最近幾年，第五代行動通訊(5th Generation Mobile Networks, 5th Generation Wireless Systems或5G)被視為是未來世界的關鍵技術，因為5G具有包括高數據速率，可靠的網路存取，低服務延遲以及支持大量數據流量等特性，能夠克服許多無線移動網路的挑戰。在5G環境中會透過網路功能虛擬化（Network Function Virtualization，NFV）以及軟體定義網路（Software-Defined Networking, SDN）來架構稱為網路切片(Network Slicing)的新概念。透過使用網路切片的概念，5G電信運營商可以實現支援具有各種不同服務用戶的目標，並且可以創建具有獨特屬性的切片功能。然而，目前傳統的認證機制並沒有辦法解決網路切片切換中，使用者需要經過繁瑣的認證過程導致計算成本提高的問題。因此，我們提出了一種網路切片的切換認證機制，不僅可以滿足3GPP所定義的標準，也可以通過將計算委託給邊緣雲來實現低時間延遲特性。此外，我們的機制中使用了代理重簽章和無證書簽章的概念。因此，即使用戶需要在不同的電信運營商中切換使用網路切片服務，依然可以滿足低時間延遲的認證流程需求。

In recent years, the 5th Generation Mobile Network (5G) is considered as a key technology in the future world, where high-speed data rate, ultra-high reliability network access, low-latency applications, and supporting massive amounts of data open several challenges of wireless mobile networks. In 5G environments, it applies the functionalities of Network Function Virtualization and Software-Defined Networking to support multiple services and proposes a new concept called Network Slicing. By using that concept, the 5G telecommunication operators can achieve the goal of supporting users with a variety of different services and can also create a slice with certain unique characteristics. For examples: eMBB slicing, URLLC slicing, etc. However, the traditional authentication mechanism does not address any concrete strategy for network slicing handover in 5G so that the computational process must be calculated by the core network. Hence, we propose a network slicing handover authentication scheme that not only satisfies the standards defined by 3rd Generation Partnership Project but also achieves low time latency through delegating computation overhead to theedge clouds. In addition, we incorporate the concepts of the proxy re-signature and certificateless signature in our scheme. As a result, when users need to use the network slicing services across the telecommunications operators, they can still meet the requirements of reducing the time latency in the process of the authentication flows.

論文審定書i
Acknowledgments iv
摘要v
Abstract vi
List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Chapter 2 Preliminaries 5
2.1 5G Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Bilinear Pairings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Boneh-Boyen Signature Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 Proxy Re-Signature Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.5 Security Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5.1 Indistinguishable against Chosen Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA) Game 10
2.5.2 Pseudorandom permutation (PRP) Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Chapter 3 Related Works 12
3.1 Yang et al.’s Blockchain-Based Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
vii
3.2 Ni et al.’s Network Slicing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3 Ying et al.’s Authentication Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Chapter 4 Our Construction 22
4.1 Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3 Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.4 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.5 Handover 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.6 Handover 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Chapter 5 Security Proof 35
5.1 Security Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.1.1 The Unforgeability Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.1.2 Secure Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.1.3 Secure Handover 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.1.4 Secure Handover 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.2 Security Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.2.1 Unforgeability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.2.2 Secure Mutual Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.2.3 Secure Handover 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.2.4 Secure Handover 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Chapter 6 Comparison 63
6.1 Properties Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.2 Performance Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Chapter 7 Conclusion 66
Bibliography 68

