本篇論文分別以數量競爭模型和價格競爭模型，研究廠商在雙占市場中如何決定是否接受退貨及刷新產品。兩階段賽局中，廠商在第一期決定是否接受退貨。一旦決定接受退貨，廠商將在第二期決定最適刷新比例。在廠商最適策略為對稱和非對稱的情形下，分別求出滿足不同可能均衡情形的最適條件。本篇論文進一步的利用數值分析來探討不同參數對子賽局完美均衡的影響。研究結果發現，隨著退貨率增加，刷新產品市場的利潤將更難彌補新產品市場的損失。除此之外，在數量競爭模型中，隨著替代效果增加，刷新產品市場利潤將以犧牲利潤較高的新產品市場為代價而增加。相反的，在價格競爭模型中，當替代效果高時，只有一家廠商進入刷新產品市場；而在替代效果低時，兩家廠商都會進入刷新產品市場。

We model a two period game with duopoly market under either quantity or price competition. In the first period, the manufacturer decides on whether to accept the returned products. The optimal ratio of refurbishing is then determined in the second period once the manufacturer has decided to do refurbishing. We identify the optimality conditions that lead to different possible equilibrium outcomes for different scenarios in which two firms may play symmetrically or asymmetrically. Our extensive numerical analysis substantiates the analytical results and we focus on the effect on the subgame perfect equilibrium caused by various parameters. Among our results, we find that, as the return ratio increases, the profits generated from the refurbished market become harder to compensate the loss in the new product market. Besides, the increase of substitution effect in the quantity competition enhances the degree of satisfaction for the refurbished products and it hurts firm’s performance in the more profitable new product market. However, the effect of substitution effect in the price competition is entirely opposite. For instance, when the substitution effect is high, only one firm enters the refurbished product market; and when the substitution effect is low, both firms enter the refurbished product market.

Chapter 1. Introduction………………..…………………..…………..…....1
1.1 Motivation and Purpose of Research..………………...…..………....….1
1.2 Methodology and Structure of Research……………..…….……...........3
Chapter 2. Literature Review…………………………………………………...…...5
2.1 Competition under different market structures………..…………...…....5
2.2 Market segmentation of new and remanufactured products…..……...…6
2.3 Demand……………………………………………………..……..……7
2.4 The return policy……………………………………..…………..…..…8
2.5 Secondary market and open-box products………………..……..…..….9
2.6 Remanufacturing………………………………………..………………9
Chapter 3. Model 1: Cournot Competition with Homogeneous Products............11
1. A Benchmark Case………………………………………..…...…..…....12
Case 1: Both firms do not accept the returned products……...………....13
Case 2: Both firms accept the returned products……………......……....13
Case 3: Only one firm accepts the returned products……...……...…….14
2. The Symmetric Case…………………………………………...………..19
3. The Asymmetric Case…………………………………………...……....20
Chapter 4. Model 2: Bertrand Competition with Heterogeneous Products….....28
1. A Benchmark Case……………………………...…………………..…..28
Case 1: Both firms do not accept the returned products………...……....29
Case 2: Both firms accept the returned products………...…...…………29
Case 3: Only one firm accepts the returned products…………...…...….30
2. A Symmetric Case…………………………………………..…………..34
3. The Asymmetric Case with the return policy…...……....………...…….38
4. The Asymmetric Case without the return policy……….……...……..…40
Chapter 5. Concluding Remarks……………………….………..………..………..61
References…………………………………...……………………………...…….....64

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