財務報表品質的優劣，會直接影響投資大眾對市場的信心，健全制度下的公司治理有助於提升企業財務報表的品質，政府為提升企業對公司治理的重視，近年來不斷修正相關法規，期望透過制度上的修正，加強企業公司治理的績效，以避免因企業財務舞弊而造成投資人的巨額財物損失。而企業發生財務弊案最主要的因素來自於財務報表的不實表達，財務報表重編更可能是財務不實表達的起源。本研究主要目的在探討公司治理中股權結構、董事會組成與審計品質，是否會影響財務報表重編，實證結果顯示股權結構中機構投資人持股比率愈高，財務報表重編機率愈高，符合利益衝突假說；審計品質中企業委託4大會計師事務所查核財務報表較不易發生財務報表重編，而當會計師事務所查核企業的非審計服務公費愈具重大性者，財務報表發生重編的機率愈高。

Financial statement quality can directly affect investor confidence. Corporate governance in well-functioning mechanisms can improve Financial statement quality. Recently, in order to enhance corporate governance performance, avoid financial fraud, and protect investors, the government constantly amend the related rules. Financial fraud is most through misstated financial reports, and even fraudulent misstatement may result from financial statement restatement. The purpose of the study is to examine whether ownership structure, board of director composition, and audit quality in corporate governance are associated with financial statement restatement. Empirical results show that in ownership structure the higher stock proportion of the institutional investors, the probability of financial statement restatement is higher. It is consistent with conflict of interest hypothesis. In audit quality, the enterprises have lower occurrence rates of financial statement restatement while they hire the big 4 accounting firms to audit their financial statements. Furthermore, when accounting firms provide non-audit services to their audit clients, the higher significance of non-audit fees, occurrence rates of financial statement restatement are higher.

目 錄
致謝詞………………………………………………………………………………Ⅰ
中文摘要……………………………………………………………………………Ⅱ
英文摘要……………………………………………………………………………Ⅲ
目錄…………………………………………………………………………………Ⅳ
圖目錄………………………………………………………………………………Ⅵ
表目錄………………………………………………………………………………Ⅵ
第一章 緒論………………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景……………………………………………………………1
第二節 研究動機及目的……………………………………………………2
第三節 研究架構……………………………………………………………6
第四節 研究流程……………………………………………………………7
第二章 文獻探討與研究假說……………………………………………………8
第一節 公司治理……………………………………………………………8
第二節 股權結構………………………………………………………… 12
第三節 董事會組成……………………………………………………… 15
第四節 審計品質………………………………………………………… 17
第三章 研究設計……………………………………………………………… 21
第一節 研究架構………………………………………………………… 21
第二節 研究樣本………………………………………………………… 22
第三節 變數衡量………………………………………………………… 23
第四節 驗證方式………………………………………………………… 27
第四章 實證結果與方析……………………………………………………… 29
第一節 樣本敘述性統計………………………………………………… 29
第二節 Pearson 相關係數……………………………………………… 34
第三節 Mann-Whitney 檢定………………………………………………37
第四節 Logistic 迴歸分析………………………………………………38
第五章 結論與建議…………………………………………………………… 43
第一節 研究結論與貢獻………………………………………………… 43
第二節 研究限制與建議………………………………………………… 45
參考文獻………………………………………………………………………… 46
中文部分 …………………………………………………………………… 46
英文部分 ………………………………………………………………… 47

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