[1] Nisha Panwar, Shantanu Sharma, and Awadhesh Kumar Singh. A survey on 5G: The next
generation of mobile communication. Physical Communication, 18:64–84, 2016.
[2] ITU-R. M.2083 : Imt vision - "framework and overall objectives of the future development
of imt for 2020 and beyond". Technical report, ITU-R, 9 2015.
[3] Afif Osseiran, Federico Boccardi, Volker Braun, Katsutoshi Kusume, Patrick Marsch,
Michal Maternia, Olav Queseth, Malte Schellmann, Hans Schotten, Hidekazu Taoka,
et al. Scenarios for 5G mobile and wireless communications: the vision of the metis
project. IEEE communications magazine, 52:26–35, 2014.
[4] Simone Redana, Alexandros Kaloxylos, Alex Galis, Peter Rost, Patrick Marsch, Olav
Queseth, Volker Jungnickel, Chen Tao, Guo Fang-Chun, and Hans Van der Veen. View
on 5G architecture. Technical report, 7 2016.
[5] Alexandros Kaloxylos. A survey and an analysis of network slicing in 5G networks. IEEE
Communications Standards Magazine, 2(1):60–65, 2018.
[6] Xenofon Foukas, Georgios Patounas, Ahmed Elmokashfi, and Mahesh K Marina. Network
slicing in 5g: Survey and challenges. IEEE Communications Magazine, 55(5):94–
100, 2017.
[7] 3GPP. Ts 23.501 system architecture for the 5G system. Technical report, 3GPP, 2017.
[8] 3GPP. Ts 33.501 security architecture and procedures for 5G system. Technical report,
3GPP, 2018.
[9] Wan-Ru Chiu. Cross-network-slice authentication scheme for the 5th generation mobile
communication system. Master thesis, National Sun Yet-sen University, 2018.
[10] Victor Shoup. A proposal for an iso standard for public key encryption (version 2.1).
IACR e-Print Archive, 112, 2001.
[11] Dan Boneh and Xavier Boyen. Short signatures without random oracles. In International
Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pages 56–73.
Springer, 2004.
[12] Masahiro Mambo, Keisuke Usuda, and Eiji Okamoto. Proxy signatures: Delegation of
the power to sign messages. IEICE transactions on fundamentals of electronics, communications
and computer sciences, 79(9):1338–1354, 1996.
[13] Matt Blaze, Gerrit Bleumer, and Martin Strauss. Divertible protocols and atomic proxy
cryptography. In International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic
Techniques, pages 127–144. Springer, 1998.
[14] Giuseppe Ateniese and Susan Hohenberger. Proxy re-signatures: new definitions, algorithms,
and applications. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and
communications security, pages 310–319. ACM, 2005.
[15] Hui Yang, Haowei Zheng, Jie Zhang, Yizhen Wu, Young Lee, and Yuefeng Ji.
Blockchain-based trusted authentication in cloud radio over fiber network for 5G. In
2017 16th International Conference on Optical Communications and Networks (ICOCN),
pages 1–3. IEEE, 2017.
[16] Jianbing Ni, Xiaodong Lin, and Xuemin Sherman Shen. Efficient and secure serviceoriented
authentication supporting network slicing for 5G-enabled iot. IEEE Journal on
Selected Areas in Communications, 36:644–657, 2018.
[17] Bidi Ying and Amiya Nayak. Lightweight remote user authentication protocol for multiserver
5G networks using self-certified public key cryptography. Journal of Network and
Computer Applications, 131:66–74, 2019.
[18] RHH Chun-Ifan and PH Ho. Truly non-repudiation certificateless short signature scheme
from bilinear pairings. J. Inf. Sci. Eng, 27:969–982, 2011.
[19] Benoît Libert and Damien Vergnaud. Multi-use unidirectional proxy re-signatures. In
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security,
pages 511–520. ACM, 2008.
[20] Digital-Signature-using-RSA-and-SHA-256. https://github.com/henmja/
Digital-Signature-using-RSA-and-SHA-256, 2018. [Online; accessed 25-
August-2018].
[21] AES 256bit Encryption/Decryption and storing in the database using java.
https://medium.com/@danojadias/aes-256bit-encryption-decryption-/
/and-storing-in-the-database-using-java-2ada3f2a0b14, 2016. [Online;
accessed 25-August-2018].
[22] Class BigInteger. https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/math/
BigInteger.html. [Online; accessed 25-August-2018].
[23] Class Cipher. https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/javax/crypto/
Cipher.html. [Online; accessed 25-August-2018].