智能電網是近年來各國政府及學者不斷研究的技術，其主要分為三個議題: 能源管理、訊息管理以及安全。在智能電網的架構中，由控制操作中心監測使用電量，每個用戶於每個單位時間（例如15分鐘）將能源使用量傳至控制中心。控制中心將預估用戶接下來的單位時間消耗量，分發能量給用戶，因此能動態地調整電量發配以調整供給和需求曲線，與傳統架構相比，能有效的降低能源浪費。而在這樣的系統中。頻繁的監測用電量可能會洩漏用戶的作息，帶來了用戶隱私的問題，因此，用戶的能源使用訊息透過資料聚合機制將以區為單位做累加，才不會洩漏單一用戶的隱私。
不論在哪一方面，智能電網發展逐漸成長茁壯，關於聚合機制的用戶電量使用資料
方面始終不夠完整。我們提出了一個新穎且具彈性的聚合機制，讓電廠能彈性地搜尋
過去單一用戶特定時段的累加用電資料。我們的方案可以保障用戶資料的隱私以及數
據的完整性。另外，相較於其它研究，我們提供更低的儲存成本，亦同時實現了用戶
的隱私保護。

In smart gird environment, the power usage will be monitored and managed by an operation center that will also dynamically adjust the supply and demand curve of power usage, and detect threat and failures in real time. In such a system, each user will report her/his information of power usage every time unit, e.g. 15 minutes. The operation center will estimate users’energy consumption of the next time unit through this information and distribute energy to users. With the real-time monitoring, smart grid efficiently reduces the energy consumption compared with traditional architectures. However, the frequent monitoring may expose the routines and schedules of users. It brings out the privacy issues in smart grid. The data received by the operation center is “accumulated”, and hence, they reveal nothing about the private information of each user.
To the best of our knowledge, no data aggregation scheme in smart grid can achieve flexible data query, which would be a useful property in such environment. Therefor we will propose a novel and flexible data aggregation scheme in smart grid. Our scheme achieves the required security properties of smart grid, including confidentiality and data integrity. A user can make a flexible query to investigate the accumulated usage of specific time units. Compared with traditional or straightforward approaches, the storage cost of our scheme only linearly increases with the number of time units, which is much lower than others.

論文審定書i
Acknowledgments iv
摘要v
Abstract vi
List of Figures ix
List of Tables x
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Chapter 2 Preliminaries 3
2.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Paillier Cryptosystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 Super-Increasing Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4 Security Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Chapter 3 Related Works 7
3.1 Fan et al.’s Scheme [5] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.1 Review of Fan et al.’s Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2 Li et al.’s Scheme [14] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.1 Review of Li et al.’s Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3 R. Petrlic’s Scheme [22] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3.1 Review of R.Petrlic’s Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.4 Asmaa et al.’s Scheme [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4.1 Review of Asmaa et al.’s Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.5 Fu et al.’s Scheme [7] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.5.1 Review of Fu et al.’s Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.6 Li et al.’s Scheme [13] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.6.1 Review of Li et al.’s Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Chapter 4 The Proposed Scheme 34
4.1 The proposed scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Chapter 5 Security Analysis 39
5.1 Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Chapter 6 Comparison 41
Chapter 7 Conclusion 42
Bibliography 43

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