當一連串的財務危機和會計醜聞襲擊台灣、亞洲、甚至全世界時，各國政府、研究機構和學者紛紛開始倡導「公司治理」的重要性。有別於之前各研究著重在公司治理機制如何提升公司價值，和降低財務風險，本研究納入投資機會組合（Investment opportunity set, IOS）為一環境因素，並測試企業經營績效、投資機會組合，和公司治理內部機制（CEO雙重性、董監質押比率），外部機制（審計品質、機構投資人持股比率）之間的互動關係。
研究樣本為2003年999家上市櫃公司（剔除金融、保險、證券業，及資料不全公司），並以因素分析、相關性分析，及迴歸分析測試四項假設。研究結果顯示：(1)不論電子業或非電子業，審計品質並不會影響經營績效和投資機會的互動關係；(2) 不論電子業或非電子業，機構投資人持股比例對經營績效和投資機會的互動關係有負向且顯著的影響；(3)CEO不兼任董事長，對非電子業無顯著影響；但對電子業有負向且顯著影響；(4)最後，高董監質押比率對經營績效和投資機會的互動關係有顯著且正向的影響。

As a series of financial crisis and accounting scandals occur around the world, the government, many institutions and the public have put great emphasis on corporate governance. Most of the prior research focus on how the corporate governance monitoring system can enhance the firm value and reduce the financial crisis.
This empirical analysis includes investment opportunity set (IOS) as an environmental factor and tests the interaction between IOS, firm performance and external corporate governance mechanisms (audit quality and institutional investor ownership) as well as internal corporate governance mechanisms (CEO duality and pledged shares ratio of directors and supervisors) in Taiwan.
The sample consists of 999 Taiwan publicly listed companies both in electronics industry and non-electronics industries in 2003. This empirical study uses common factor analysis, Pearson’s correlation analysis and regression analysis to test four hypotheses.
The hypotheses are as follows: (1) the relationship between IOS and firm performance will be affected if the auditor is from the Big 4 auditing firm. (2) The relationship between IOS and firm performance will be changed due to the institutional investor ownership. (3) The CEO duality will influence the relationship between IOS and firm performance. (4) The pledged shares ratio of directors and supervisors has an influence on the relationship between IOS and firm performance.
The results show that audit quality has no influence on the association of IOS and firm performance, but the institutional investor ownership has a negative and significant influence on that relationship. In non-electronics industries, CEO duality won’t change the firm performance but a negative influence is reported in this study.
Eventually, while many companies with financial distress have a higher pledged shares ratio than other normal companies, a positive influence is shown in this study when the investment opportunity set is considered.

Content
Chapter 1 Introduction…………………………………………………...1
1-1 Research background…………………………………………………….1
1-2 Purpose….………………………………………………………………..5
1-3 Research model…………………………………………………………..6
1-4 Research process…………………………………………………………7
Chapter 2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development…………….8
2-1 External Corporate Governance mechanisms…………………………...12
I. Audit Quality…………………………………………………………12
II. Institutional investor ownership..…………………………………….14
2-2 Internal Corporate Governance mechanisms……………………………17
I. CEO duality…………………………………………………………..17
II. Pledged shares ratio…………………………………………………..20
Chapter 3 Research Design……………………………………………...22
3-1 Sample selection and restrictions…………………………………….….22
3-2 Variable Measurement…………………………………………………...25
I. IOS……………………………………………………………………25
II. Independent variables………………………………………………...27
III. Dependent variable…………………………………………………...28
IV. Control variables……………………………………………………..28
3-3 Regression model……………………………………………………….30

Chapter 4 Results and Discussion……………………………………..32
4-1 Descriptive statistics analysis……………………………………………32
4-2 Correlation analysis……………………………………………………...38
4-3 Regression analysis……………………………………………………...40
4-4 Sensitivity analysis………………………………………………………46
Chapter 5 Summary and Suggestion……………………………………47
5-1 Summary and contribution………………………………………………47
5-2 Research limitation……………………………………………………...49
5-3 Recommendation………………………………………………………..50
Reference………………………………………………………………..51


Table Content
Table 3-1 Distributions of samples of 999 Taiwan listed companies in 2003………..23
Table 3-2 Common factor analysis of the three measures of IOS……………………27
Table 4-1 Frequency distribution (for all industries)…………………………………32
Table 4-2 Frequency distribution (for electronic industries)…………………………33
Table 4-3 Frequency distribution (for non-electronic industries)…………………….33
Table 4-4 Descriptive statistics (for all industries)…………………………………...35
Table 4-5 Descriptive statistics (for electronic industries)…………………………...36
Table 4-6 Descriptive statistics (for non-electronic industries)………………………37
Table 4-7 Pearson’s correlations……………………………………………………...39
Table 4-8 Regression results (for all industries)……………………………………...40
Table 4-9 Regression results (for electronic industries)……………………………...42
Table 4-10 Regression results (for non-electronic industries)……………………….44
Table 4-11 Regression results (for all industries)……………………………………46


Figure Content
Figure 1-1 Research model…………………………………………………………….6
Figure 1-2 Research process…………………………………………………………...7
Figure 2-1 Corporate Governance framework……………………………………….11

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