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博碩士論文 etd-0819110-143909 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-0819110-143909
論文名稱
Title
強制性財報重編、家族涉入與財報相關人士的撤換決策
Mandatory Restatements, Family Involvement and Replacement Decisions for Related Parties of Financial Statements
系所名稱
Department
畢業學年期
Year, semester
語文別
Language
學位類別
Degree
頁數
Number of pages
87
研究生
Author
指導教授
Advisor
召集委員
Convenor
口試委員
Advisory Committee
口試日期
Date of Exam
2010-08-18
繳交日期
Date of Submission
2010-08-19
關鍵字
Keywords
撤換決策、家族涉入、財報重編
replacement decisions, family involvement, restatements
統計
Statistics
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中文摘要
強制性財報重編具有獨特性,然而多數重編文獻探討企業撤換決策時很少關注在此。此外,以前研究亦很少探討家族涉入在財報品質及企業撤換決策上扮演的角色。本篇旨在探討強制性財報重編及其重大性對財報相關人士之影響。特別是,本篇也關注家族涉入(家族持股與家族董事)在上述關係的中介效果。本研究發現顯示,強制性財報重編企業會撤換高階管理當局、財務主管、企業稽核人員與監察人。強制性財報重編性愈高之企業,會有較頻繁的企業稽核人員、監察人與內部稽核人員異動。此外,本研究發現顯示,家族涉入在強制性財報重編與企業撤換決策間關連中是一個重要的中介因子。本研究證據指出,家族持股僅能有限激勵家族成員認同撤換涉入重大財務報導失敗之財報相關人士。然而,家族成員擔任董事時,為期強化家族控制,會正當化其對這些財報相關人士撤換之侵權行為。一些研究發現更指出,強制性重編企業在撤換家族經理人後,仍可能會雇用家族經理人,這更進一步支持家族成員會透過管理者職位以獲取其對企業控制之可能性。整體言,本研究結果提供台灣證券主管機關一個警訊,亦即有必要去重視對於應為會計醜聞事件負責的那些人之懲處機制、強化這些人士家族地位的管理者異動揭露,及教育個別投資者異動揭露的重要性。
Abstract
Mandatory restatements are unique in the nature whereas they are often ignored in restatement literature examining restating firms’ replacement decisions. Furthermore, family studies little examine the role family involvement plays in determining financial reporting quality and firms’ replacement decisions. This paper is motivated to investigate the impact of mandatory restatements and the restatement severity to related parties of financial statements. Particularly, this paper also concerns on the moderating effect of family involvement (family shareholding and family directorships) in the above association. The findings indicate that mandatory restating firms would replace top management, financial executives, firm auditors and supervisors. Firms with higher mandatory restatement severity have more frequent turnover of firm auditors, supervisors and internal auditors. Besides, the findings show that family involvement is an essential moderating factor in the relationship between mandatory restatement and firms’ replacement decisions. The evidence shows that family shareholding has limited motivating effects for family members to be in favor of the replacement of related parties of financial statements involving in material financial reporting failure. However, family directorships enhance family members’ entrenchment in influencing the firms’ replacement decisions so as to strengthen family control. Some evidence indicates that mandatory restating firms would still replace family CEO with family CEO, which further supports the possibility that family members limit managerial positions to capture control of the firms. Overall, the evidence provides a warning sign to Taiwanese security regulators that there’s a necessary to emphasize the punishment mechanisms for those who are responsible for accounting scandals, strengthen managerial turnover disclosure about their family status and educate individual investors the value of turnover disclosure.
目次 Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1. Motivation and Research Purpose 1
1.2. Results Preview 5
1.3. Results Implications 6
1.4. Thesis Structure 8
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 9
2.1. Financial Restatements 9
2.1.1. The Accountability for Related Parties of Financial Statements 9
2.1.2. Restatement Reason Categories 9
2.1.3. Antecedents and Consequences of Financial Restatements 11
2.2. Legitimacy Theory, Signal Theory and Firms’ Replacement Decisions 13
2.3. Hypotheses Development 15
2.3.1. Related Parties of Financial Statements and Financial Reporting Quality 15
2.3.2. More Serious Financial Misstatements 19
2.3.3. Family Involvement and Family Members’ Behavior 20
CHAPTER 3 DATA and METHODOLOGY 24
3.1. Sample Selection Process 24
3.2. Research Models 26
3.3. Variable Definition 28
3.3.1. Turnover Variables (Dependent Variables) 28
3.3.2. Restatement Variables (Independent Variables) 29
3.3.3. Family Involvement Variables 29
3.3.4. Interaction Term Variables 30
3.3.5. Control Variables 31
CHAPTER 4 Results for Tests 35
4.1. Univariate Analysis 35
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 38
4.3. Robustness Tests 49
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 69
5.1. Conclusion 69
5.2. Discussion 70
REFERENCE 73
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