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博碩士論文 etd-0908104-101111 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-0908104-101111
論文名稱
Title
利益相關者價值、股權結構與外包之公司治理機制研究
Essays on Corporate Governance of Stakeholder's Value, Stockholding Structure and Outsourcing
系所名稱
Department
畢業學年期
Year, semester
語文別
Language
學位類別
Degree
頁數
Number of pages
139
研究生
Author
指導教授
Advisor
召集委員
Convenor
口試委員
Advisory Committee
口試日期
Date of Exam
2004-07-31
繳交日期
Date of Submission
2004-09-08
關鍵字
Keywords
公司治理、利益相關者、外包、股權結構、交易成本
Transaction Cost, Corporate Governance, Outsourcing, Stockholding Structure, Stakeholder
統計
Statistics
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中文摘要
公司治理(Corporate Governance)是近年來企業達成組織經營目標過程中,運用最為廣泛的制度架構。1997年東南亞金融危機,暴露了企業制度的明顯缺陷,也促使政府與民間機構,開始重新審視公司治理的重要性,紛紛提出公司治理原則,強化公司治理機制、提高公司治理效率、滿足股東利潤極大化的目標、保障利益相關者的權益。
本研究以策略性公司治理的觀點,分章探討公司治理的相關議題。第貳章從企業理論的角度,簡述公司治理理論的基礎內涵;第參章以利益相關者理論為基礎,分別從企業所有權狀態依存、風險承擔和倫理責任的角度,提出公司治理模式的選擇與安排,可以提供企業經營之參考;隨著各國的政治、經濟、文化的差異,其治理模式也會趨於不同。第肆章以委託代理理論為基礎,分別在股權結構分散與股權結構集中的兩種情況下,對所有者與經營者之間的委託代理行為進行分析,得到兩種情況下的Nash均衡,其Nash均衡水準與經營者的報償、股東對經營者的懲罰以及監督成本有關,對經營者的激勵與監督結果,必須適當的結合賞優懲劣制度。第伍章以外包為例,在交易成本的基礎上,加入企業核心能力觀點,分別從外包治理的成本和企業核心能力效益,建構出外包治理的觀念模式,並導出了四個不同條件下的六種不同的外包治理模式,可提供企業採取外包作為之依循。在不同條件下,由內製轉外求型式或外求轉內製型式之外包,顯示了公司內部物質資源與核心能力二者之間相互增長的動態觀念。第陸章以透過我國半導體產業為案例,比較我國與韓國在半導體產業的展概況,發覺我國半導體產業在政治、經濟、文化和產業結構與韓國不同,我國採取了垂直分工的治理模式,韓國則採取垂直整合的模式;並以台積電與聯電的個案,輔助說明交易成本、公司治理模式發展、股權結構的情況。
管理考慮投入與產出,著重經營活動所帶來的效率,治理由倫理與責任著手,注重訊息的公開透明、社會責任的關懷,偏重利益相關者權益的保護。所以,公司治理必須在倫理思考的架構下,採取相對應的公司治理結構,保護利益相關者的權益,創造更多的價值,達成企業價值極大化的目標。
Abstract
The corporate governance is the extensive framework which applies to reach enterprise business goal in the recent years. Due to the south-eastern Asia financial crisis in 1997, it indicated the distinct defects of the enterprise system. The government and some institutions had to address the principles of the corporate governance and enhance the efficiency of the corporate governance.
The essays we discuss are from the strategic corporate governance viewpoint respectively by chapters. The second chapter briefs the basic content of the corporate governance theories. The third chapter based on the theories of the stakeholder theories, we raise the selection models of the corporate governance structure from the viewpoint of the state-contingent ownership, risk taking and ethics, respectively. Due to the differences in politics, economic and cultures from countries, there would be different corporate governance structure. In the fourth chapter, based on the principal-agent theory, we analyze the principal-agent behavior between the owner and the operator under the centralized and dispersal ownership structure conditions, respectively. It gets the Nash equilibrium, which relates with the manager’s rewards, the manager’s punishment and the monitoring cost. The manager’s motivation and rewards should combine with the granting rewards and punitive sanction. The fifth chapter is the example of outsourcing. Based on the transaction cost from the viewpoint of the enterprise core competence, it establishes the outsourcing governance model from the cost of outsourcing and the benefit of the enterprise core competence, and derives the six different outsourcing governance models from the four different conditions. Under the different conditions, it displays the dynamic viewpoint between the internal resources and core competence of the enterprise. In the sixth chapter, it takes the domestic semi-conductor industry as the example to compare the domestic development of the semiconductor industry with Korea’s. There are a lot of differences in politics, economic, culture and the industrial structure between these two countries. My country takes the vertical specialization, but Korean takes the vertical integration. Moreover, TSMC and UMC cases help to elaborate the transaction cost, the development of the corporate governance, and the ownership structure.
Management considers the input and the output and stresses on the efficiency of business operation. The governance starts from the ethics and accountability, emphasizes the information transparency and social responsibility, the protection of the stakeholders’ interest. Therefore, the corporate has to adopt the good corporate governance structure under the framework of ethics-thinking, ensure the interest of stakeholder, and create the more business value.
