本文是以尋租的概念為基礎，探討擁有豐富天然資源的開發中國家政府對於貿易的管制行為，並將天然資源貿易範圍縮小至原木貿易跟歐盟國家的交易行為，歐盟國家應根據開發中國家政府的管制措施，訂定相對應的處置。
面對越來越多經濟體要求砍伐原木須符合綠色環保前提下，富有豐富原木的開發中國家是否能真正落實合法砍伐?或開發中國家政府會從不同的角度看待這樣的規定。研究發現，開發中國家執法程度的拿捏，取決於能否替政府帶來效用極大化，假如有不符合綠色認證標準的廠商想要透過賄賂政府官員，來取得政府的認同，其賄賂金額如果沒有辦法為政府帶來極大效用，政府會選擇嚴格執法以杜絕不符合綠色認證標準的廠商，讓擁有作弊念頭的廠商知難而退。
綜上所述，所有的租(利潤)都能完全被政府擷取，對政府而言廠商是否符合綠
色認證標準並不影響政府執法程度，因為最後政府都是最大的贏家。
本文也發現，對歐盟國家而言，在不確定開發中國家是否確實執行綠色認證審核下，只有訂立懲罰條款來提高合法的機率，才能確保在歐盟國家境內銷售的木製品確實符合綠色標準，其來源也合法，在這樣的前提下，當歐盟查緝到開發中國家貿易商出口至歐盟的原木屬於不合法來源，歐盟給予的懲罰大於可得到的效用時，開發中國家政府就會因此加強取締不符合綠色標準的廠商，以提高合法率，降低被歐盟懲罰的機率。

The study is based on the concept of rent-seeking to explore control behavior of trade for the government in emerging countries. The scope is confined to the trade between the emerging countries with the Europe Union on logs and EU should take corresponding action based on government’s control measures in emerging countries.
Under the premise of the environmental protection for logging required by many countries, the study will discuss whether the emerging countries can ensure the legal logging or the government can have different angles on this issue.
The study discover that the government in emerging countries decide the degree of the execution for legal logging depend on the utility brought for the government. If there are unqualified log trading company which fail to meet the green environmental standard and try to bribe the official to pass, the government will choose to enforce the law strictly to remove unqualified logging company.
In conclusion, the rent can be exempt from the logging company by the government because the degree of the enforcement of the law will make no difference whether the logging company meets the green standard or not. No matter what, the government wins.
The study also discover that because of the weak verification for green standard by the emerging countries, the Europe Union can only set up the penalty clause to raise up the ratio of meeting the law and make sure the sale of wood product are qualified with green

論文審定書...........................................................i
謝辭................................................................ii
摘要...............................................................iii
Abstract............................................................iv
目錄.................................................................v
第一章 緒論..........................................................1
第一節 研究動機..................................................1
第二節 研究方法與架構............................................2
第二章 文獻探討......................................................3
第三章 基本模型......................................................5
第一節 模型假設.................................................5
第二節 模型分析.................................................9
第三節 加入歐盟國家的懲罰條款..................................13
第四章 結論與建議...................................................17
第一節 研究結論.................................................17
第二節 研究建議.................................................18
參考文獻............................................................19

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