在混合寡占的文獻中，一般假設國營廠商及民營廠商的成本函數形式相同，
但事實上，國營和民營企業不論在經營管理方式或獎懲制度上皆有許多差異而導
致其成本函數的不同，例如民營企業通常以業績刺激工作的效率性，國營企業則
缺乏能誘使員工積極生產的制度，造成民營企業的生產相對國營企業較有效率。
因此，本文將假設國營及民營廠商成本函數不同，並進而探討政府的民營化決
策。我們分別以極大社會福利和極大社會福利與廠商利潤之加權平均為前提下進
行產量決策，再對民營化的程度進行分析。我們發現，若以社會福利函數及利潤
加權為目標函數且不考慮補貼政策時，政府會實施部分民營化或完全民營化。但
若以社會福利函數與利潤的加權平均為目標函數且考慮補貼政策時，政府將不會
實行補貼政策且民營化之決策與不考慮補貼相同。而以社會福利函數為目標函數
時，不論是否有補貼政策，政府皆應實行完全民營化政策。

none

1 緒論 ............................................................................................................................................. 7
1.1 研究動機與背景 .............................................................................................................. 7
1.2 研究目的與方法 .............................................................................................................. 8
2 文獻回顧 ..................................................................................................................................... 9
3 基本模型 ................................................................................................................................... 12
3.1 無補貼政策混合寡占下的民營化 .................................................................................. 12
3.1.1 基本模型及分析 .................................................................................................. 12
3.1.2 以社會福利為目標的無補貼混合寡占模型 ..................................................... 14
3.1.3 最適民營化程度 ................................................................................................. 19
3.1.4 不同市場結構下社會福利比較 ......................................................................... 21
3.2 以社會福利和利潤加權為目標的無補貼混合寡占模型 ............................................. 22
3.2.1 分析及結論 .......................................................................................................... 22
3.2.2 最適民營化程度 ................................................................................................. 25
3.2.3 不同市場結構下社會福利比較 ......................................................................... 27
4 進階分析 ................................................................................................................................... 31
4.1 以社會福利為目標的實施補貼混合寡占模型 ............................................................. 31
4.1.1 基本模型及結論 ................................................................................................. 32
4.1.2 最適民營化程度 ................................................................................................. 36
4.1.3 不同市場結構下社會福利比較 ......................................................................... 39
4.2 以社會福利和利潤加權為目標的實施補貼混合寡占模型 ......................................... 41
4.2.1 模型及結論 .......................................................................................................... 41
4.2.2 最適民營化程度 ................................................................................................. 44
4.2.3 不同市場結構下社會福利比較 ......................................................................... 47
5 結論 ........................................................................................................................................... 50
附 錄 ....................................................................................................................................... 54
參考文獻 ....................................................................................................................................... 56

中文部份
1. 平新喬 (2000)，「論國有經濟比重的內生決定」，經濟研究，7: 11-26。
2. 翁永和、羅鈺珊和劉碧珍 (2003)，「市場結構與最適民營化政策」，經濟論文，
31(2): 149-169。
英文部分
1. Beato, P and A. Mas-Collel (1984), “The marginal cost pricing as a regulation
mechanism in mixed markets,” In: Marchand, M., Pestieau, P., Tulkens, H., (Eds.),
The Performance of Public Enterprises. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
2. De Fraja, G. and F. Delbono (1989), “Alternative strategies of a public enterprise
in oligopoly,” Oxford Economic Paper, 41: 302-311.
3. Delbono, F. and V. Denicolo (1993), “Regulating innovative activity: The role of a
public firm,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 11(1): 35-48.
4. Fershtman, C. (1990), “The interdependence between ownership status and market
structure: the Case of Privatization,” Economica, 57: 319-328.
5. Fjell, K. and D. Pal (1996), “A mixed oligopoly in the presence of foreign private
firm,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 29: 737-743.
6. Harris, R.G. and E. G. Wiens (1980), “Government enterprise: an instrument for
the internal regulation of industry,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 13: 125–132.
7. Matsumura, T.(1998), “Partial privatization in mixed duopoly,” Journal of Public
Economics, 70: 473–483.
8. Matsumura, T.and N. Matsushima (2004), “Endogenous cost differentials between
public and private enterprises: A mixed duopoly approach,” Economica, 71:
671-688.
9. Merrill, W and N. Schneider (1966), “Government firms in oligopoly industries: a
short-run analysis,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80: 400–412.
10. Nett, L. (1994), “Why Private Firms Are More Innovative Than Public Firms,”
56
European Journal of Political Economy, 10(4): 639-653.
11. Pal, D. and M. White (1998), “Mixed oligopoly, privatization and strategic trade
policy,” Southern Economic Journal, 65: 264-281.
12. Poyago-Theokoy, J. (1998), “R&D competition in a mixed duopoly under
uncertainty and easy imitation,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 26(3):
415-428.
13. White, M. (1996), “Mixed oligopoly, privatization and subsidization,” Economics
Letters, 53: 189-195.
Merrill, W and N. Schneider (1966), “Government firms in oligopoly industries:a
short-runanalysis Quarterly,” Journal of Economics, 80: 400–12.