產業內存在兩家擁有創新技術的潛在性授權廠商，一家擁有舊技術的潛在性被授權廠商。當兩家潛在性授權廠商擁有的創新技術相同時，無論是以固定權利金方式或是以單位權利金方式授權，將對權利金激烈殺價競爭至零；當其中一家潛在性授權廠商擁有的創新技術遠遠超過另一家潛在性授權廠商時，則兩家技術較差之廠商將要求技術授權，並以固定權利金方式支付權利金。

Two firms with innovative technology are potential licensors in the industry. In addition, there is a potential licensee which only possesses aged technology. When the two potential licensors have exactly the same technology, they will cut the license fee to zero due to severe competition no matter whether the fee is in the format of fixed payments or royalties. When one potential licensor possesses the technology far advanced than the technology the other potential licensor has, those two firms with less advanced technology will ask for technology licensing and pay the license fee in the format of fixed payment.

目錄
1 緒論1
1.1 研究動機與目的. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 研究方法與架構. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 文獻回顧4
3 理論模型7
3.1 創新程度相同. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.1 模型假設. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.2 收取固定權利金. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.3 收取單位權利金. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1.4 比較：固定權利金與單位權利金. . . . . . . . . 14
3.2 創新程度不同. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2.1 模型假設. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2.2 收取固定權利金. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2.3 收取單位權利金. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.4 比較：固定權利金與單位權利金. . . . . . . . . 30
4 結論31
參考文獻33
A 附錄35
A.1 創新程度相同，固定權利金情況. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.2 創新程度相同，單位權利金情況. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A.3 創新程度不同，固定權利金情況. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
A.4 圖3另一種表示. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
A.5 成立條件. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A.6 創新程度不同，單位權利金情況. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

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