本研究探討董事會網絡對購併績效之影響效果。研究樣本選取2002年至2011年間，美國財富500大企業購併美國上市公司之事件總計331筆樣本，並且使用Cai & Sevilir (2012)的董事會網絡定義去區分購併樣本中，主併公司和目標公司之間是否存在董事會網絡。研究設計上，我先使用事件研究法估計購併案之累積異常報酬率(Cumulative Abnormal Returns)，在藉由迴歸分析驗證董事會網絡對購併案績效的影響，實證分析結果如下：
1. 對於美國財富500大企業，購併宣告會帶來負向累積異常報酬率。
2. 對於美國財富500大企業，董事會網絡會降低購併績效。
3. 對於美國財富500大企業，董事會網絡會無法有效促進資訊流通。

This study investigates the effect of board networks on M&A transactions. I select 331 samples of M&A transactions among U.S. Fortunate 500 companies which are also U.S. public companies from 2002 to 2011. In addition, I use definition of board networks by Cai & Sevilir (2012) to identify whether there exist board networks in each sample. About research design, first I use event study methodology to estimates cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), and then examine the relationship between the board networks and M&A performance through regression analysis. Empirical analysis results are as follows:：
1. M&A announcement brings significantly negative abnormal returns to the U.S. Fortunate 500 companies.
2. The board networks will decrease the M&A performance for the U.S. Fortunate 500 companies.
3. The board networks are not efficient information channels for the U.S. Fortunate 500 companies.

論文審定書-----------------------------------------------------------i
致謝-------------------------------------------------------------------ii
中文摘要------------------------------------------------------------iii
英文摘要-------------------------------------------------------------iv
第一章 緒論-------------------------------------------------------1
第一節 研究背景與動機-----------------------------------------1
第二節 研究目的--------------------------------------------------3
第三節 論文架構--------------------------------------------------3
第二章 文獻探討-------------------------------------------------5
第一節 企業購併策略--------------------------------------------5
第二節 董事會網絡對購併績效之影響-----------------------9
第三章 假說建立與研究設計--------------------------------19
第一節 研究假說-----------------------------------------------19
第二節 資料來源與樣本選擇--------------------------------21
第三節 研究方法-----------------------------------------------23
第四章 實證結果與分析--------------------------------------29
第一節 樣本特性-----------------------------------------------29
第二節 購併宣告效果分析-----------------------------------32
第三節 董事會網絡對購併績效關係之分析--------------33
第四節 董事會網絡資訊傳遞效果之分析-----------------36
第五章 結論與建議--------------------------------------------38
第一節 研究結論-----------------------------------------------38
第二節 研究限制-----------------------------------------------40
第三節 研究貢獻與建議--------------------------------------40
參考文獻-----------------------------------------------------------42

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網路資料部分：
1. Bloomberg Businessweek http://www.businessweek.com/
2. Securities and Exchange Commission http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml