報告，國立台北大學公共行政暨政策學系。
23.劉泰麟，2004，公司治理之增額除弊效果，東海大學會計學系碩士論文。
24.蕭瓊枝，2006，我國獨立董監制度及董監酬勞公司經營績效影響之研究，輔仁大學會計學系碩士論文。
25.戴家偉，2006，董事會成員特質對盈餘管理影響之實證研究， 台北大學會計學系碩士論文。
26.鍾志杰，2006，董監酬勞與會計資訊品質-從盈餘管理與資訊揭露的角度探討，中原大學會計研究所碩士論文。
27.經濟合作暨發展組織（Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development，OECD）,2004,OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Paris: OECD.
二、英文部分：
1.Alkhafaji, A. F.,1990,“Effective Boards of Directors：An Overviews”, Industrial Management and Data Systems, pp.18-26.。
2.Berle, A. and G. C. Means,1932,The Modern Corporate and Private Property, New York：Macmillan.。
3.Bowen, R. M., S. Rajgopal, and M. Venkatachalam.,2003,"Accounting choice,corporate governance and firm performance." Working paper, University of Washington.
4.Bryan, S., L. Hwang, A. Klein, and S. Lilien.,2000, Compensation of Outside Directors: An Empirical of Economic Determinants. Working Paper.
5.Bushman, R. M, and A. J. Smith ,2001, Financial accounting information and corporate governance. Journal of Accounting & Economics 32：237-333.
6.Daily, C.M., J.L. Johnson , A.E. Ellstrand, and D.R. Dalton.,1998, Compensation committee composition as a determinant of CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal 41 (2): 209－220.
7.DeAngelo, L. E.,1986,Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study of Management Buyouts of Public Stockholders. The Accounting Review 61(3):400-420.
8.Dechow, P., and R. Sloan ,1991, Executive Incentives and the Horizon Problem. Journal of Accounting and Economics 14 (1):51-89.
9.Dechow, P., R. Sloan, and Sweeney,1995,“Detecting Earnings Management,”The Accounting Review :193-226.
10.Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney.,1996 , "Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. " Contemporary Accounting Research 13, 1-36.
11.Donaldson J. and P. Davis,1992,Business ethics, London, Academic Press, San Diego.
12.Eisenhardt, K.M.,1989,Agency Theory: an Assessment and Review, Academy of Management Review 14：p.57-74.
13.Fama, E. and M.C. Jensen,1983,Agency Problems and Residual Claims, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26：p.327-349.
14.Fama, E. F., 1985, "What's Different about Banks?" Journal of Monetary Economics 15, 29-39.
15.Finkelstein,S.andD.C. Hambrick,1989,Chief Executive Compensation：A Study of the Intersection of Markets and Political Process. Strategic Management Journal,10：p.121-134.
16.Guay, W. P., S. P. Kothari, and R. L. Watts. 1996. A Market-Based Evaluation of Discretionary Accruals Models. Journal of Accounting Research 34 (Supplement): 83-105.
17.Healy, P.,1985,“The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 7(1): 85-107.
18.Healy and Wahlen,1999,“A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting,” Accounting Horizons, Vol. 13,365-383..
19.Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling,1976,Theory of the film：Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure , Journal of Finance Economics 3：p.305-360.
20.Jensen, M. C.,1993,"The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems." Journal of Finance 48, 831-880.
21.Jones, J.J.,1991,“Earnings Management during Import Relief Investigation. ”Journal of Accounting Research29：193-228.
22.Kesner, I. F. and D. R. Dalton,1987,“Composition and CEO Duality in Boards of Directors: An International Perspective,” Journal of Internation Business Studies, Vol. 18, pp33-42.
23.La Porta, Rafael, Flowrencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer,1999,Corporate ownership around the world, Journal of Finance,54：p.471-517.
24.Leland, H and D. Pyle,1977, ”Information Asymmetries”, Vol 132, pp371-387
25.Liu, Q., and Z. Lu.,2002, Earning management to tunnel: Evidence from China’s listed companies. Working paper, University of Hong Kong.
26.Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny,1988,“Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis” , Journal of Financial Economics 20, pp.293-315.
27.Moses,O.D.,1987,Income smoothing and incentives: Empirical testsusing accounting changes.The Accounting Review 62(2):358-377.
28.Oviatt B. M.,1988,Agency and Transaction Cost Perspectives on the Manager-Shareholder Relationship: Incentive for Congruent Interests, Academy of Management Review, 13(2)：p.214-225.
29.Patton, A. and J. C. Baker,1987,Why Won’t Directors Rock the Boat?, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 65：p.10-18.
30.Schipper, K.,1989,Earnings management. Accounting Horizons, 3: 91-102.
31.Smith, C. W. and J.Warner,1979, On the Financial Contracting an Analysis of Bond Covenants, Journal of Financial Economics,7, 117-161.
32.Starks, L.,2000, Corporate governance and institutional investors: Implications for Latin America. AB ANTE, Estudios en Dirreccion de Empresas 2：161-182.。
33.Vafeas, N.,1999, Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 53, 113-142.
34.Warfield, T. D., J. J. Wild, and K. L. Wild.,1995,"Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings." Journal of Accounting and Economics 20, 61-92.
35.Williamson, O. E.,1983,"Organization form Residual Claimants and Corporate Control." Journal of Law and Economics, 26 (2), 351-366.
36.World Bank,1999,“Corporate Governance： A Framework for Implementation-Overview”,The World Bank,Washington D. C.。
37.Xie, B., W. N. Davidson, and P. J. DaDalt.,2003, Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance 9, 295-316.
38.Zahra, S. A. and J. A. Pearce ,1989,Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance：A review and Integrative Model, Journal of Management, Vol. 15：p.291-334.