摘　要

　　員工分紅配股是台灣業界在既有法規架構下，公司將員工薪資結構與公司營運績效結合的特有方式，與國外員工股票選擇權制度相較，員工分紅配股制度除了將薪資結構與公司績效結合的精神是一致外，員工分紅配股不僅在會計的處理方式、公司實際支付的成本及員工實際利得的來源有所差異；對於其所創造的誘因效果及對股東利益的影響也有待進一步釐清。

　　本文的研究目的即是探討員工分紅配股制度的功過，並分析台灣科技產業過去對「員工分紅配股制度」實際運作情形，與決策特徵。 本研究第一部分即針對員工分紅配股制度與員工股票選擇權制度的基本精神、運作方式及對員工誘因效果的差異等議題作出說明，並從會計處理原則及企業評價的角度探討兩制度對股東價值的影響。　第二部分在分析台灣科技產業過去對員工分紅配股制度實際運作情形，指出部分傷害股東利益的作法，並利用幾個度量指標來分辨各公司執行員工分紅配股制度的誘因效率、效果及對股東財富剝奪的程度。　第三部分以台灣科技產業為樣本，以87至90年為選樣期間，針對選擇後的國內53家上市電子公司，應用迴歸模型對實際運作情形做實證分析，探討員工分紅配股制度橫斷面的決策特徵，並與假說理論相互印証。

研究結果發現：
1. 員工分紅配股的本質是利用稀釋股東權益，讓員工獲取分紅配股的利益。當市場處於多頭時，在股價填權的庇蔭下，完美的結合了股東利益與員工紅利；但當市場呈空頭走勢或公司股價表現不佳時，股價沒有填權時，員工分紅配股就成了股東的負擔。
2. 員工所獲分紅配股利益是由市場支付而非公司支付，與採用何種會計方法無關。 採認列費用的會計方法主張可呈現更真實的損益表，但對公司帳面股東權益並無影響。
3. 對股東權益真實價值而言，EBO模型以會計盈餘為基礎，若把員工分紅配股費用化將降低綜合淨利，使真實價值降低。 DFC模型因不同會計方法不會改變公司的自由現金流量，所以把員工分紅配股費用化亦不會影響公司整體真實價值，但每股的真實價值會因員工分紅配股稀釋股數而略為影響。
4. 87~90年度我國上市電子類股的研究樣本中，盈餘分紅配股率的平均數為6.1%，標準差為3.2%，中間值為5.6%；分紅配股稀釋率的平均數為1.4%，標準差為0.95%，中間值為1.2%。 而員工分紅股市值對權益市均值增值比的平均數為13%，標準差為53%，中間值為8%，顯示員工分紅配股制度所創造的股東財富效果隨個別公司有很大的差異。
5. 實證結果顯示除了採取固定分紅配股率的公司外，經理人在決定員工分紅配股方案時，主要是以員工分紅配股的市值為衡量的依據，而非員工分紅配股稀釋率或盈餘分紅配股率。
6. 從特徵實証結果得知，公司整體發放的員工分紅配股市值與市場認定之成長機會、薪資水準增加率、稅後淨利成長率呈顯著的正向關係，與公司規模、財務槓桿呈顯著的負向關係；而平均每位員工所獲得的分紅配股市值與公司規模、市場認定之成長機會、薪資水準增加率、稅後淨利成長率呈顯著的正向關係，與財務槓桿呈顯著的負向關係。 其結果印證了以代理理論、資訊不對稱理論、規模效率為基礎的假說。　再者，實證結果不能支持公司經理人會把公司價值的增加情形做為決定員工分紅配股多寡的依據之假說。

Abstract

Employee Stock Bonus (ESB) is a unique bonus model to link employee salary package with company performance under the current regulation in Taiwan. Comparing with Employee Stock Option (ESOP) in USA, ESB is different in accounting process, company’s actual cost and the model of employee gain in spite of the principle of linking employee salary package to corporate performance is the same. Moreover, the incentive effectiveness and the impact on shareholders’ value between ESB and ESOP need to be clarified.

