本研究探討不同通路結構下價格作為品質訊號的效果。本研究中成本是影響品質唯一的因素，而此成本在直接通路(製造商直接販售商品給消費者)為一私有資訊，消費者無法得知；在間接通路下(製造商透過零售商將商品販售給消費者)，此資訊為製造商與零售商共有之資訊。另一方面，消費者對高品質產品的需求高於低品質產品。本研究假設除了產品成本外，所有的資訊皆是透明的，因此生產高品質產品的廠商必須要向消費者傳遞品質訊號，以取得較高的銷售量。本研究將先驗證直接通路下的價格傳訊效果，再進一步探討間接通路下的傳訊效果。本研究證明這兩個通路結構下傳訊效果皆存在後，接著比較這兩個不同通路下的傳訊效果，並以之作為廠商面對逆選擇情況下，通路結構策略之參考。
本研究結果歸納如下:
一. 不論直接與間接通路，價格傳遞品質訊號的效果隨者消費者對價格敏感度、消費者對高階產品的需求，以及產品成本的增加而減弱。
二. 消費者對價格敏感度低時，間接通路的傳訊效果較佳。
三. 同類產品生產成本較高時，直接通路的傳訊效果較佳。
關鍵詞：訊號賽局；通路策略；高價策略

This article studies the signal effects between different distribution channels. In this article, we assume the quality of goods only depends on production cost. The production cost is private information only belongs to manufacturers in direct channel. On the other hand, in indirect channel, production cost is information shared by manufactures and retailers, but the consumers will not know the production cost. Referring to consumer side, the demand of high quality goods is higher than the demand of low quality goods. All information is public to all players except the production cost. Therefore, the manufactures who provide high quality goods must signal their quality to consumers to get high sales volume. This research will verify the signaling effect in direct channel then explore the effect in indirect channel. After proving how the signaling effects work in both channels, we compare the effects among different channels. The comparison could help venders who face the adverse selection problems to make their channel strategies.

The research results are as following:
1. No matter direct or indirect channels, the signaling effect get weak with the increase of consumer’s price sensitivity, demand for high end goods and production cost of the goods.
2. The signaling effect in indirect channel is more effective than the effect in direct channel when consumers are with low price sensitivities.
3. The signaling effect in direct channel is more effective than the effect in indirect channel when the cost of goods in the same category is low.

Keywords: signaling game; channel strategies; price strategies.

Abstract I
中文摘要 II
目錄 III
表目錄 IV
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究內容 2
第三節 論文結構 3
第二章 文獻探討 4
第三章 研究方法 9
第四章 模型均衡 11
第一節 直接通路模型設定 11
第二節 直接通路混同均衡 13
第三節 直接通路分離均衡 14
第四節 間接通路模型設定 17
第五節 間接通路混同均衡 18
第六節 間接通路分離均衡 19
第七節 不同通路結構之比較 23
第八節 製造商策略之初探 26
第五章 研究結果 28
第六章 研究限制與未來研究方向 30
參考文獻 31
附錄A均衡推導 33
附錄A-1直接通路混同均衡推導 33
附錄A-2直接通路分離均衡推導 35
附錄A-3間接通路混同均衡推導 37
附錄A-4間接通路分離均衡推導 39
附錄B 間接通路分離均衡數值分析方法說明 42

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