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博碩士論文 etd-0731108-180500 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-0731108-180500
論文名稱
Title
篩選員工工作能力與內在工作動機之誘因薪資包裹
Optimal Incentive Wage Package for Screening Workers' Intrinsic Motivation.
系所名稱
Department
畢業學年期
Year, semester
語文別
Language
學位類別
Degree
頁數
Number of pages
73
研究生
Author
指導教授
Advisor
召集委員
Convenor
口試委員
Advisory Committee
口試日期
Date of Exam
2008-06-13
繳交日期
Date of Submission
2008-07-31
關鍵字
Keywords
逆選擇、不對稱訊息、誘因工資、內在工作動機
intrinsic motivation to work, incentive wage, asymmetric information, adverse selection
統計
Statistics
本論文已被瀏覽 5775 次,被下載 1629
The thesis/dissertation has been browsed 5775 times, has been downloaded 1629 times.
中文摘要
員工內在特質—「工作能力」與「工作動機」皆是為廠商帶來利潤的有用資源。
本文旨在探討廠商制訂薪資方案時, 由於廠商無法得知員工內在特質而產生資訊不對稱問題。
本文採用「機制設計研究途徑」建立模型, 分別針對「單一特質」與「雙重特質」所設計最佳「誘因薪資包裹」。
結果發現, 廠商依據單一特質設計薪資, 則面對高產出員工給高薪資, 低產出員工給低薪資;
依據雙重特質設計薪資時, 則廠商須考慮何者特質為顯著, 用以制訂薪資。
關鍵字: 內在工作動機、誘因工資、不對稱訊息、逆選擇
Abstract
The intrinsic features of woker, ``ability' and ``motivation', are useful resources of human capital that makes profit for the firm.
The purpose of the study is to examine how the firm designs the optimal wage policy when worker's intrinsic features are private information.
The study follows the mechainsm-design approach, by which models with single, as well as double,
intrinsic feature(s) of worker are established, and best ``incentive wage packages' are deduced. We finded out that, under single intrinsic feature, the firm's optimal wage package entails that, the more output the higher wages; under double intrinsic features, the firm must takes the relative strength of intrinsic features of the worker into account when making the optimal incentive wage package.
目次 Table of Contents
1 緒論 1
1.1 工作能力與工作動機………………1
1.2 文獻回顧 ………2
1.2.1內在工作動機文獻之回顧……….3
1.2..2機制設計文獻之簡單回顧….…………………….3
2 差別產出能力下的「最適誘因薪資包裹」設計…….5
2.1 完全訊息下最優之「完全差別能力薪資」方案…….6
2.2 差別薪資結構之「誘因薪資包裹方案」………….8
2.3 結論……………………………….11
3 內在工作動機模型之薪資設計 .12
3.1 廠商雇用單一員工之薪資方案……….13
3.1.1 完全訊息下最優「完全差別薪資」方案…….14
3.1.2「單一薪資」方案之員工雇用風險與逆選擇問題….16
3.2 雇用單一員工之「誘因薪資包裹」與不同薪資方案比較….18
3.2.1「誘因薪資」方案之員工篩選…………18
3.2.2「誘因薪資」與「單一薪資」之方案比較……21
3.3獨占廠商對潛在眾多應徵者之薪資方案……….23
3.4 結論……………………………….27
4 延伸—混合模型之薪資設計 29
4.1 最優「能力幹勁薪資」方案…………….30
4.2 雙重私訊息下之「誘因薪資包裹」設計……….33
4.2.1 投入不可觀測之員工篩選……….34
4.2.2 能力顯著情況………………….36
4.2.3 幹勁顯著z況……………………………….38

5 結論 43
參考文獻 44
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