本文主要引用了動態賽局的概念，探討在租稅模型中，公司管理者、會計師和稅務機關之間如何建構出一個策略關係，以達到均衡的狀態。並且分析當管理者考慮逃漏稅以提高本身的效用時，要如何決定申報所得，並且以賄賂的方式勾結會計師以順利逃稅。文中模型分為兩個部分：第一個部分，假設公司只有兩種可能的真實所得和申報所得；第二個部分，假設公司的真實所得和申報所得是介於兩個數值之間，為均勻分配中的某一個值。經由分析的結果發現，若政府加重逃稅的懲罰，雖然對於一般逃漏稅的公司而言確實有減少賄賂和逃稅的效果，但是對於真實所得很高的公司而言，只會增加管理者以賄賂的方式來達到逃稅目的的意願。若政府降低免受罰款的限額，相反的，只對於真實所得很高的公司有減少賄賂和逃稅的效果；對於一般逃漏稅的公司而言，只會增加管理者以賄賂的方式來達到逃稅目的的意願。只有政府提高審查率，才是全面減少逃稅和賄賂的有效方式。

The purpose of this paper discusses how to construct a strategic relationship among managers, accountant, and tax authority in order to reach the equilibrium, by using a formal model of corporate income tax evasion with concept of game theory. We also analyze when managers think over to raise the utility itself by tax evasion, how to determine the income report and how to collude with accountants by bribing them in order to evade taxes successfully. There are two parts of the model. The first part, we assume companies have only two possible real income values and reported income values; the second part, we assume the real income and the reported income of a company are between two values, which can be any values with in the uniform distribution. After analyzing, we find the result that if the government aggravates the penalty for tax evasion, managers of high real income companies will increase their desires to bribe and evade taxes. Although doing this way actually decreases the cases of bribery and tax evasion, but it works for general (non high real income) companies only. If the government does the opposite way, the result would be totally opposite as well; Managers of general real income companies increase their desires to bribe and evade taxes. Therefore, (the government) increasing the audit rate is the only effective way to decrease the cases of tax evasion and bribery.

第一章 緒論............................................... 1
第一節 研究背景與目的................................... 1
第二節 研究方法......................................... 2
第三節 本文架構......................................... 3
第二章 文獻回顧........................................... 4
第三章 基本模型........................................... 8
第一節 模型架構..........................................8
第二節 模型設定........................................ 10
第三節 模型分析.........................................12
第四章 延伸模型...........................................17
第一節 模型架構.........................................17
第二節 模型設定.........................................18
第三節 模型分析.........................................19
第五章 結論與建議.........................................35
第一節 結論.............................................35
第二節 建議............................................ 37
參考文獻................................................. 38

圖表目錄
圖一 基本模型的賽局樹....................................9

一、中文部份：

1.洪麗雲(2005)，“逃稅賄賂行為分析”，碩士論文，中山大學經濟學研究所在職專班。

2.曾秀惠(2001)，“租稅逃避與貪污行為的經濟分析”，碩士論文，逢甲大學經濟研究所。

3.張維迎著；劉楚俊編校(2000)，《賽局理論與信息經濟學》，茂昌圖書有限公司。

4.賈魯君(2002)，“廠商逃稅與賄賂行為的經濟分析”，碩士論文，逢甲大學經濟研究所。


二、英文部份：

1. Andreoni, James; Brian Erard; onathan Feinstein (1998),“Tax compliance,” Journal of Economic Literature Vol.36,No.2 p818-860

2. Arrow,K.J. (1970), Essays in the theory of Risk-bearing,ch.3. Amsterdam：North-Holland.

3. Allingham Michael G. and Sandmo Agnar. (1972),“Income tax evasion：A theoretical analysis,” Journal of Public Economics Vol.1, p.323-338.

4. Becker, Gary S. (1968),“Crime and Punishment,” Journal of Political economy Vol.76, p.169-217.

5. Chu,C. Y. C. (1990),“A Model of Income Tax Evasion with Venal Tax Officials：The case of Taiwan,” Public Finance, p.392-408.

6. Chu,C.Y. C. and Kong-Pin Chen (1995),“Internal Control And External Evasion：A Model of Business Tax Compliance,” unpublished paper.

7. Chu,C.Y. C. and Kong-Pin Chen (2002),“Internal Control vs External Manipulation：A Model of Corproate Income Tax Evasion,” Rand Journal of Economics, p1-25.

8. Chu,C.Y. C. and Leslie Tan (1996),“Tax Evasion By Small Business：Theory And Empirical of Taiwan,” Public Economics Review 1-2, p.157-183.

9. Cowell, F. A. (1985), ” Tax Evasion With Labour Income ”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol.26, pp.19-34.

10. Chander Parkash, Wilde Louis, (1992),“Corruption in tax administration,” Journal of Public Economics 49, p.333-349.

11. Crocker, Keith J. and Joel Slemrod (2005), “Corporate tax evasion with agency costs,” Journal of Public Economics Vol.89,p.1593-1610

12. Graetz, Michael J. and Reinganum Jennifer F. and Louis L.Wilde. (1986),“The tax compliance game：Toward an interactive theory of law enforcement,” Journal of Law,Economics, and Organization Vol.2, No.1 p.1-32.

13. Lee,K. (1998),“Tax Evasion, Monopoly, And Nonneutral Profit Taxes,”National Tax Journal Vol. 51, p.333-338.

14 Mossin,J. (1968),“Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing,”Journal of Political economy 76, pp.553-568.

15. Reinganum Jennifer F. and Wilde Louis L. (1985), “Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework,” Journal of Public Economic Vol.26 p.1-18.

16. Yitzhaki,S. (1974),“Income Tax Evasion：A Theoretical Analysis,”Journal of Public Economics Vol.3, p.201-202.

17. Yitzhaki,S. (1982), ” A Tax Programming Model,” Journal of Public Economics Vol.19, p.107-120.