The objectives of this research are to discuss the pros and cons of ESB program as well as to analyze the implementation history and decision characterization of ESB in Taiwan. In the first part of this study, we compare the difference between ESB and ESOP in terms of their fundamentals, implementation and incentive effectiveness, as well as analyze the impact on shareholders’ value by various accounting principles and valuation models approaches.　In the second part, we do a history study on ESB implementation history of Taiwan hi-tech industries. We point out some improper ESB decisions that hurt shareholder’s value. We also propose some indexes to measure effectiveness, efficiency of ESB and degree of impact on shareholder’s value. In the third part, we apply regression methodology and cross-sectional analysis to characterize the ESB decision using the samples from Taiwan listed hi-tech companies between 1998 to 2001.

We conclude the following contributions in this research:
1. The fundamental of ESB is to provide employee bonus by diluting shareholder’s value. During bull market or stock price appreciates after stock splits, ESB perfectly incorporates employee bonus with shareholders’ value. On the other hand, ESB becomes an extra overhead for shareholders during bear market or stock price depreciates after stock splits.

2. What employees gain from ESB is paid by equity market instead of being paid by the company, no matter whichever accounting principle is adopted. Recognizing ESB as company expense will present income statement in more a proper way but will not impact book value of equity.

3. To recognize ESB as company expense will reduce “intrinsic value of equity” evaluated by EBO model as EBO model is based on accounting profit. As DFC model is based on free cash flow, “intrinsic value of equity” evaluated by DFC model will not change even if different accounting principles are adopted. However, “intrinsic value of equity per share” will be slightly affected by the dilution of share number.

4. In the research samples, mean of “the market value of ESB over average appreciation value of company” is 13%，standard deviation is 53%，median is 8%, which implies the welfare effectiveness created by ESB to shareholders varies with individual company.

5. The result of empirical study supports that the main measurement index for managers to decide the share number of ESB program is “total market value of ESB” instead of “profit share rate” or “dilution rate”, regardless companies which adopted “fix profit share rate for ESB” policy.

6. According to the result of empirical study, “the market value of ESB ” is significantly positive- correlated to growth opportunity, merit raises rate, net profit growth rate, and significantly negative – correlated to company size and financial leverage. “The market value of ESB per employee” is significantly positive-correlated to company size, growth opportunity, merit raises rate, net profit growth rate, and significantly negative – correlated to financial leverage. The result is consistent with hypotheses that are based on Agency Theory, Information Asymmetry Theory and Scale of Economic. The result of empirical study is not able to support the hypotheses that managers will offer employee more value of ESB according to the appreciation of company value.

論文目次

第一章 緒論 ……………………………………………………… 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 ……………………………………… 1
第二節 研究範圍 ……………………………………………… 2
第三節 研究方法與研究架構 ………………………………… 3

第二章 文獻探討 ………………………………………………… 6
第一節 國外文獻 ……………………………………………… 6
第二節 國內文獻 ……………………………………………… 6

第三章 員工股票選擇權制度與員工分紅配股制度 …………… 9
第一節 員工股票選擇權制度 ………………………………… 9
第二節 員工分紅配股制度 ……………………………………12
第三節 員工股票選擇權制度與員工分紅配股制度之比較 …15
第四節 制度的謬誤現象 ………………………………………17
第五節 小結 ………………………………………………… 18

第四章 會計制度與企業評價對員工分紅配股的處理與影響 … 19
第一節 會計方法的影響 …………………………………… 19
第二節 會計方法的介紹 …………………………………… 19
第三節 會計方法對財報分析的影響 ……………………… 20
第四節 企業評價方法的介紹 ………………………………… 23
第五節 會計方法對企業評價的影響 ………………………… 28
第六節 小結 ………………………………………………… 29

第五章 員工分紅計畫實施狀況與評鑑 ………………………… 31
第一節 公司員工分紅配股政策的模式 ……………………… 31
第二節 盈餘分紅配股率與分紅配股稀釋率 ………………… 33
第三節 員工分紅股市值對權益增值比 ……………………… 37
第四節 固定盈餘分紅配股率政策 ………………………… 41
第五節 員工紅利配股率與股東股利配股率 ………………… 43
第六章 員工分紅配股特徵實証研究 …………………………… 48
第一節 實証假說 …………………………………………… 48
第二節 實証模型設計 ……………………………………… 50
第三節 實証樣本 …………………………………………… 53
第四節 實証結果 …………………………………………… 53

第七章 結論與建議 ………………………………………… 59

參考文獻 ………………………………………………………… 62

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