管理會計文獻於預算寬列的研究結果有兩方面異於理論預期。首先，誘導寬列（slack-inducing）報償方案理論上受測者最大的報酬來自設定預算等於零，但是研究結果發現不管風險中立者或風險逃避者，受測者設定的平均預算寬列值都超過零（Waller, 1988; Chow, Cooper, and Waller, 1988; Chow, Cooper, and Haddad, 1991）。其次，理論上誘導實情（truth-inducing）報償方案下，受測者最大的報酬來自所設定的預算績效等於最佳預測績效，亦即沒有預算寬列，但是實驗結果仍無法完全消除預算寬列（Chow, Cooper, and Haddad, 1991）。上述研究結果的可能原因，有的研究者認為非經濟因素，例如個人的誠實和善惡觀念（personal integrity and conscience），或社會壓力為可能的影響因素（Chow, Cooper, and Waller, 1988）。另外，就研究方法而論，可能因為單期的實驗工作，無法提供受測者足夠的學習經驗（Chow, Cooper, and Haddad, 1991），或受測者間及受測者與實驗者間的互動所產生的社會壓力，所造成的測量誤差影響理論預期。
本研究在上述有關參與式預算制度研究脈絡下，探討報償方案、社會壓力、內在規範和組織承諾對預算寬列的影響，具體言之，以實驗室實驗的方法，研究由上司而來的社會壓力，組織制度中誘導實情報償方案，部屬個人內在控制的特性及其對組織承諾的程度，對部屬設定較低於預期績效的預算之影響。
實驗操作上受測者預算目標的設定是在兩個社會壓力的實驗水準下，配合以三種報償方案之一來實施。報償方案以誘導實情報償方案、固定報酬加紅利（fixed-pay-plus-bonus）報償方案，和棘輪（ratchet）存在下的固定報酬加紅利報償方案三種水準來區分，而社會壓力以上司有或無部屬的預算目標績效和實際績效的資訊二種水準來區分，內在控制及組織承諾則以問卷衡量。
實驗工作在以程式化的人機互動電腦螢幕裡進行，採多期匿名方式妥慎控制社會壓力，對於無社會壓力組則以電腦程序創造受測者間匿名和實驗者與受測者間匿名的情境，排除可能的社會壓力，以探討內在規範和組織承諾對預算寬列的影響。
本研究以高雄某一製造業公司的120位生產單位主管為樣本，驗證下述假設：（1）三種報償方案中所產生預算寬列量，以誘導實情報償方案最少，棘輪存在下的固定報酬加紅利報償方案次之，固定報酬加紅利報償方案最多，（2）隨著社會壓力之增加，預算寬列量亦隨之降低，（3）隨著社會壓力之增加，在誘導實情報償方案和在固定報酬加紅利報償方案時所產生的預算寬列差異量將會降低，亦即社會壓力和報償方案對預算寬列存在有交互作用效果，（4）在沒有社會壓力的情況下，個人的內在規範強度和預算寬列量呈負相關，（5）在沒有社會壓力的情況下，隨著組織承諾之增加，預算寬列量亦隨之降低。實驗結果除了部分證實第（1）項假設外，其餘假設均獲得證實。
本研究的貢獻在於探討影響預算寬列的因素，除了延續管理會計文獻中考慮制度面的報償方案外，並進一步探討組織中因上司控管所衍生的社會壓力，及部屬個人的內在規範和組織承諾對預算寬列的可能影響。尤其，區隔出社會壓力與內在規範對預算寬列的影響範疇，對企業之人事招募與管理風格頗具意涵。

Two significant differences were found between theoretical expectation and empirical results to budgetary slack in managerial accounting study. First, subjects under the slack-inducing pay schemes set their budgets well above zero regardless of their risk-neutral or risk-averse characteristics, although their maximum rewards arise from setting their budgets at zero (Waller, 1988; Chow, Cooper, and Waller, 1988; Chow, Cooper, and Haddad, 1991). Second, theoretically subjects operating under truth-inducing pay schemes set budgets at their best estimate performance, that is, no budgetary slack. But in violation of traditional economic theory, truth-inducing pay schemes have not been found to drive all slack out of the budget (Chow, Cooper, and Haddad, 1991). These results suggest that the existence of other non-pecuniary factors impacting slack, such as personal integrity and conscience, or social pressure (Chow, Cooper, and Waller, 1988). Moreover, the other potential causes in methodology may affect the congruence with theoretical expectation: (1) single-period experimental setting may limit the subjects’ learning effect (Chow, Cooper, and Haddad, 1991), or (2) social pressure that was not controlled between subjects results in measurement errors.
This study investigates the impacts of pay scheme, social pressure, internal norm and organizational commitment on budgetary slack in the participative budgeting setting. Specifically, this research executes an experimental test of the effects of a truth-inducing pay scheme, superior-generated social pressure, and subordinates’ intern norm and their organizational commitment on the propensity to set their budgets below expected performance.
In the experimental setting budgets were participatively set under three kinds of pay scheme and under the condition of either existence of social pressure or no social pressure. Pay schemes are categorized by three factors: truth-inducing pay scheme, fixed-pay-plus-bonus pay scheme, and fixed-pay-plus-bonus pay scheme with ratchet. The social pressure manipulation involved having subordinates either personally submit their budgets and performance to a superior, or enter their budgets into a computer with no personal interaction. Moreover, internal norm and organizational commitment are measured by questionnaires built in the personal computer.
The experiment was conducted by computerizing the multi-period task on the screen of man-machine interactive personal computer. To eliminate the potential social pressure, subjects in the group with no social pressure executed the computerized procedure to create a ”doubled-blinded” environment where there was inter-participant anonymity (anonymity between subjects) and experimenter-participant anonymity (anonymity between experimenter and subjects), hence the effects of internal norm and organizational commitment on budgetary slack were investigated.
This study tested the following hypotheses with 120 production unit managers that sampled from one manufacturing company in Kaohsiung. (1) Managers will build the least slack into their budget under a truth-inducing pay scheme, the second slack under a fixed-pay-plus-bonus pay scheme with ratchet, and the most slack under a fixed-pay-plus-bonus pay scheme. (2) Managers will build less slack into their budget as social pressure from superior is increased. (3) The difference in budgetary slack between the truth-inducing pay scheme and fixed-pay-plus-bonus pay scheme with ratchet will be reduced as social pressure from superior is increased. That is, there is an interaction between pay scheme and social pressure. (4) The level of slack built into the budget will be negatively correlated with the managers’ degree of internal norm in condition of no social pressure. (5) The level of slack built into the budget will be negatively correlated with the managers’ degree of organizational commitment in condition of no social pressure. The test result verified the mentioned-above hypotheses except item (1) that is partially supported.
This study not only extends the management accounting literature that investigates the effects of pay schemes, but also further examines the potential effects of social pressure from superior, subordinates’ internal norm and organizational commitment on budgetary slack. Especially, the results that isolated the effects of internal norm from social pressure on budgetary slack have shown the implications of personnel recruitment and managerial style in the enterprises organization.

第一章 緒論 1

第二章 文獻探討與假設建立 7 第一節 相關變數定義 7
第二節 預算寬列的影響因素 15
第三節 報償方案與預算寬列的關係 60
第四節 社會壓力與預算寬列的關係 66
第五節 報償方案和社會壓力對預算寬列的交互作用 70
第六節 內在規範對預算寬列的影響 72
第七節 組織承諾與預算寬列的關係 75

第三章 研究方法 77
第一節 實驗環境 77
第二節 自變數操作性定義 80
第三節 實驗程序 87
第四節 實驗架構 91
第五節 資料分析方法 93

第四章 資料分析與結果 95
第一節 變數操作結果及其統計量 95
第二節 假設檢定 110
第三節 進一步分析與比較 121

第五章 結論 124

參考文獻 130

附錄1 預算寬列的量表 140
附錄2 實驗程序摘要 141
附錄3 預算及實際解出題數紀錄表 143
附錄4 實驗工作電腦畫面 144

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