本文將驗證中央銀行是否會創造政治景氣循環。本文將引用Leetouwer and Maier (2002)之投機模型並將數據時間延展至2008年第四季，且加入台灣、韓國與馬來西亞等國家。文中將歐美亞十國央行公告之利率做為依變數，以選舉日期、中央銀行獨立性等驗證中央銀行是否會受到執政者壓力，配合選舉日期在選舉前，用降低利率之寬鬆的貨幣政策來創造政治景氣循環。
而實證結果顯示：1.中央銀行利用利率來創造政治景氣循環之假設不成立，這與Leetouwer and Maier (2002)之研究結果相輔，表示利率無法做為中央銀行是否創造政治景氣循環之工具2.央行獨立性越高，央行採用的利率政策較低，通貨膨脹也較低。

This article will verify whether the central banks create political business cycles or not. To refer to the Opportunistic Model operated by Leetouwer and Maier (2002), this research will expand the acquisition time of data till the fourth season of 2008, and added Korea、Malaysia and Taiwan into the model. In this article, the independent variables will be the rates announced by central banks of these ten countries. The dependent variables will be the date of president/parliamentary elections and the independence of central bank to verify before the elections whether will the central banks create political business cycles through setting lower rate in monetary policy are pressured by rules or not.
The empirical results show that: 1.The assumption of Central banks will use interest rates to create a political business cycle does not hold. This complements with Leetouwer and Maier’s results studied in 2002, the interest rate cannot be used as a tool to create political business cycle. 2. The higher independence of central bank, the interest rate introduced by central bank will be lower, and as well as the inflation rate.

第一章 緒論 .......................................................................................-1-

第一節 研究動機.........................................................................................-1-
第二節 研究目的.........................................................................................-3-
第三節 研究架構與流程.............................................................................-4-

第二章 文獻回顧 ..............................................................................-5-

第一節 政治景氣循環文獻回顧.................................................................-5-

第二節 央行獨立性國內外文獻……...…...................................................-9-
第三章 研究方法與模型的建立....................................................-14-
第一節 模型建立........................................................................................-14-
第二節 追蹤資料單根檢定(Panel Data Unit Root Test)……......................-18-
第三節 追蹤資料分析方法(Panel Data Methods)......................................-20-
第四章 模型實證分析 .....................................................................-24-
第一節 資料來源與處理............................................................................-24-
第二節 實證結果分析................................................................................-26-
第五章 結論 ......................................................................................-31-
參考文獻…........................................................................................-33-
附錄 中央銀行各面向之獨立性判定.............................................-40-

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