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博碩士論文 etd-0723103-133605 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-0723103-133605
論文名稱
Title
股權結構、監理機制與公司價值之研究--以台灣上市公司為例
A Research of the Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Firm Value for Taiwan Publicly Listed Conpanies
系所名稱
Department
畢業學年期
Year, semester
語文別
Language
學位類別
Degree
頁數
Number of pages
92
研究生
Author
指導教授
Advisor
召集委員
Convenor
口試委員
Advisory Committee
口試日期
Date of Exam
2003-07-17
繳交日期
Date of Submission
2003-07-23
關鍵字
Keywords
股權結構、監理機制、代理問題、公司價值
agency problem, firm value, ownership structure, corporate governance
統計
Statistics
本論文已被瀏覽 5710 次,被下載 3625
The thesis/dissertation has been browsed 5710 times, has been downloaded 3625 times.
中文摘要
摘要
自從1997 年亞洲金融風暴後,許多針對東亞國家之研究發現,此地區公司的股權集中程度普遍高於其他地區,且公司監理機制之不完善,是導致亞洲金融危機的最主要原因。因此,本研究即以La Porta 等人(1999)追蹤公司「最終控制權」的方法,亦即分辨投票權之最終控制者身份,將屬於同一控制群體的直接與間接所持有的投票權相加,藉以辨認公司的最大控制群體(持股最大股東),來探討我國上市公司的最終控制型態以及各種控制方法對於控制權、現金流量請求權以及兩者偏離幅度的影響。
此外,並以Proxy Q作為公司價值評價之因變數,透過控制股東之控制權與現金流量權偏離的情形,來衡量控制股東對於小股東財富剝奪的程度。本研究亦探討現行公司監理機制的設計,能否有效扮演減緩公司代理問題、提升公司價值的角色。
本研究以2000年至2003年四月間曾發佈公開說明書之上市公司為研究對象,另考量金融保險業之營業性質及財務結構較為特殊,與其他產業相差甚鉅予以排除後共得有效樣本183家。透過複迴歸分析,其實證結果如下:
1. 台灣上市公司確實存在有明顯的股權集中現象,且其最終控制型態係以家族為最主要的控制型態。
2. 台灣上市公司的控制股東普遍運用金字塔結構、交叉持股與透過名目投資公司的方式獲取控制權,及藉由參與管理來強化控制權。並因此而使其控制權與現金流量權產生偏離,且家族控制型態確實顯示出有較高的控制權與控制權與現金流量權偏離的現象。
3. 台灣上市公司中,控制股東投入之現金流量請求權較大者,有較高的公司價值。
4. 台灣上市公司之監理機制,並無法發揮其應有的監理功能。
Abstract
Abstract
Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, several researches for the East Asian have found that concentration of ownership higher than other areas and weak corporate governance have been important reasons of financing crisis. Therefore, the study adopts the method developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), which traces the chain of ownership to find who has the most voting rights, identifies their ultimate control patterns, finds the controlling shareholders of firm, and then calculates each ultimate owner’s control rights and cash flow rights. We also try to find the relationship between those ways of controlling shareholders to the voting rights, cash flow rights, and the degree of control rights deviating from cash flow rights.
In Addition, we regress to the Proxy Q on controlling shareholders’ control rights deviating from cash flow rights, then examine the evidence on expropriation of minority shareholders. This paper investigates whether the board construction on corporate governance mechanism effectively discharge its monitoring function and mitigate central agency problem.
The research data are collected from the publications of those companies that stocks are openly traded on the Taiwan Stock Market between 2000 and 2003 April. There are 183 validated observations which are obtained. Empirical result suggests:
1. The high concentration of ownership is more common in Taiwan publicly listed companies and those firms are typically controlled by families.
2. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights because they through the use of pyramids, cross-holdings, paper company and participation in management. And the condition of family control company is the worst.
3. The more the controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights, the better performance of the firm.
4. For Taiwan publicly listed companies, the corporate governance mechanism could not effectively discharge its monitoring function and mitigate central agency problem.
目次 Table of Contents
目錄
第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………………….….1
第一節 研究動機與目的…………………………………………………..…..1
第二節 研究目的…………………………………………………………...….4
第三節 研究架構………………………………………………………...…….5
第二章 文獻探討與研究假說…………………………………………..…………7
第一節 核心代理問題………………………………………………...……….7
第二節 股權結權與控制股東………………………………………...……….8
第三節 一股一權的偏離與控制方法………………………………….…….10
第四節 監理機制與公司績效…………………………………………….….12
第三章 研究方法…………………………………………………………………19
第一節 研究模型……………….…………………………………….………19
第二節 研究變數定義………………………………………………….…….21
第三節 研究樣本…………………………………………………….……….25
第四節 控制權與現金流量請求權的計算………………………….……….27
第五節 範例-台塑集團…………………………………………….……….33
第四章 實證結果與分析…………………………………………………………37
第一節 基本統計量分析………………………………………….………….47
第二節 迴歸分析……………………………………………………….…….47
第三節 實證分析結論………………………………………………………..73
第五章 結論與建議………………………………………………………………76
第一節 結論…………………………………………………………………..76
第二節 建議…………………………………………………………………..77
第三節 研究限制……………………………………………………………..79
參考文獻……………………………………………...……………………………...81
附錄一 本研究樣本公司(183家)……………………………………………..86
附錄二 各迴歸模型變數間之變異數擴張因子(VIF)值表…………………..88
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