中文摘要
一般說來，由於有限理性與交易成本的存在，使得研發合作契約在本質上便是一種不完全契約；更重要的是，契約當事人在收到適當的研發報酬前，得進行必要的投資以方便契約之履行，可以想見的是，研發合作契約的不完全性，容易誘使一方當事人利用訊息不對稱，攫取其他當事人投資之準租。
如何讓不完全研發合作契約降低或消除當事人之間訊息的不對稱，以消弭不利研發投資的機會主義行為，將是科技管理的重要議題之一。本論文之目的便是依據研發合作的特性，嘗試利用不完全契約之架構，探討並建立研發合作契約機制設計之理論模型。
首先，我們在當事人允諾事後不進行再協商的假設下，引入「由研發單位先宣告類型廠商再決定是否挑戰」的序貫機制。在此機制中，整個機制的子賽局完美均衡為：(誠實宣告，{接受,挑戰})，雙方可以依照彼此的真實類型來決定交易內容，且研發投資的貝氏Nash均衡也等於最適之水準。
再者，當廠商與研發單位不允諾不進行再協商時，機制設計便需要考慮再協商所產生的效應。我們根據第參章之模型，證明在契約中設計由廠商與研發單位同時顯示類型，再加上Rubinstein式的非合作議價賽局，可以誘使顯示機制的Nash均衡為（誠實宣告，誠實宣告），但雙方事前的研發投資卻低於最適水準。
為避免事後再協商對事前投資之影響，部分經濟學家認為由廠商或研發單位擁有全部的研發剩餘權，雙方的事前投資皆能達到最適水準，但這樣的結果卻與Aghion & Tirole(1994)的結論大相逕庭。因此，我們採納Barzel(1989)的產權觀點，將契約所涉及的產權界定視為一種演進的過程，由第肆章的模型可看出，當事人透過可出售事前投資的實質選擇權機制，正是將外部性內化的一種手段，如果將產權事前給定而不考慮事後對其進行調整，將排除使外部成本或外部利益內化的可能。

Abstract
In an ideal world, the agents would write a contingent contract specifying exactly which outcome is to be implemented in each state. However, the bounded rationality, the contracting agents may be unable to define ex ante the contingencies, and the transaction costs, the costs result from the difficulty of foreseeing contingencies, writing and enforcing contract, will lead to R&D cooperative contracts incomplete essentially.
When R&D cooperative contracts are incomplete, the contracting agents face the hazard of ex post opportunistic behavior: each agent may engage in inefficient R&D investment in an attempt to “hold up” other agents and to obtain a large share of the available quasi-rents. The purposes of this dissertation are to show that the mechanism design to the hold-up problem may implement in incomplete R&D cooperative contracts.
In chapter II, we assume that the agents commit not to renegotiate ex post and set up a sequential mechanism. Under this sequential mechanism, the seller (university) sends massages (seller’s true type) to the buyer (firm) who receives the massages and decides whether he will challenge them. The monetary transfer from the buyer to the seller and the quality of trade are the function of agents’ true type. The great merit of this mechanism is that the seller and the buyer play the subgame perfect equilibrium in which both of them announce truthfully.
We release the assumption that the contracting agents commit not to renegotiate ex post in chapter III. Under the current legal system, there is nothing to stop buyers or sellers to prevent renegotiation of their original contract. More importantly, the agents will rationally anticipate any renegotiation and this will change the equilibrium strategies of the mechanism itself.
According to proposition 3-2, we demonstrate that the direct-revelation mechanism with Rubinsteinian bargaining game induced buyer and seller both announcing honestly but the R&D investment offered by agents were lower than the first best.
To avoid the effect generated by renegotiation, some economists argued that the contract in which either buyer or seller has all the ex post bargaining power can induce efficient investment, and thus can implement the first best. This argument contrasts to Aghion and Tirole(1986), for they argued that whether the buyer or the seller should own the innovation hinged on the marginal efficiency of the buyer’s investment compared with that of the seller’s effort. Hence, we accept the property rights concepts proposed by Barzel(1989) and show that the agents can actually raise their payoff by using a mechanism in which performs the function analogous to the real option.

目 錄

第壹章 緒 論
第一節 研究緣起 1
第二節 主要問題 4
第三節 過去相關之研究 5
第四節 研究目的 8
第五節 研究方法與概念架構 9
第六節 章節安排 12
第貳章 不完全研發合作契約之序貫機制 13
第一節 前言 10
第二節 基本模型 17
第三節 雙方允諾不再協商下之序貫機制 21
第四節 討論 27
第參章 雙方允諾事後再協商之機制設計 30
第一節 前言 30
第二節 基本模型 32
第三節 討論 43
第肆章 研發合作契約之產權結構與事前投資誘因 47
第一節 前言 47
第二節 基本模型 51
第三節 研發投資產權均衡結構與事前投資誘因 55
第四節 討論 63
第伍章 結論 66
第一節 研究發現 66
第二節 研究限制與未來研究方向 71
參考文獻 73

圖 表 目 錄

圖二之一 研發合作契約的時程 19
圖二之二 類型揭露的簡單序貫機制 20
圖二之三 包含序貫機制的研發合作契約 21
圖二之四 狀態下之序貫決策過程 23
圖二之五 買方面對不同類型賣方之分離均衡 24
圖二之六 買方面對不同類型賣方之混合均衡 28
圖三之一 包含顯示機制與再協商的研發合作契約 38
圖三之二 狀態下研發合作剩餘之柏拉圖效率邊界 39
圖四之一 時 面積之比較 60
圖四之二 時 面積之比較 61
圖四之三 時 面積之比較 62

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