近年來，產業的併購(勾結)在市場上非常普遍，這是由於廠商可藉由整合將所有的生產價值全數囊括。垂直整合不僅可以增加自身競爭力，同時能減少交易成本，降低製造商向外購買中間材料所產生的風險，也因此企業利用相互的整合與併購已成為一種趨勢。
垂直整合除了能為廠商帶來更多利潤，同時也可能造成市場的壟斷與封殺。當製造商進行垂直併購使中間財市場價格上漲而發生所謂『市場封殺』(market foreclosure)時，社會福利與市場競爭的機制跟效率將有所影響。一般來說是市場封殺可依製造商進行整合後對中間財市場干預的程度區別為『完全封殺』以及『部分封殺』，製造商利用兩種整合策略來達到自身利潤極大的目標。
本文利用連續市場(successive market)中寡占競爭之Cournot數量模型，透過分階段的賽局進行數量競爭，假設下游廠商為中間財價格接受者，同時最終財價格因為產品的異質與替代性而有所不同，透過下游廠商利潤極大求出最適的最終財產量，再逆推回上游廠商導出其最適中間財之產量與價格。在此以Avenel and Barlet(2000)連續市場的分析架構，考慮現存和潛在競爭上游廠商間最適的整合策略組合，以及給定策略組合下，最終產品間替代、互補性對中間財市場及社會福利之影響。文末發現整合策略的選擇對中間財市場影響程度隨著最終財為替代或是互補有不同的變化。

Merger and collusion has become a popular and widespread activity between firms in the recent years. By doing this, firms can involve all the values which was created by their own factories to themselves. Manufacturers can not only raise their own profits but also diminish the uncertainty risk of purchasing middle material by vertical integrations. It has become a trend to integrate and collusion between firms. Vertical integrations bring more profits, but it also causes monopoly and forcing out.
Vertical integrate can raise the market price, and it causes market foreclosure. As a result, the social welfare and the market competitive ability will be affected. General speaking, market foreclosure can be classified into full market foreclosure and partial market foreclosure according to the interrupting level to the middle material market. The manufactures use these two strategies to attain the highest profits.
This article uses the Cournot model of oligopoly competition in successive market, and we use Cournot competition by different stages. We assumed the downstream as the price taker of middle material, and the price of final goods will be different according to the variety and substitution of the products. We figure out the appropriate final quantity and then reverse to the quantity and price of the upstream. We use Avenel and Barlet(2000) analyzing structure of successive market, and considering the most appropriate integrated forms between present and potential firms. Secondly, under a given strategy bundle, we analyze the influence between the final goods substitution and complementary to middle material market and social welfare. We found out the influence to middle material market by the choice of integrated strategy varied by substitution or complementary of final goods.

目錄
第一章 緒論 …………………………………………………………… 1
第一節 研究動機與背景 …………………………………………… 1
第二節 研究目的與方法 …………………………………………… 2
第三節 本文架構 …………………………………………………… 3
第二章 文獻回顧 ……………………………………………………… 5
第一節 垂直整合定義與結構 ……………………………………… 5
第二節 垂直整合與市場封殺 ……………………………………… 8
第三章 理論模型結構與推導 ……………………………………… 12
第一節 模型相關假設 …………………………………………… 12
第二節 上游競爭者未進入市場之情形 …………………………… 13
第三節 上游競爭者進入市場之情形 ……………………………… 16
第四章 模型分析 ……………………………………………………… 26
第一節 整合策略與市場競爭影響分析 …………………………… 26
第二節 面對潛在競爭對手之最適策略組合 ……………………… 31
第五章 結論與建議 ………………………………………………… 35
附錄 ……………………………………………………………………… 37
參考文獻 ……………………………………………………………… 38

文獻參考
中文部分
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