目次 Table of Contents
目 錄
章 節 內 容 頁碼
第壹章 緒論 1-1
第一節 研究動機與背景 1-1
第二節 研究目的 1-2
第三節 研究方法與架構 1-4
第貳章 公司治理理論的分析框架 2-1
第一節 前言 2-1
第二節 公司治理的基本內涵 2-2
第三節 公司治理的理論派別 2-6
第四節 公司治理結構概述 2-9
第五節 公司治理理論的未來發展 2-19
第六節 策略性公司治理架構 2-22
第七節 小結 2-23
第參章 利益相關者價值與公司治理模式 3-1
第一節 前言 3-1
第二節 企業經營與利益相關者 3-2
第三節 治理倫理與企業價值極大化 3-9
第四節 公司治理模式的安排與選擇 3-14
第五節 公司治理模式的趨同分析 3-22
第六節 小結 3-28
第肆章 股權結構與治理機制 4-1
第一節 前言 4-1
第二節 代理理論 4-1
第三節 股權結構的模型分析 4-9
第四節 小結 4-17
第伍章 網絡治理邊界與外包治理模式 5-1
第一節 前言 5-1
第二節 網絡組織與治理邊界 5-2
第三節 外包的類型與理論 5-6
第四節 外包治理模式的建構 5-15
第五節 小結 5-26
第陸章 半導體產業個案研究 6-1
第一節 半導體產業發展現況 6-1
第二節 台灣與韓國半導體產業結構的比較分析 6-7
第三節 台灣積體電路公司(TSMC)和聯華電子公司(UMC) 6-11
第四節 小結 6-18
第柒章 結論 7-1
參考文獻 參-1


表 目 錄
表 次 內 容 頁碼
表2-1 公司治理理論派別的不同觀點 2-9
表2-2 上市公司董事及監察人持股比例統計樣本分配表 2-13
表2-3 台灣上市公司股權結構表 2-18
表2-4 股東至上主義與利益相關者理論 2-20
表2-5 主流公司治理理論與大股東治理理論的差異 2-21
表2-6 公司治理與網路治理的比較 2-22
表3-1 初級和次級利益相關者:利益與權利的性質 3-7
表3-2 國外主要公司治理原則對利益相關者的規定 3-9
表3-3 股東與利益相關者賽局的報償矩陣 3-23
表3-4 股東與利益相關者賽局的報償矩陣 3-24
表4-1 所有者與經營者的報償矩陣 4-12
表4-2 所有者與經營者的報償矩陣 4-15
表5-1 市場、網絡組織、企業組織的特性比較 5-1
表5-2 外包模型的整合 5-9
表5-3 外包治理模式之建構與選擇 5-23
表6-1 台灣半導體產業表現 6-3
表6-2 國內半導體上下游業者 6-5
表6-3 台積電主要業務內容及其營業比重 6-12
表6-4 台積電主要商品之銷售地區統計表 6-12
表6-5 台積電主要銷售對象 6-12
表6-6 股權大小分配情況 6-13
表6-7 股東結構類別持股比例 6-14
表6-8 聯電主要商品產值比重 6-16
表6-9 聯電主要商品之銷售地區統計表 6-16
表6-10 股權大小分配情況 6-17
表6-11 股東結構類別持股比例 6-17


圖 目 錄
圖 次 內 容 頁碼
圖1-1 公司治理理論體系 1-5
圖1-2 策略性公司治理架構 1-6
圖1-3 基本研究內容 1-6
圖2-1 內部的治理機制 2-10
圖3-1 企業的黑箱模型 3-2
圖3-2 Wheeler對利益相關者的界定 3-4
圖3-3 傳統投入產出模式的企業 3-5
圖3-4 利益相關者模式的企業 3-5
圖3-5 股權至上的公司治理模式 3-15
圖3-6 股東員工共同參與的公司治理模式 3-16
圖3-7 社會責任的公司治理模式 3-17
圖3-8 利益相關者的公司治理模式 3-18
圖3-9 共創企業價值觀念模式 3-20
圖3-10 企業所有權狀態依存性的治理模式安排 3-21
圖3-11 風險承擔態度與治理倫理要素的公司治理模式 3-22
圖3-12 參與者的策略選擇 3-27
圖4-1 訊息不對稱因果關係圖 4-7
圖5-1 網絡的基本型態 5-2
圖5-2 企業的治理邊界 5-5
圖5-3 按獨特性和價值劃分的業務外包類型 5-8
圖5-4 按程度劃分的業務外包類型 5-9
圖5-5 外包的企業活動 5-10
圖5-6 外包決策模型 5-15
圖5-7 物質資產相對的治理成本 5-16
圖5-8 整合資產的相對治理成本 5-18
圖5-9 外包的相對治理效益 5-19
圖5-10 外包相對治理價值之一 5-21
圖5-11 外包相對治理價值之二 5-21
圖5-12 外包治理模式的選擇 5-26
圖5-13 外包治理模式的整合邏輯 5-26
圖6-1 IC晶片的製造程序 6-4
圖6-2 半導體產業的群聚結構 6-6
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