家族式經營是台灣企業普遍的治理模式，家族企業因所有權與經營權的集中雖降低了傳統的代理問題，卻可能因經理人同時由家族成員擔任，衍生另一種型態的核心代理問題(主理人-主理人)，因而成為各界要求強化公司治理的主因之一。然而，過去探討企業內部的公司治理機制，焦點大多在於董事會獨立性的影響，鮮少針對內部稽核獨立性的影響進行研究。本研究透過問卷的設計及調查，以實際檢測內部稽核人員對所屬企業的內部稽核獨立性程度，並從有效回收問卷整理出103家上市(櫃)公司作為研究樣本，以代理理論觀點，分析在家族治理模式下，內部稽核獨立性對於降低代理問題及其公司績效的影響。
本研究提出二項影響內部稽核獨立性的指標因素，分別為：外部因素-內部稽核權力與內部因素-內部稽核獨立執行業務的能力。研究結果證實：(1)外部董事席次比率愈高，其公司績效愈佳。(2)家族治理模式下，內部稽核獨立性對其公司績效具有顯著的影響力。(3)內部稽核獨立執行業務的能力愈高的影響下，會強化外部董事席次比率與其公司績效的正向影響。(4)內部稽核獨立執行業務的能力愈高的影響下，會強化家族成員擔任董事長對其公司績效的正向影響。
本研究不僅提出了內部稽核獨立性之衡量指標可供後續研究者參考，同時驗證了內部稽核獨立性對公司治理與組織績效具有影響。研究結果對於家族企業內部稽核獨立性議題，具有理論與實務上相當之意義與價值。

Family-owned enterprise is a typical governance structure around the world. In addressing the governance issues in family business, the founding family usually utilizes the direct or indirect ownership structure and also the management design to mitigate the typical agency-principal problem among founding family and the professional managers in family businesses. However, scholars indicate that the majority shareholders, such as the founding family in a family business, will induce the principal-principal agency concern, and also have the possibility to exploit the minority shareholder’s interests in publicly traded family businesses. Thus, the corporate governance today will not only focus on mitigating the typical agency-principal problem, but also the principal-principal agency problem in family businesses. This study tries to examine the role of the internal audit’s independence in addressing the performance issues in publicly traded family businesses in Taiwan. From the agency theory viewpoint, this study try to utilize the questionnaires method to estimate the degree of the internal audit’s independence, and future examine its performance impact in family businesses in Taiwan.
This study suggests that the internal audit power, and the internal audit independent execution, can be two kinds of independence indexes in estimating the degree of internal audit’s independence. The results indicate that the internal audit’s independence will generate direct and moderated impact on publicly trade family business’s performance in Taiwan. Specifically, the more independent board of directors a family business has, the better performance that this focal firm behaves. Moreover, the internal audit’s independence will generate positively direct impact on firm performance in a family business. Additionally, the degree of internal audit’s independent execution will moderate the positive impact from independent board of directors and family leadership on firm performance in publicly trade family businesses in Taiwan. This study provides referable values in estimating the internal audit’s independence in publicly trade businesses. And it also provides theoretical and practical implications in addressing governance issues in family businesses in Asia.

目 錄
論文審定書 i
誌謝辭 ii
中文摘要 iii
英文摘要 iv
第 一 章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 問題陳述與研究目的 4
第三節 研究重要性 7
第四節 研究流程 9
第 二 章 文獻探討 10
第一節 家族集團企業 10
第二節 代理理論 18
第三節 內部稽核 31
第四節 假說推導 39
第五節 研究架構 45
第 三 章 研究方法 46
第一節 研究對象與資料蒐集 46
第二節 研究變數定義 49
第三節 研究工具及信效度分析 54
第四節 修正後研究架構 60
第五節 資料分析方法 61
第 四 章 資料分析與實證研究 63
第一節 敘述性統計分析 63
第二節 信度分析 67
第三節 相關分析 70
第四節 迴歸分析 72
第 五 章 結論與建議 78
第一節 研究結論 78
第二節 理論與實務意涵 80
第三節 後續研究建議 86
第四節 研究限制 87

參考文獻 88
附 錄 98

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