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博碩士論文 etd-0820101-103629 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-0820101-103629
論文名稱
Title
動態資本結構評價模式之分析與應用
Analysis and Application about the Valuation Model of Dynamic Capital Structure
系所名稱
Department
畢業學年期
Year, semester
語文別
Language
學位類別
Degree
頁數
Number of pages
80
研究生
Author
指導教授
Advisor
召集委員
Convenor
口試委員
Advisory Committee
口試日期
Date of Exam
2001-07-24
繳交日期
Date of Submission
2001-08-20
關鍵字
Keywords
代理成本、蒙地卡羅方法、兩稅合一、動態資本結構
monte carlo approach, agency cost, integration of individual and corporate taxes, dynamic capital structure
統計
Statistics
本論文已被瀏覽 5706 次,被下載 5345
The thesis/dissertation has been browsed 5706 times, has been downloaded 5345 times.
中文摘要
近代資本結構理論探討的重點在於公司管理當局能否在股東財富極大下,找到最適資本結構。然而公司實務上欲找出資本結構最適點並非易事,而動態資本結構評價模式,可藉由蒙地卡羅模擬方式,模擬出最適資本結構。因此本研究從營業收入觀點出發修正Goldstein、Ju及Leland(1998)之模型,同時由於我國面臨新稅制改革,因此更進一步擴充此模型使其符合我國之稅率結構,期能提出一套較完整之動態資本結構評價模式。
首先以該模式模擬一般產業與高科技產業之最適資本結構,再者以該模式之決策變數(公司規模、成長機會、獲利能力、營運風險及股利政策)模擬其對資本結構之影響,同時進一步探討我國實施兩稅合一後對資本結構、股利政策及公司價值之影響。茲歸納本研究之主要結果如下:
依據本研究之動態資本結構評價模式之模擬結果,高科技產業之最適財務槓桿低於一般產業,因此,台灣產業特性對最適資本結構之影響是顯著的。公司規模、成長機會與負債比率呈現正相關,而獲利能力、股利率與負債比率呈負相關,而營運風險與負債比率則呈曲線關係。一般產業傾向於未設限型而高科技產業之負債比率較傾向於上限型的最適負債比率動態調整策略。
公司有效稅率愈高其公司價值愈高,至於保留盈餘稅率及股東適用個人所得稅率愈高則公司價值愈低。因此兩稅合一之綜效,須視股東個人適用稅率而定。
由模擬結果知兩稅合一後負債比率應下降,僅高科技產業符合預期,一般產業之負債比率不但沒有減少反而增加。其可能原因為產業結構改變,致使一般產業之市值於兩稅合一後下降,因此現金增資之資金成本相對較高,故僅能以舉債融資。股利支付率較兩稅合一實施前為高,其主要在於規避加徵之保留盈餘稅,且於兩稅合一前股利支付率愈高,其公司價值愈低,故符合所得稅效果假說。
最後,應用本研究所推導出之動態資本結構評價模式,其模擬結果大致與研究假說一致,可見此模式對時況的描述具相當程度之適用。故希望能藉本文之結論以供企業管理者調整資本結構及股利政策時之參考。
Abstract
The modern capital structure theory attempts to determine an optimal capital structure on the maximum shareholder’s wealth. In practice, it is very difficult to find an optimal capital structure. Nevertheless, the dynamic capital structure model can simulate an optimal capital structure by Monte Carlo approach. Therefore, this study begin at the opinion of sales revenue and modifies the model of Goldstein, Ju and Leland(1998).
Firstly, using the model to simulate the optimality of capital structures about traditional and high-tech industries of Taiwan. Secondly, the impacts of industry characteristic、firm size、growth、profitability、operating risk and dividend policy on the optimal capital structure are also analyzed. Meanwhile, to investigate the effect of implementation of the integration of individual and corporate taxes on the firm value、dividend policy and capital structure. There are some conclusions in this study.
The simulate results indicate that the leverage ratio of traditional industry is higher than that of high-tech industry. Firm size and growth are positively associated with debt ratio. The profitability and dividend yield are negatively associated with debt ratio. But operating risk and debt ratio have curve relation. The traditional industry trends to optimal static capital structure strategy. But high-tech industry is toward optimal upward dynamic capital structure strategy.
The higher corporate tax rate, the higher firm value is. The shareholder’s individual tax rate and the tax rate on the retained earnings with firm value are negatively relation. So the extent of how tax reform affects firm value depends on the shareholder’s individual tax rate.
According to the model, debt ratio should decrease. The empirical result for the high technology industry has satisfied the theoretical prediction. However, the increase of the debt ratios of firms in the traditional industry indicates that industry framework is changed for higher equity cost. Therefore, the resource of firm funds will be by debt policy. Dividend payment will increase after the implementation of the integration of individual and corporate taxes. The more dividend pay out, the lower firm value is. So it consists with tax-effect hypothesis.
Finally, this study derives the valuation model of dynamic capital structure. The simulate results are consistent with research hypothesis. That can advise managers to revise capital structure and to make dividend policy.
目次 Table of Contents
誌謝 I
摘要 II
目錄 IV
圖目錄 V
表目錄 V
第壹章 緒論
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 論文架構與研究流程 4
第貳章 理論與文獻探討
第一節 最適資本結構理論及相關文獻回顧 6
第二節 動態資本結構理論及相關文獻回顧 14
第三節 兩稅合一理論及相關文獻回顧 21
第參章 動態資本結構評價模式 28
第一節 最適資本結構評價模式 29
第二節 設限之動態資本結構調整 39
第肆章 實証研究方法
第一節 研究假說 44
第二節 變數定義與資料來源 48
第三節 研究方法 53
第伍章 模擬結果分析
第一節 影響公司資本結構因素之模擬分析 55
第二節 兩稅合一政策實施對公司價值及資本結構之影響 61
第陸章 結論與建議
第一節 結論 68
第二節 建議 69
第三節 研究限制 70
參考文獻 71
附錄 77
參考文獻 References
參考文獻
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