本文運用內生經濟成長模型通用的最適控制理論，在消費者與生產者獨立決策的分權市場上進行分析。特別在考慮伴隨產能之提高而負擔更高交易成本的條件下，如何選擇最適生產迂迴度與決定經濟成長率。
自成長理論的觀點而言，本文在研究因為生產規模擴大造成的邊做邊學「外部效果」及生產迂迴度加深造成的「分工經濟」，如何促進生產效率而創造經濟持續成長的來源。
從新制度經濟學的研究傳統而言，本文仍強調交易成本在經濟體系中所扮演的重要角色。但並不著重於「最適生產組織」的探討，而偏向研究「最適迂迴生產技術」的決定條件。
本文將從「取得迂迴生產技術的知識不需花費成本」的方向出發，建立單一部門的內生成長模型，說明交易成本率的大小如何決定最適生產迂迴度。其次再探討「需要投入經濟資源以創造迂迴分工生產之知識」的情況，以此擴建成至少包含商品生產與研究發展之兩部門模型；並以模擬的方法，研究經濟體系靜止均衡之持續成長與過渡到靜止均衡階段的動態調整。

Applying the maximum principle of optimal control that is widely used in the theories of endogenous growth to the decentralized market, this project will study how, under the consideration of transaction costs, producers and consumers choose the optimal degree of production roundaboutness and determine the growth rate of the economy. The purposes of the project can be viewed from two respects:

1. From the view point of growth theory, the project studies how the combined effect of production widening, i.e. learning by doing effect caused by social production capacity, and production deepening, i.e. economies of division of labor caused by higher degree of production roundaboutness, improve the productivity of production and thus create the possibility of permanent growth.
2. The project also emphasizes the important role of transaction costs, as the new institutionalism having highlighted, in the determination of optimal production roundaboutness, in contrast to that tradition concentrating how the organization from for transaction is chosen.

We shall start with an one-sector model in which the knowledge of production is available freely, and show that the optimal degree of production roundaboutness depends on the rate of transaction cost. Next, in an extended two-sector model in which the technology of roundabout production can be invented only through investing scarce resource, we shall demonstrate how the path of transitional dynamics leads the economy to its steady state that reveals permanent growth.

目錄
第一章 經濟成長與交易成本………………………………………1
第一節 經濟成長理論回顧……………………………………2
第二節 交易成本………………………………………………7
第三節 技術深化經濟成長理論的建構……………………..10
第二章 單部門內生成長模型……………………………………..14
第一節 邊做邊學的產出效果………………………………..14
第二節 分權經濟下的成長率之決定………………………..19
第三節 集權經濟下的成長率之決定………………………..21
第四節 規模效果……………………………………………..24
第五節 最適生產迂迴度……………………………………..25
第三章 兩部門內生成長模型的擴建與動態分析………………..28
第一節 兩部門內生成長模型的擴建………………………..28
第二節 兩部門模型的靜止均衡……………………………..32
第三節 過渡到靜止均衡階段的動態分析…………………..35
第四章 結論與未來研究方向的建議……………………………..41
第一節 結論…………………………………………………..41
第二節 未來研究方向的建議………………………………..42
數學附錄………………………………………………………………..43
參考文獻………………………………………………………………..53

參考文獻：

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許振明 (1997)，「總體經濟分析」，二版，台北，茂昌圖書有限公司。

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