本論文在垂直分工體系的模型裡引入外在選擇的機會，以及研發投入兩個因素。藉由此一模型，我們想要分析上述兩個因素對於買賣雙方契約簽定之影響。我們得到下列之結論：
(1) 無論是讓上游廠商或是下游廠商擁有外在選擇的機會，外在選擇報酬的改變只會影響雙方合作計畫成功的可能性，但不會影響廠商間合作模式的選擇；此外，當外在選擇報酬大於某一特定水準時，同時投資將成為上下游廠商合作的唯一模式，並且使得因不完全契約所造成的脅持問題與延遲問題徹底消失。
(2) 當研發投入的技術效率非常落後時，無論技術外溢程度的多寡，下游廠商在一期外包契約下的利潤一定比在兩期外包契約下的利潤來的大。然而，當研發投入的技術效率相當高時，技術外溢程度的多寡將影響下游廠商選擇兩期或一期外包契約的條件。

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第1章 緒論 1

第2章 不完全契約下之外在選擇與投資時點的關係

第2.1節 前言 4
第2.2節　 模型架構 7
第2.3節 投資時機以及下游廠商的外在選擇 9
第2.4節 上游廠商的外在選擇 19
第2.5節 本章結論 27
參考文獻 29

第3章 兩期契約下之研發投入與契約期間的關係

第3.1節 前言 31
第3.2節 模型架構 32
第3.3節 一期契約時上下游市場的均衡 34
第3.4節 兩期契約時上下游市場的均衡 38
第3.5節 本章結論 43
參考文獻 44

第4章 結論 45

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