在許多產業經常可見到廠商使用新產品預告的行銷方式，特別是具有網路外部性的資訊科技產業中。然而，廠商不正確產品預告有可能是反競爭的行銷策略。所以，本文研究當市場具有網路外部性，考量系統產品相容度選擇問題下，利用兩階段賽局來探討獨占廠商面臨市場中有無競爭者時，是否有採取不實預告的動機，以及此舉是否造成反競爭現象。本研究發現，如果將來沒有競爭對手的情況下，當產品具有網路外部性，以及跨期產品相容度較高時，獨占廠商有動機誇大產品預告。如果將來有潛在競爭者進入，獨占廠商不實產品預告的程度將隨著其產品品質優勢上升而提高；但是如果產品不具品質優勢，只要網路效果夠大，廠商仍有空間不實預告，阻止對手進入，繼續維持獨占利潤，此舉將誤導消費者形成錯誤預期，品質較差的產品反而贏得市場，導致不公平競爭的問題。另外，當兩家廠商產品差異程度越大時，將提高獨占廠商不實產品預告的誘因；而如果兩產品完全相容時，獨占廠商新產品預告程度僅受品質優勢影響，若獨占廠商產品品質優勢上升，則廠商誇大產品預告的程度將提高。

In the information technology industry which has high network externalities, it is common for a firm to employ new product pre-announcements to promote their future products. However, false product pre-announcements are strategically anti-competitive. Under the two-stage game model, this paper examines the monopolistic firm’s incentive of employing false pre-announcements when competing with a potential rival and whether those pre-announcements are strategically anti-competitive, provided that the market exhibits network externalities and the compatibility of system products is considered. This paper shows that if there are no potential rivals in the future, if the products have network externalities, and if the compatibility of cross-period products is relatively high, then the monopoly will have an incentive to exaggerate the pre-announcements. If potential rivals enter the market at the second stage, then the greater the monopoly’s technological advantage is, the higher the extent of false pre-announcements will be. However, as long as the network effect is large enough, the monopoly is likely to employ pre-announcements, even if the product has no technological advantage. By excluding potential entrants from entering the market, established monopolistic firms keep their profits. And consumers may have false expectation—a firm could win with an inferior technology—which will in turn cause unfair competition. In addition, when the differences of the products are getting larger, a firm’s incentive of employing false pre-announcements will raise. When the two products are totally compatible, the monopoly’s new product pre-announcements are merely affected by the technological advantage. Then the greater the monopoly’s technological advantage is, the higher the extent of false pre-announcements will be.

第一章緒論……………………………………………………1
1.1研究背景與動機……………………………………………1
1.2研究目的與方法……………………………………………3
1.3研究流程與架構……………………………………………4
第二章文獻回顧………………………………………………6
2.1網路外部性相關文獻………………………………………6
2.2產品創新預告相關文獻……………………………………10
第三章廠商創新產品預告與產品相容性決策………………13
3.1模型基本設定………………………………………………13
3.1.1廠商………………………………………………………13
3.1.1消費者……………………………………………………14
1.第二期市場中無潛在競爭者時……………………………15
2.第二期市場中有潛在競爭者時……………………………16
3.2獨占廠商面臨無潛在競爭者之產品預告與相容性決策…17
3.3獨占廠商面臨有潛在競爭者之產品預告與相容性決策…19
3.3.1雙占結構市場……………………………………………20
1.獨占廠商之產品預告行為…………………………………20
2.獨占廠商產品相容度對預告行為的影響…………………23
3.3.2獨占廠商迫使競爭對手退出市場………………………27
1.獨占廠商之產品預告行為…………………………………27
2.獨占廠商產品相容度對預告行為的影響…………………30
3.4小結…………………………………………………………33
3.5既存獨占廠商創新產品相容度的選擇……………………34
第四章結論與建議……………………………………………35
4.1結論…………………………………………………………35
4.2未來研究建議………………………………………………37
參考文獻………………………………………………………38

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