銀行追求最大利潤是天經地義的事情，理專受雇於銀行替公司追求最大利潤好像也是理所當然的事，銀行承擔風險的能力當然比一個理專承擔風險的能力高，在總體經濟的領域中，告訴我們加總的個體並不等於總體，就像節儉的矛盾，銀行與理專之間也存在著風險的矛盾，因為一樣遇到金融海嘯，金融體系都活下來，但是好多理專都陣亡，所以我們試圖從模型中解釋這當中的矛盾，銀行的最適選擇應該不是理專的最適選擇。

基礎模型為兩期模型，銀行的利潤來自於專員引導的資產保全跟銀行引導的資產投資，金融海嘯發生的損傷率則是折現率，第一階段公司賣風險性資產，專員有賣與不賣的選擇，金融海嘯發生的損傷率會改變原本的選擇，跳槽原本是一件不中性的詞，但是專員一開始打定跳槽的主意反而可以保護客戶的資產，加入跳槽這個因素，決定第二期要帶多少客人走，最後竟成為保留下來的資產，折現率越小，代表著社會的穩定度越高，理專保留資產的動作好像對社會的穩定度盡了棉薄之力。

It is a matter of course for a bank to maximize its profit; it is also perfectly justified for a financial advisor to seek maximum profit for the bank whom employed him. It is obvious that the bank has more ability in undertaking risk than a single financial advisor. In the field of economy, there is an unalterable principle- the sum of every single subunit does not equal to the unit as a whole. Like Paradox of Thrift, there is a risk contradiction between the bank and the financial advisor. During the financial crisis, a large number of financial advisors were knocked out of the game, while most of the financial institutes survived the disaster; therefore, we attempted to interpret the contradiction within the model. First of all, the best decision for the bank may not be the ideal decision for its employed financial advisors. The basic model is a two term model, and bank's profit is generated by financial advisor guiding asset ensuring and by bank guiding asset investment. The loss caused by the financial crisis is discount rate. In the first stage of selling risky asset by the firm, financial advisors have the option to sell it or to keep it, but it is likely that the discount rate of financial crisis causes them to change their mind and go for the alternative option. Originally, job-hopping isn't a neutral word, but ever since a financial advisor decided to job-hop, their clients' asset will be protected. Includes the job-hopping factor, the losing client contributes to the preserved asset. We can conclude that as the value of discount rate decreases, the stability of the society increases. The conservation of assets by the financial advisor might have contributed slightly to the stability of the society.

論文審定書...........................................................i
謝辭................................................................ii
摘要...............................................................iii
Abstract............................................................iv
目錄.................................................................v
緒論.........................................................1
研究動機.................................................1
研究方法與架構...........................................2
文獻探討.....................................................3
基本模型.....................................................5
模型假設................................................5
跨期預算限制............................................9
銀行賣風險性資產........................................11
發生金融海嘯的影響......................................13
公司高壓管理，理專跳槽..................................20
混合策略均衡............................................23
銀行求償多少............................................25
帶多少客戶走............................................26
群體選擇................................................27
結論與建議...................................................29
研究結論.................................................29
未來研究建議.............................................30
參考文獻............................................................31
附錄一..............................................................33
附錄二..............................................................34

表次
表一 S值大小之經濟意義分析表........................................7
表二 S值大小之銀行著重分析表........................................7
表三 策略式表述....................................................22

圖次
圖一 跨期預算限制圖.................................................8
圖二 γ變大之跨期預算限制圖..........................................9
圖三 現實主義者的跨期預算限制圖....................................10
圖四 未來主義者的跨期預算限制圖....................................11
圖五 銀行與理專靜態賽局圖..........................................12
圖六 現實主義者與未來主義者加入銀行賣風險性資產的跨期預算限制圖....12
圖七 現實主義者加入銀行賣風險性資產的跨期預算限制圖................14
圖八 現實主義者加入銀行賣風險性資產加入金融海嘯的跨期預算限制圖....15
圖九 未來主義者加入銀行賣風險性資產的預算限制圖....................16
圖十 未來主義者加入∆P-τ遇到金融海嘯的預算限制....................17
圖十一代表在沒有∆P-τ的情況下發生金融海嘯現實與未來主義的比較圖....18
圖十二銀行加入∆P-τ的情況下發生金融海嘯現實與未來主義的比較圖......19

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