近期因為許多企業醜聞的爆發讓會計師審查獨立性及輪調的議題成為關注討論的焦點。為了強化會計師的審查獨立性美國政府於2002年通過的沙賓法案中強制規定企業必須每五年更換簽證的會計師，以確保會計師的審計報告品質不會隨著會計師的任期增長而遭受不好的影響。但對於此項法案通過的結果並不是每位學者都採贊成的態度，因此為了分析這個議題，我們將利用賽局理論及議價模型試圖探討會計師任期的長短是否會對公司逃稅行為及會計師審查獨立性造成影響。
由本文研究的主要結果：在會計師的議價能力隨會計師任期增加的模型假設下，公司管理者因為會計師議價能力增加使得分配到的勾結逃稅利益降低，因而隱含隨著會計師任期的增加會減少公司管理者勾結逃稅的誘因，最終選擇提高申報所得。相反的，對於會計師而言將因議價能力增加讓分配到的勾結逃稅利益增加，不過要讓公司願意和會計師勾結的前提是會計師必須握有公司逃稅的證據，所以這將提高會計師審查的努力程度並選擇幫助公司製作不實簽證。因此當會計師任期越長時將影響其審查獨立性及報告品質。

Because of recent corporate scandals, auditor independence and turnover have become the focus of much debate. For strengthening auditor independence , American government compulsorily stipulate that the firm has to replace its auditor every five years in Sarbanes-Oxley Act that was passed in 2002 to ensure that the increasing tenure can’t lead to an bad audit quality. However, not every scholar all supports the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In order to analyze these issues, we try to find out the relation between the length of auditor tenure and behavior of corporate income tax evasion and auditor independence by using game theory and bargaining model.
Our main results are as follows. In our model, we suppose the auditor bargaining ability is positively related to tenure. Manager will gain lower benefits of tax evasion with increasing auditor bargaining ability, implying that increasing tenure reduces managerial collusion incentives. Finally, manager decides to report higher income. In contrast, auditor will gain higher benefits of tax evasion with increasing auditor bargaining ability. But for the auditor, the precondition of making company to be willing to collude with auditor is to possess the evidence of corporate income tax evasion. Because of that, auditor will increase the level of auditing efforts and choose to help company to make an incorrect attestation. So increasing tenure will influence auditor independence and audit quality.

誌謝 Ⅰ
摘要 Ⅱ
Abstract Ⅲ
目錄 Ⅳ
圖目錄 Ⅵ
表目錄 Ⅵ
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究動機及目的 1
1.2 研究方法 3
1.3 研究流程 4
1.4 全文架構 5
第二章 文獻回顧 6
2.1 稽查與代理模型 6
2.2 稽查與訂價模型 7
2.3 稽查者與被稽查者之間的互動策略 8
第三章 理論模型 13
3.1 基本架構 13
3.2 模型設定及假設 14
3.3 模型的動態賽局說明 17
3.4 公司管理者與會計師的議價合作 22
3.5 公司申報所得及會計師審查 27
3.6 會計師任期的影響 35
第四章 結論及未來研究 39
4.1 結論 39
4.2 未來研究 41
參考文獻42

一、中文文獻
1.張維迎著；劉楚俊編校，「賽局理論與信息經濟學」，台北市：茂昌圖書有限公司，民國88年。
2.羅婉茹，「會計師任期與盈餘管理關係之研究」，朝陽科技大學會計系碩士論文，民國93年。
二、英文文獻
1.　Carey, Peter and Simnett, Roger (2006) “Audit partner tenure and audit quality,” The Accounting Review, Vol. 81, No. 3, pp653-676.
2.　Chu, C. Y. Cyrus and Chen, Kong-Pin (2002) “Internal Control vs External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion,” Rand Journal of Economics ,pp1-25.
3.　Coate, Charles J., Florence, Robert E. and Kral, Kristi L. (2002) “Financial statement audits, a game of chicken?” Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 41, pp1-11.
4.　Davis, Larry R., Soo, Billy and Trompeter, Greg (2002) “Auditor tenure, auditor independence and earnings management,” working paper, Michigan Tech University and Boston College.
5.　DeAngelo, Linda Elizabeth (1981) “Auditor independence, ‘Low balling’ and disclosure regulation,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 3, pp113-127.
6.　Fairchild Richard (2008) “Auditor tenure, managerial fraud and report qualification: a behavioural game-theoretic approach,” Behavioural Accounting and Finance, Vol. 1, No. 1.
7.　Fellingham, John C. and Newman, D.Paul (1985) “Strategic considerations in auditing,” The Accounting Review, Vol. 60, pp634-650.
8.　Geiger, Marshall A. and Raghunandan, K. (2002) “Auditor tenure and audit reporting failures,” Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, March, Vol. 21, No. 1.
9.　Ghosh, Aloke and Moon, Doocheol (2005) “Does audit tenure impair audit quality?” The Accounting Review, Vol. 80, pp585-612.
10.　Magee, Robert P. and Tseng, Mei-Chiun (1990) “Audit pricing and independence,” The Accounting Review, Vol. 65, pp315-336.
11.　Matsumura, Ella Mae and Tucker, Robert R. (1992) “Fraud detection: a theoretical foundation,” The Accounting Review, Vol. 67, pp753-782.
12.　Morton, Sanford (1993) “Strategic auditing for fraud,” The Accounting Review, Vol. 68, pp825-839.
13.　Myers, James N, Myers, Linda A. and Omer, Thomas C. (2003) “Exploring the term of the auditor-client relationship and the quality of earnings: a case for mandatory auditor rotation?” The Accounting Review, Vol.78, pp779-800.
14.　Newman, Paul and Noel, James (1989) “Error rates, detection rates and payoff functions in auditing,” Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 8, (Supplement) pp50-63.